Cisco votes YES.

 

 

-- 

Jos Purvis ([email protected])

.:|:.:|:. cisco systems | Cryptographic Services

PGP: 0xFD802FEE07D19105  | +1 919.991.9114 (desk)

 

On 2017-Feb-22, 16:34, "Public on behalf of Gervase Markham via Public" 
<[email protected] on behalf of [email protected]> wrote:

 

Hi everyone,

This ballot is now entering its seven-day discussion period. My sincere thanks 
to everyone who helped shape the text into what it is today.

Changes from draft 3:

* 1 hour changed to 8 hours as minimum caching time, to make manual issuance 
easier.

* Added text from Ryan, at Doug's suggestion, of exactly which properties need 
to be supported.

* Marked Jeremy and Ryan as endorsers (assuming they don't object to the above 
changes).

Gerv

Ballot 187 - Make CAA Checking Mandatory

The following motion has been proposed by Gervase Markham of Mozilla and 
endorsed by Jeremy Rowley of DigiCert and Ryan Sleevi of Google: 

Statement of Intent 

Certificate Authority Authorization (CAA) is a DNS Resource Record defined in 
RFC 6844 - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6844/ , published in January 
2013. It allows a DNS domain name holder to specify one or more Certification 
Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain and, by 
implication, that no other CAs are authorized.

The intent of this motion is to make it mandatory for CAs to check CAA records 
at issuance time for all certificates issued (except in a few special cases), 
and to prevent issuance if a CAA record is found which does not permit issuance 
by that CA. This therefore allows domain owners to set an issuance policy which 
will be respected by all publicly-trusted CAs, and allows them to mitigate the 
problem that the public CA trust system is only as strong as its weakest CA.

Note that CAA is already a defined term in the BRs and so does not need 
definitional text to be provided by this motion. 

-- MOTION BEGINS -- 

Add the following text as a new section 3.2.2.8 (titled "CAA Records") of the 
Baseline Requirements:

This section is effective as of 8 September 2017.

As part of the issuance process, the CA must check for a CAA record for each 
dNSName in the subjectAltName extension of the certificate to be issued, 
according to the procedure in RFC 6844, following the processing instructions 
set down in RFC 6844 for any records found. If the CA issues, they must do so 
within the TTL of the CAA record, or 8 hours, whichever is greater.

This stipulation does not prevent the CA from checking CAA records at any other 
time.

When processing CAA records, CAs MUST process the issue, issuewild, and iodef 
property tags as specified in RFC 6844. Additional property tags MAY be 
supported, but MUST NOT conflict with or supersede the mandatory property tags 
set out in this document. CAs MUST respect the critical flag and reject any 
unrecognized properties with this flag set.


RFC 6844 requires that CAs "MUST NOT issue a certificate unless either (1) the 
certificate request is consistent with the applicable CAA Resource Record set 
or (2) an exception specified in the relevant Certificate Policy or 
Certification Practices Statement applies." For issuances conforming to these 
Baseline Requirements, CAs MUST NOT rely on any exceptions specified in their 
CP or CPS unless they are one of the following:
CAA checking is optional for certificates for which a Certificate Transparency 
pre-certificate was created and logged in at least two public logs, and for 
which CAA was checked. 
CAA checking is optional for certificates issued by an Technically Constrained 
Subordinate CA Certificate as set out in Baseline Requirements section 7.1.5, 
where the lack of CAA checking is an explicit contractual provision in the 
contract with the Applicant. 
CAA checking is optional if the domain's DNS is operated by the CA or an 
Affiliate of the CA. 
CAs are permitted to treat a record lookup failure as permission to issue if:
the failure is outside the CA's infrastructure; 
the lookup has been retried at least once; and 
the domain's zone does not have a DNSSEC validation chain to the ICANN root. 
CAs MUST document potential issuances that were prevented by a CAA record in 
sufficient detail to provide feedback to the CAB Forum on the circumstances, 
and SHOULD dispatch reports of such issuance requests to the contact(s) 
stipulated in the CAA iodef record(s), if present. CAs are not expected to 
support URL schemes in the iodef record other than mailto: or https:.

Update section 2.2 ("Publication of Information") of the Baseline Requirements, 
to remove the following text:
    Effective as of 15 April 2015, section 4.2 of a CA's Certificate Policy 
and/or Certification 
    Practice Statement (section 4.1 for CAs still conforming to RFC 2527) SHALL 
state whether 
    the CA reviews CAA Records, and if so, the CA’s policy or practice on 
processing CAA Records 
    for Fully Qualified Domain Names. The CA SHALL log all actions taken, if 
any, consistent with 
    its processing practice.  
and replace it with: 
    Effective as of 8 September 2017, section 4.2 of a CA's Certificate Policy 
and/or Certification 
    Practice Statement (section 4.1 for CAs still conforming to RFC 2527) SHALL 
state the CA’s policy or 
    practice on processing CAA Records for Fully Qualified Domain Names; that 
policy shall be consistent
    with these Requirements. It shall clearly specify the set of Issuer Domain 
Names that the CA
    recognises in CAA "issue" or "issuewild" records as permitting it to issue. 
The CA SHALL log all actions 
    taken, if any, consistent with its processing practice.  
 
Add the following text to the appropriate place in section 1.6.3 ("References"):
RFC6844, Request for Comments: 6844, DNS Certification Authority Authorization 
(CAA) Resource Record, Hallam-Baker, Stradling, January 2013. 

-- MOTION ENDS -- 


The procedure for approval of this Final Maintenance Guideline ballot is as 
follows:

 

BALLOT 187Status: Maintenance GuidelineStart time (22:00 UTC)End time (22:00 
UTC)
Discussion (7 to 14 calendar days)2017-02-22

2017-03-01

Vote for approval (7 calendar days)2017-03-01

2017-03-08
If vote approves ballot: Review Period (Chair to send Review Notice) (30 
calendar days).  If Exclusion Notice(s) filed, ballot approval is rescinded and 
PAG to be created.If no Exclusion Notices filed, ballot becomes effective at 
end of Review Period.Upon filing of Review Notice by Chair30 days after filing 
of Review Notice by Chair

 

>From Section 2.3 of the Bylaws: If the Draft Guideline Ballot is proposing a 
>Final Maintenance Guideline, such ballot will include a redline or comparison 
>showing the set of changes from the Final Guideline section(s) intended to 
>become a Final Maintenance Guideline, and need not include a copy of the full 
>set of guidelines.  Such redline or comparison shall be made against the Final 
>Guideline section(s) as they exist at the time a ballot is proposed, and need 
>not take into consideration other ballots that may be proposed subsequently, 
>except as provided in Section 2.3(j) of the Bylaws.

 

Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread on the Public 
Mail List.  A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear “yes” in the 
response. A vote against must indicate a clear “no” in the response. A vote to 
abstain must indicate a clear “abstain” in the response. Unclear responses will 
not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting 
member before the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting members 
are listed here: https://cabforum.org/members/ 

In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds (2/3) or more of the votes 
cast by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by 
members in the browser category must vote “yes”.  Quorum is shown on CA/Browser 
Forum wiki.  Under Section 2.2(g) of the Bylaws, at least the required quorum 
number of voting members must participate in the ballot for the ballot to be 
valid, either by voting in favor, voting against, or abstaining.

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