Apple currently does not support critical name constraints based on testing in US Federal PKI.
Kenneth Myers Protiviti | Government Solutions | Manager Alexandria | +1 571-366-6120<tel:+1%20571-366-6120> | [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Connect: LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/kennethmy> | Thought Leadership: Protiviti.com<http://www.protiviti.it/en-US/Pages/Insights.aspx> On Jan 9, 2017, at 12:43, Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: More likely I’ll ask the WFA change their name constraints to “Required”. Their rationale against name constraints was the same as the CAB Forum – that Apple didn’t support it at the time. From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Rich Smith via Public Sent: Monday, January 9, 2017 10:40 AM To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Cc: Rich Smith <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Proposed Ballot 183 - Allowing 822 Names and (limited) otherNames - HS2.0 Intermediate Certificates again don’t follow CABF BR for the NameConstraints extension; HS2.0 states that this extension shall not be critical, when CABF BR states that it SHOULD be critical; please keep in mind that RFC5280 says it MUST be critical, CABF has reduced this requirement to a SHOULD to accommodate Apple devices; now that recent versions of MacOS and iOS support the NC extension, is it really a good sign to lower again the requirements on this extension? [JR] This is complaint with the current BRs. It doesn’t lower the requirements on the extension as no change to the BRs is required for the root to issue publicly trusted certs. No, it doesn't lower the requirement, but it does give Digicert incentive to argue against increasing the requirement when the time comes to do so. If memory serves our intent when we made the decision to make the criticality of name constraints a SHOULD rather than a MUST, thereby bucking the RFC5280 requirement, we did so both reluctantly, and with the intent that we would update this to a MUST as soon as it was feasible to do so w/out adversely affecting a massive number of relying parties. I think the discrepancy in policies here is far more serious than you are allowing for, and lends credence to Ryan's arguments against this proposal. Scenario: We ignore this and Ryan's arguments against, and we pass this proposal. Next month we decide that the various browsers all now have enough support for critical name constraints to update the BRs to MUST, but because it will break your newly authorized dual-use certs Digicert is now arguing against bringing the BRs back into full compliance w/RFC5280. -Rich On 1/4/2017 11:44 AM, Jeremy Rowley via Public wrote: Thanks Erwann for looking at this. - Hotspot 2.0 Root Certificates don’t follow CABF BR in the subject field; HS2.0 require « C=US, O=WFA Hotspot 2.0, CN=Hotspot 2.0 Trust Root CA - <ID#> », where CABF BR clause 7.1.2.1 has different expectations on C and O [JR] I disagree. C the O both accurately represent the CA in this case (the WFA). Although DigiCert operates a root on behalf of the WFA, I believe the CA in this case is the WFA. - HS2.0 Intermediate Certificates again don’t follow CABF BR for the NameConstraints extension; HS2.0 states that this extension shall not be critical, when CABF BR states that it SHOULD be critical; please keep in mind that RFC5280 says it MUST be critical, CABF has reduced this requirement to a SHOULD to accommodate Apple devices; now that recent versions of MacOS and iOS support the NC extension, is it really a good sign to lower again the requirements on this extension? [JR] This is complaint with the current BRs. It doesn’t lower the requirements on the extension as no change to the BRs is required for the root to issue publicly trusted certs. - HS2.0 Intermediate Certificates let the CRLDP extension to be optional, when it’s mandatory for CABF BR [JR] This is not inconsistent. Anyone wanting to issue publicly trusted Hotspot certs would be required to have a CRLDP extension in the intermediate. - there has been some effort to standardize the SRVName name form (RFC4985), with (incomplete) Name Constraints matching rules. I don’t see any comparable effort for this hotspot-friendlyName name form. Since technically-constrained CAs is a preferred model for enterprises (and browsers), I think it’s preferable to describe the expected behaviour of a relying party facing such combinations before blindly allowing them, even more with the « shall not be critical » describe above, which will surely transform someday into a « I won’t implement it, it’s not critical anyway » and will bite us in the future. [JR] I4985 has been around since 2007. The WFA friendly name has only existed since 2015. I can bring up technically constrained Sub CAs with the WFA (they’d be open to it), but I do not think the lack of a standardized version of technical constraints creates an inconsistency between the BRs and the WFA CP. Until name constraints are fully defined for friendly names, the cert would never qualify as technically constrained, meaning an audit would be required for each publicly trusted intermediate, etc. The only change in the BRs I’m asking for is to permit WFA otherNames. As browsers don’t currently use the otherName, they won’t be affected by the modification, especially the certs themselves would be completely compliant with the BR requirements. Jeremy Le 3 janv. 2017 à 22:07, Jeremy Rowley via Public <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : Agreed, but this line of reasoning always leads to simply not supporting third party projects because the projects may cause issues with the CAB Forum update. IMO, if a group wants to use publicly trusted certs, then that group inherits all the baggage that goes with it. We really control all the cards on this one as the interoperability is one-way. What would you propose to make sure we can update requirements in the future? A statement like “CAB Forum can do whatever it wants without notice” is superfluous as this is already the case. Jeremy From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, January 3, 2017 1:54 PM To: Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Peter Bowen <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Proposed Ballot 183 - Allowing 822 Names and (limited) otherNames On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 12:46 PM, Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: There is a public file (in the link I provided), but it requires filling out information to access. It’s the HotSpot 2.0 Technical documentation, which includes the Certificate Policy (“Hostspot 2-0 (R2) OSU Certificate Policy Specification”). The documentation is already free to anyone who wants to enter information and agree to the terms of use. Ah, the many meanings of free ;) I suppose it wasn't clear that I was talking more about freedom than beer there :) We essentially already have a liaison member from the WFA (DigiCert, Microsoft, Apple, and Google are all members). I wouldn't put Google in that list - none of Google's CA/B Forum participants participate in HotSpot 2.0 nor communicate developments on either side of that profile to the other party. I would suggest, to date, only DigiCert does, and only to the extent you've shared anything to the Forum. Obviously, the context was that we shouldn't be introducing this to the Web PKI unless we're sure we're not going to repeat all the same mistakes we're currently going through the SHA-1 exception process - or at least trying to learn from them. It would be foolish to ignore the feedback we've received from those affected by SHA-1 when considering expanding that scope. _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public NOTICE: Protiviti is a global consulting and internal audit firm composed of experts specializing in risk and advisory services. Protiviti is not licensed or registered as a public accounting firm and does not issue opinions on financial statements or offer attestation services. 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