Sorry – that was pretty confusing.  I revised the questions in way that I think 
answers most of your question:

1.      If we include the validation WG proposed language in Section 3.2.2.4, 
does that adequately address the concerns with the previous version of ballot 
190?
2.      If there are still concerns, should we drop the reuse language 
altogether? Note that this will require revalidation of all information prior 
to issuance of new certificates if the original validation was not in 
accordance with one of these ten sections.
3.      If we add the language to Section 3.2.2.4, would you vote against the 
ballot because of the document reuse?
4.      If the reuse language proposed was dropped altogether and re-validation 
became required, would you vote against the ballot?
5.      If you’d vote against the ballot, is there some middle ground that we 
can reach? For example, could we say that all previous validation information 
not complaint with the 10 methods must expire 13 months from the date of the 
ballot? Alternatively, everything under section 7 expires immediately while 
documents affected by a modification to 1-6 will remain valid for 825 days? 
Other proposals.

Basically, we’re at an impasse on the ballot, and I’m not sure which way the 
vote would go.

 

A couple of comments:

 

“I think the general language proposal is a bit awkward - I would rather see it 
pegged to an explicit minimum version (for example, BRs 1.4.1) and explicitly 
forbid using a previous "any other method" validation. Is that problematic?”

 

This seems reasonable to me, but I’ll let others chime in.

 

“I think if we're still unable to agree on a timeline such as that - requiring 
revalidation consistent with the current-3.2.2.4 for anything that was 
validated under a previous-3.2.2.4 that is no longer permitted - my only other 
suggestion would be to require an explicit expression within the certificate 
that it complies with the current version of 3.2.2.4 at the time of issuance. 
This would help give Relying Parties the necessary assurances that the CA is 
committed to security.”

 

This seems reasonable to me as well.

 

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