GDCA votes “NO”, and our reasons are as follows:
1. Despite that the reduction in the validity period of certificates seems to
be reasonable and irresistible in the long run, we hold the view that a 27
months validity period at the current stage is reasonable.
2. A one year implementation period will be better for CAs, resellers and
enterprise customers to get ready for the change.
Thanks.
原始邮件
发件人:张翼 via [email protected]
收件人:'CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List'[email protected]
抄送:张翼[email protected]; [email protected]; '赵烨昕'[email protected];
'牛帅'[email protected]
发送时间:2017年2月22日(周三) 10:30
主题:[cabfpub] Reply: Ballot 185 (Revised) - Limiting the Lifetime ofCertificates
CFCA votes “NO” on Ballot 185
For the Lifetime of Certificates:
We agree that in the long run, reduce lifetime of Certificates is reasonable.
We also believe that the EV standard right now (Max 27Months / 2 years) is
enough for security. And as Robin says “Usable security”.
In other word, we do not find it critical to change OV(39 months limit) and EV
(27months limit) all to 398 days.
In our point of view, limit all end-certificate’s Lifetime to 27months(The
highest standard right now) is a more reasonable choice.
For the Effective Date:
For this kinds of change and limitation, 1 year or more time is needed for both
CA and their customer, please consider the period that changing 60 months to
39/27months.
For Google’s statement:
Given that should the Baseline Requirements fail to show consensus, the
next step will be to require these changes as part of a browser program –
both as to considering a certificate trusted and to considering a certificate
misissued - in order to ensure security needs are met. As such, it would
helpful that those voting NO provide concrete and actionable reasons as
to the concerns, so as to inform what conditions that the CA might
consider it acceptable. Failure to articulate concerns simply means that
such concerns cannot be given any consideration before taking action.
Well, “next step will be to require these changes as part of a browser program”
Personally when I read this paragraph ,King Robert Baratheon is in my head ”I'm
the king, I get what I want”
We respect Google’s effort on security, such as CT, we understand that Google
controls Android trusted store and Chrome and Google is the Pioneer in field of
Security.
But please do consider the opinions and concerns from CA and their customer.
I kindly suggest that we discuss this on the upcoming CAB forum F2F meeting 40
and do not be hurry to make hard decision .
A natural consequence of this is that you see Root Store members already –
and have always had - requirements that go above and beyond what the Baseline
Requirements require. You can see this very evidently through the policies of
both
Microsoft ( https://aka.ms/rootcert ) and
Mozilla
(https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/
)
For the fact the trust store may add more restriction to BR,
Most time it’s BR request “A” we also need you to do “B”,
not “A” is not good, so forget about BR, we request “B”
Regards.
Zhang Yi
CFCA
发件人: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] 代表 Robin
Alden via Public
发送时间: 2017年2月18日 1:32
收件人: 'CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List'
抄送: Robin Alden
主题: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 185 (Revised) - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates
Comodo votes "NO".
Given that should the Baseline Requirements fail to show consensus, the
next step will be to require these changes as part of a browser program –
both as to considering a certificate trusted and to considering a certificate
misissued - in order to ensure security needs are met. As such, it would
helpful that those voting NO provide concrete and actionable reasons as
to the concerns, so as to inform what conditions that the CA might
consider it acceptable. Failure to articulate concerns simply means that
such concerns cannot be given any consideration before taking action.
Google are going to impose a 398-day maximum validity period in Chrome
regardless of the outcome of this vote, right?
We are committed to security. Usable security. We represent many
certificate holders who do not yet have sufficient technical expertise,
manpower and/or automation to be able to cope with this proposed
reduction in the maximum validity period.
Carefully consider the commitment to usability of any browser which votes Yes!
Regards
Robin Alden
Comodo
From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via
Public
Sent: 13 February 2017 19:18
To: CABFPub [email protected]
Cc: Ryan Sleevi [email protected]
Subject: [cabfpub] Ballot 185 (Revised) - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates
Pursuant to the consensus
onhttps://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-February/009530.html about the
nature of changes during the discussion period, and the request from Gervase
onhttps://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-February/009618.html to adjust
what represents the Baseline agreement, this adjusts the effective date from 1
April to 24 August. While individual programs may choose to enact or enforce
requirements prior to that, as the Baseline Requirements capture the effective
point of common agreement of the bare minimum security levels, it seems
appropriate that this Ballot accurately reflect that.
Ballot 185 - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates
The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Sleevi of Google, Inc and
endorsed by Josh Aas of ISRG and Gervase Markham of Mozilla to introduce new
Final Maintenance Guidelines for the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy
for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" and the
"Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates"
-- MOTION BEGINS --
Modify Section 6.3.2 of the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the
Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" as follows:
Replace Section 6.3.2, which reads as follows:
"""
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods
Subscriber Certificates issued after the Effective Date MUST have a Validity
Period no greater than 60 months.
Except as provided for below, Subscriber Certificates issued after 1 April 2015
MUST have a Validity Period
no greater than 39 months.
Until 30 June 2016, CAs MAY continue to issue Subscriber Certificates with a
Validity Period greater than 39
months but not greater than 60 months provided that the CA documents that the
Certificate is for a system or
software that:
(a) was in use prior to the Effective Date;
(b) is currently in use by either the Applicant or a substantial number of
Relying Parties;
(c) fails to operate if the Validity Period is shorter than 60 months;
(d) does not contain known security risks to Relying Parties; and
(e) is difficult to patch or replace without substantial economic outlay
"""
with the following text:
"""
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods
Subscriber Certificates issued on or after 24 August 2017 MUST NOT have a
Validity Period greater than three hundred and ninety-eight (398) days.
Subscriber Certificates issued prior to 24 August 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity
Period greater than thirty-nine (39) months.
"""
Modify Section 9.4 of the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of
Extended Validation Certificates" as follows:
Replace Section 9.4, which reads as follows:
"""
9.4. Maximum Validity Period For EV Certificate
The validity period for an EV Certificate SHALL NOT exceed twenty seven months.
It is RECOMMENDED that EV
Subscriber Certificates have a maximum validity period of twelve months.
"""
with the following text:
""""
9.4 Maximum Validity Period for EV Certificate
EV Certificates issued on or after 24 August2017 MUST NOT have a Validity
Period greater than three hundred and ninety-eight (398) days.
EV Certificates issued prior to 24 August2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period
greater than twenty seven (27) months.
"""
-- MOTION ENDS --
Ballot 185 - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates
Status: Final Maintenance Guideline
Review Period:
Start Time: 2017-02-10 00:00:00 UTC
End Time: 2017-02-17 00:00:00 UTC
Vote for Approval:
Start Time: 2017-02-17 00:00:00 UTC
End Time: 2017-02-24 00:00:00 UTC
Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread on the Public
Mail List.
A vote in favor of the ballot must indicate a clear 'yes' in the response. A
vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to abstain must
indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses will not be
counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting Member
before the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting Members are
listed here: https://cabforum.org/members/
In order for the ballot to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast by
Members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by members in
the browser category must be in favor.
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