On April 22, nearly one third of the authentication databases of all 
certificate authorities is invalidated. All data currently held from work done 
between 825 days and 39 months ago is wiped from use when it could have been 
consumed until March 1 if 193 was written as Chris seems to have intended.

 

That data could inform and partially automate issuance of new 3 month 
certificates today under pre-193 rules. That data could also support 
replacement of an existing certificate initially issued with three year life 
that a site operator wishes to replace with additional SANs that are all within 
previously validated Authorization Domain Name and Organization data pairs. 
Once 193 kicks in, we must revalidate replacements of existing 3 year 
certificates within the last year of their life unless validation was refreshed 
due to the issuance of a different certificate with the same Org and ADNs.

 

Some CAs auto-issue such replacements if they do not cause need for new human 
effort. Now, customers will queue for full revalidation during the life of an 
existing “certificate” which is what the customer perceives as what they 
bought: a three year license to have a thing with my names in it, no matter how 
many FQDNs I have within the domains I own. That logical certificate may exist 
as a dozen or more physical certificates with more or less names over the life 
of the license.

 

All enterprise RAs in technically constrained account relationships that have 
not had their org/ADN pairs revalidated within 825 days must be revalidated 
before April 22 or else on that day they must be blocked from access to at 
least some of the domains authorized in their accounts by >825 day validation 
records.

 

Due to the way we handled ballot 169, we are not fully impacted by this. For 
example, we revalidated all our enterprise RA authentication data last quarter 
constrained by the intent of ballot 169.

 

From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via 
Public
Sent: Monday, April 03, 2017 7:13 AM
To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]>
Cc: Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXT] Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 194 – Effective Date of Ballot 193 
Provisions

 

Hi Chris,

 

With the current Bylaws, it's not possible to retroactively correct this issue. 
The Ballot will come into effect and all CAs must ensure that any new 
certificates issued between that time and (should this ballot be passed) that 
new time are validated with information less than two years. At present, this 
would be April 22, 2016 to May 16, 2017.

 

Perhaps it was unintentional - and this highlights the challenge in rushing a 
ballot forward, especially with a path for further productive discussion was 
given in the conclusion of Ballot 185 - but it remains that CAs must comply 
with the current Baseline Requirements, and a future version can't really 
'retroactively' correct that.

 

Can you explain to me what the problems are with the current approach? Why is 
it 'not' just a matter of ensuring the information has been reviewed within the 
past 2 years, much as CAs already review it in the past 3 years? What 
meaningfully changes in this equation? Even with a phase in (of a year), there 
will still be a significant population of users with 'stale' validity 
information. Unless you plan to revalidate all of those users within the next 
year, independent of issuing a certificate - a plan I would be shocked to hear 
being proposed - then it seems that regardless of the date of enforcement, 
there will be a rolling population of users who need to be revalidated. Why 
should we punt that a year, given that the ballot as originally proposed 
meaningfully improves security and this (new) ballot harms it?

 

On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 4:26 PM, Chris Bailey via Public <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

Ballot 194 – Effective Date of Ballot 193 Provisions

 

Purpose of Ballot: Recent Ballot 193 reduced the maximum period for 
certificates and for reuse of vetting data for DV and OV certificates from 39 
months to 825 days.  The effective date for reducing the maximum validity 
period of certificates was specified as March 1, 2018, but no effective date 
was specified for when the reduction of the maximum period for reuse of vetting 
data becomes effective.

 

It was the intention of the authors of Ballot 193 that the effective date for 
reducing the maximum period for reuse of vetting data under BR 4.2.1 would also 
be March 1, 2018.  This ballot is intended to clarify that intention.  The 
ballot also makes these changes retroactive to the effective date of Ballot 193 
so there is no gap period.

 

Ballot 193 is in the Review Period (which will end on April 22, 2017), and has 
not yet taken effect.  Bylaw 2.3 states that Ballots should include a “redline 
or comparison showing the set of changes from the Final Guideline section(s) 
intended to become a Final Maintenance Guideline” and that “[s]uch redline or 
comparison shall be made against the Final Guideline section(s) as they exist 
at the time a ballot is proposed”.

 

To avoid confusion, this Ballot will show the proposed changes to BR 4.2.1 will 
be presented two ways: (1) a comparison of the changes to BR 4.2.1 as it 
existed before Ballot 193 (which is as BR 4.2.1 exists at this time this ballot 
is proposed), and also (2) a comparison of the changes to BR 4.2.1 as it will 
exist after the Review Period for Ballot 193 is completed (assuming no 
Exclusion Notices are filed).

 

The following motion has been proposed by Chris Bailey of Entrust Datacard and 
endorsed by Ben Wilson of DigiCert, and Wayne Thayer of GoDaddy to introduce 
new Final Maintenance Guidelines for the "Baseline Requirements Certificate 
Policy for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" 
(Baseline Requirements) and the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of 
Extended Validation Certificates" (EV Guidelines).

 

-- MOTION BEGINS -- 

 

Ballot Section 1

 

BR 4.2.1 is amended to read as follows:

 

[Ballot amendments shown against BR 4.2.1 as it currently exists without the 
changes adopted in Ballot 193]

 

BR 4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

 

The certificate request MAY include all factual information about the Applicant 
to be included in the Certificate, and such additional information as is 
necessary for the CA to obtain from the Applicant in order to comply with these 
Requirements and the CA’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice 
Statement. In cases where the certificate request does not contain all the 
necessary information about the Applicant, the CA SHALL obtain the remaining 
information from the Applicant or, having obtained it from a reliable, 
independent, third‐party data source, confirm it with the Applicant. The CA 
SHALL establish and follow a documented procedure for verifying all data 
requested for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant.

 

Applicant information MUST include, but not be limited to, at least one 
Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or IP address to be included in the Certificate’s 
SubjectAltName extension.

 

Section 6.3.2 limits the validity period of Subscriber Certificates. The CA MAY 
use the documents and data provided in Section 3.2 to verify certificate 
information, provided that: the CA obtained the data or document from a source 
specified under Section 3.2 no more than thirty‐nine (39) months prior to 
issuing the Certificate.

 

(1) Prior to March 1, 2018, the CA obtained the data or document from a source 
specified under Section 3.2 no more than 39 months prior to issuing the 
Certificate; and

 

(2) On or after March 1, 2018, the CA obtained the data or document from a 
source specified under Section 3.2 no more than 825 days prior to issuing the 
Certificate. 

 

The CA SHALL develop, maintain, and implement documented procedures that 
identify and require additional verification activity for High Risk Certificate 
Requests prior to the Certificate’s approval, as reasonably necessary to ensure 
that such requests are properly verified under these Requirements.

 

If a Delegated Third Party fulfills any of the CA’s obligations under this 
section, the CA SHALL verify that the process used by the Delegated Third Party 
to identify and further verify High Risk Certificate Requests provides at least 
the same level of assurance as the CA’s own processes.

 

 

[Ballot amendments shown against BR 4.2.1 as it existed after Ballot 193 was 
approved]

 

BR 4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

 

The certificate request MAY include all factual information about the Applicant 
to be included in the Certificate, and such additional information as is 
necessary for the CA to obtain from the Applicant in order to comply with these 
Requirements and the CA’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice 
Statement. In cases where the certificate request does not contain all the 
necessary information about the Applicant, the CA SHALL obtain the remaining 
information from the Applicant or, having obtained it from a reliable, 
independent, third‐party data source, confirm it with the Applicant. The CA 
SHALL establish and follow a documented procedure for verifying all data 
requested for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant.

 

Applicant information MUST include, but not be limited to, at least one 
Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or IP address to be included in the Certificate’s 
SubjectAltName extension.

 

Section 6.3.2 limits the validity period of Subscriber Certificates. The CA MAY 
use the documents and data provided in Section 3.2 to verify certificate 
information, provided that: the CA obtained the data or document from a source 
specified under Section 3.2 no more than 825 days prior to issuing the 
Certificate.

 

(1) Prior to March 1, 2018, the CA obtained the data or document from a source 
specified under Section 3.2 no more than 39 months prior to issuing the 
Certificate; and

 

(2) On or after March 1, 2018, the CA obtained the data or document from a 
source specified under Section 3.2 no more than 825 days prior to issuing the 
Certificate. 

 

The CA SHALL develop, maintain, and implement documented procedures that 
identify and require additional verification activity for High Risk Certificate 
Requests prior to the Certificate’s approval, as reasonably necessary to ensure 
that such requests are properly verified under these Requirements.

 

If a Delegated Third Party fulfills any of the CA’s obligations under this 
section, the CA SHALL verify that the process used by the Delegated Third Party 
to identify and further verify High Risk Certificate Requests provides at least 
the same level of assurance as the CA’s own processes.

 

Ballot Section 2

 

The provisions of Ballot Section 1 will be effective retroactive to the 
effective date of Ballot 193.

 

 

--Motion Ends--

 

The procedure for approval of this Final Maintenance Guideline ballot is as 
follows (exact start and end times may be adjusted to comply with applicable 
Bylaws and IPR Agreement):

 


BALLOT 194

Status: Final Maintenance Guideline

Start time (22:00 UTC)

End time (22:00 UTC)


Discussion (7 to 14 days)

April 2, 2017

April 9, 2017


Vote for approval (7 days)

April 9, 2017

April 16, 2017


If vote approves ballot: Review Period (Chair to send Review Notice) (30 days). 
 

If Exclusion Notice(s) filed, ballot approval is rescinded and PAG to be 
created.

If no Exclusion Notices filed, ballot becomes effective at end of Review Period.

Upon filing of Review Notice by Chair

30 days after filing of Review Notice by Chair

 

>From Bylaw 2.3: If the Draft Guideline Ballot is proposing a Final Maintenance 
>Guideline, such ballot will include a redline or comparison showing the set of 
>changes from the Final Guideline section(s) intended to become a Final 
>Maintenance Guideline, and need not include a copy of the full set of 
>guidelines.  Such redline or comparison shall be made against the Final 
>Guideline section(s) as they exist at the time a ballot is proposed, and need 
>not take into consideration other ballots that may be proposed subsequently, 
>except as provided in Bylaw Section 2.3(j).

 

Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread on the Public 
list.  A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the 
response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to 
abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses will 
not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting 
member before the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting members 
are listed here: https://cabforum.org/members/ 

 

In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast by 
members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by members in 
the browser category must be in favor.  Quorum is shown on CA/Browser Forum 
wiki.  Under Bylaw 2.2(g), at least the required quorum number must participate 
in the ballot for the ballot to be valid, either by voting in favor, voting 
against, or abstaining.

 

 

--                  

Chris Bailey

 


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