CFCA accept Peter’s suggested solution on ballot 202.
Regards. Zhang Yi China Financial Certification Authority 发件人: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] 代表 zhangyq via Public 发送时间: 2017年8月1日 14:53 收件人: Kirk Hall; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List 主题: [cabfpub] 回复： Ballot 202 and Unicode We confirm that GDCA accept Peter’s sugguested solution on ballot 202. Thanks. Yongqiang ZHANG 原始邮件 发件人: Kirk Hall via Public<[email protected]> 收件人: public<[email protected]> 发送时间: 2017年8月1日(周二) 08:01 主题: [cabfpub] Ballot 202 and Unicode Thanks for your email, Yongqiang. It looks like GDCA can accept Peter Bowen’s suggested solution to this issue – can you please confirm that? Can the representatives of CFCA and SHECA also review Peter’s suggested solution below, and let other Forum members know if you can also accept the suggested solution? If yes, Peter can then add the language changes to a new ballot he is working on to update our BR definitions. Thanks to you all. Kirk Hall From: zhangyq [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2017 4:08 AM To: public <[email protected]> Cc: Kirk Hall <[email protected]>; pzb <[email protected]> Subject: [EXTERNAL]回复：Unicode Hi All, Thanks for the attention and work on our concerns. We are deeply sorry for the fact that we have planned to issue certificates with Chinese Domain Names but not one certificate of this kind has been issued, and this is also why we failed to notice and raise our concerns during the discussion period, apart from that, it took us quite some time during the voting period to discuss these concerns internally, and no consensus was reached until the last day before the voting period ends. We apologize for the inconvenience caused to you. We wish to restate our reasons for voting against Ballot 202 here: 1. From the perspective of certificates localization, most of the Browsers support certificates in local languages; 2. And from the security point of view, there is not a simple and straightforward method or mechanism for the Browser users to verify the consistency between the Domain Names being accessed and Punycode encoded Domain Names, therefore, it is not possible for Browser users to determine that the certificate is issued to the Domain Name being accessed, and this will lead to the distrust from the users; 3. Certificates subscribers may be confused by the Punycode codes in the certificates converted from their Domain Names. Regarding the solutions that we think will address these issues: 1. We agree with Peter’s proposal, and we quote from his comments “I saw Ryan’s response to you and he suggests that "consistent and unambiguous representation” is needed in the common name. Based on testing the 20,055 certificates, it looks like we can have this by allowing a CA to choose to either use all LDH labels in a common name or use only NR-LDH labels and U-labels, where the U-labels are created by converting the A-labels to Unicode. This would give the option of two consistent and unambiguous representations — one in punycode and one in Unicode”. 2. Another solution that we propose is that, for Non-English Domain Names, the CN field of an SSL certificate adopts Unicode, while the combination of Unicode and Punycode applies to each and every Domain Name in the SAN field, to consider both machine recognition and recognition by human reading. Thanks. Yongqiang ZHANG 原始邮件 发件人: Kirk Hall< <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> 收件人: '赵改侠'< <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]>; zhangyq< <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]>; xiongyuanyuan< <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> 抄送: Chris Bailey< <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> 发送时间: 2017年7月27日(周四) 13:30 主题: Unicode Hi, everyone – as you know, Ballot 202 did not pass, but it will come back. See the potential solution that Peter Bowen of Amazon has proposed on your issue. Is this a good idea? Could you live with it in a new ballot? You can ask questions of Peter if you want to… Kirk From: Peter Bowen [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2017 5:05 PM To: Kirk Hall <[email protected]>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]> Subject: [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 202 - Underscore and Wildcard Characters Kirk, In order for any browser to access a website with an Internationalized Domain Name, it must be able to convert Unicode (i.e. non-English language) to LDH-labels (i.e. punycode), as it is LDH labels that are sent to the DNS server. Therefore the situation where a browser can handle Unicode in the address bar but cannot handle punycode in the certificate should not exist. In order to address the concerns raised by CFCA, GDCA, and SHECA, I have spent the last couple of hours processing all the unexpired certificates in CT logs to quantify the impact of the rule proposed in this ballot and look at alternatives. There are currently 385,042 certificates with Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs), including both IDNs where the ccTLD has non-ASCII characters and ones where some other portion of the name has non-ASCII characters. Of these, zero were issued by CFCA, GDCA, or SHECA. So there would be no known impact to these CAs. That being said, there are 20,055 certificates which have Unicode in the common name issued by other CAs. Having Unicode common names is far less prevelant than punycode common names; 364,987 certificates with IDNs do not have Unicode common names. In testing in the browsers which I have on my desktop, I don’t see any difference but it is possible that local browsers may show a difference. Here are two sites to test: https:// <https://xn--6oqy0rkra12v.cn> 会影基地.cn and https:// <https://xn--uisy4s8rz.cn/> 城惠网.cn I saw Ryan’s response to you and he suggests that "consistent and unambiguous representation” is needed in the common name. Based on testing the 20,055 certificates, it looks like we can have this by allowing a CA to choose to either use all LDH labels in a common name or use only NR-LDH labels and U-labels, where the U-labels are created by converting the A-labels to Unicode. This would give the option of two consistent and unambiguous representations — one in punycode and one in Unicode. Adding this option for CAs would all full representation of languages in the common name. Thanks, Peter On Jul 26, 2017, at 9:41 AM, Kirk Hall via Public <[email protected]> wrote: Peter, Ben, and Ryan – do you have a response to the punycode issue raised by CFCA, GDCA, and SHECA? From: Public [ <mailto:[email protected]> mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of ?? via Public Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2017 1:44 AM To: 'CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List' < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> Cc: '赵改侠' < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> Subject: [EXTERNAL][cabfpub] Reply: Ballot 202 - Underscore and Wildcard Characters CFCA votes No we suggest that the punycode shouldn't be applied on SSL certs in this approach. For non-English countries, the domain name may be displayed wrong in some browers in punycode and the governance policy requires that local CA should obey the laws to display local language when ccTLD is used in local language. IF punycode is used and the browsers(Which I mean any browsers including local browsers) couldn't translate it into local language , the website visitors may be confused. Zhang Yi Business Research Competent China Financial Certification Authority Business Department Address: Bldg. 2， #20， 14th Kechuang street, YiZhuang Economic-Technological Development Zone，Daxing District，Beijing , P. R. China Postcode: 100176 TEL: +86 010-58903555 Mobile: +86 18510280028 Email: <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] 发件人: <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] [ <mailto:[email protected]> mailto:[email protected]] 代表 Erwann Abalea via Public 发送时间: 2017年7月26日 2:39 收件人: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List; Ben Wilson 主题: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 202 - Underscore and Wildcard Characters Bonsoir, DocuSign France votes No. While there are good clarifications around domain names, FQDNs, wildcards, and reserved labels, there are a few drawbacks: 1. Underscores in SAN:dNSName entries. It’s not the current BR that disallows underscores in dNSNames, it’s X.509 and RFC5280 (and current DNS specifications), and there is no justification about allowing underscores other than « it’s done by some admins » or « Microsoft allows it ». While domain names can contain anything (even characters such as '[({*$!?" ), dNSName shall contain a host name, and host names shall only be composed of LDH labels. I’d prefer the standards to be changed instead of explicitly allowing deviations from the standard. 2. « Reserved IP address ». The new definition now allows a CA to deliver a certificate for an obviously invalid IP (I doubt anyone could claim « owning » 192.0.0.9 or 192.0.0.10, and I haven’t fully checked the others). 3. « Wildcard Domain Name ». The new definition is not robust enough. An FQDN is a sequence of Domain Labels —which can contain any character—, so « *. <http://domain.com/> domain.com » is a valid FQDN, so « *.*. <http://domain.com/> domain.com » is a valid Wildcard Domain Name according to this definition. Cordialement, Erwann Abalea Le 12 juil. 2017 à 19:24, Ben Wilson via Public < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> a écrit : Ballot 202 - Underscore and Wildcard Characters The current Baseline Requirements do not expressly allow underscore characters in Subject Alternative Names. This ballot seeks to clarify that one or more underscore characters (“_”) are allowed in FQDNs. In many places it also replaces the term "FQDN" with "Domain Name" because "Domain Name" now means either "FQDN" or "Wildcard Domain Name". The ballot clarifies validation of wildcard domain names. It also cleans up some of the language in Sections 3.2.2.4 and 7.1.4.2.1 of the Baseline Requirements. The following motion has been proposed by Ben Wilson of DigiCert and endorsed by Peter Bowen of Amazon and Ryan Sleevi of Google to introduce new Final Maintenance Guidelines for the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" (Baseline Requirements). --Motion Begins-- A. In Sections 1.3.2, 1.6 (Base Domain Name), 2.2, 3.2.2.4, 3.2.2.4.5, 3.2.2.4.6, 3.2.2.4.10, 3.2.2.4.11, 4.2.1, 4.9.1.1.6, and 4.9.11 of the Baseline Requirements, REPLACE the words "Fully Qualified Domain Name" and "FQDN" with "Domain Name". B. In Section 1.6.1 of the Baseline Requirements, REPLACE the definition for "Authorization Domain Name" with the following: The Domain Name used to obtain authorization for certificate issuance for a given Domain Name. The CA may use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the Domain Name for the purposes of domain validation. If the Domain Name is a Wildcard Domain Name, then the CA MUST remove “*.” from the left most portion of requested Domain Name. The CA may prune zero or more labels from left to right until encountering a Base Domain Name and may use any one of the intermediate values for the purpose of domain validation. C. In Section 1.6.1 of the Baseline Requirements, INSERT the following definition: "Domain Label: An individual component of a Domain Name." D. In Section 1.6.1 of the Baseline Requirements, REPLACE the definition for "Domain Name" with the following: A set of one or more Domain Labels, each separated by a single full stop character ("."). E. In Section 1.6.1 of the Baseline Requirements, REPLACE the definition for "Fully-Qualified Domain Name" with the following: A Domain Name that includes the Domain Labels of all superior nodes in the Internet Domain Name System. F. In Section 1.6.1 of the Baseline Requirements, REPLACE the definition for "Reserved IP Address" with the following: An IPv4 or IPv6 address that the IANA has "False" for Globally Reachable in either of the IANA Special-Purpose IP Address Registries: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml> https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml or <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml> https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml G. In Section 1.6.1 of the Baseline Requirements, REPLACE the definition for "Wildcard Certificate" with the following: A Certificate containing a Wildcard Domain Name in any of the Subject Alternative Names in the Certificate. H. In Section 1.6.1 of the Baseline Requirements, INSERT the following definition: "Wildcard Domain Name: A Domain Name consisting of a single asterisk character ("*") followed by a single full stop character (".") followed by a Fully-Qualified Domain Name." I. In Section 2.2 of the Baseline Requirements, INSERT the word "requested" in the fourth sentence between the words "processing CAA records for" and "Domain Names" so that it reads, "processing CAA records for requested Domain Names". J. REPLACE the second paragraph of Section 3.2.2.4 of the Baseline Requirements so that it reads, "The CA SHALL confirm that, as of the date the Certificate issues, the CA has validated each Domain Name listed in the Certificate using at least one of the methods listed below, or is within the Domain Namespace of a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) that has been validated using at least one of the methods listed below (not including the method defined in section 3.2.2.4.8)." K. REPLACE Section 3.2.2.6 of the Baseline Requirements in its entirety with: 3.2.2.6. Additional Validation for Wildcard Certificates Before issuing a Wildcard Certificate, the CA MUST establish and follow a documented procedure[^pubsuffix] that determines if the FQDN portion of any Wildcard Domain Name in the certificate is “registry-controlled” or is a “public suffix” (e.g. “*.com”, “*. <http://co.uk/> co.uk”, see RFC 6454 Section 8.2 for further explanation). If the FQDN portion of any Wildcard Domain Name in the certificate is "registry-controlled" or is a "public suffix", CAs MUST refuse issuance unless the applicant proves its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace. (e.g. CAs MUST NOT issue "*. <http://co.uk/> co.uk" or "*.local", but MAY issue "*. <http://example.com/> example.com" to Example Co.). [^pubsuffix] Determination of what is “registry-controlled” versus the registerable portion of a Country Code Top-Level Domain Namespace is not standardized at the time of writing and is not a property of the DNS itself. Current best practice is to consult a “public suffix list” such as <http://publicsuffix.org/> http://publicsuffix.org/ (PSL), and to retrieve a fresh copy regularly. If using the PSL, a CA SHOULD consult the "ICANN DOMAINS" section only, not the "PRIVATE DOMAINS" section. The PSL is updated regularly to contain new gTLDs delegated by ICANN, which are listed in the "ICANN DOMAINS" section. A CA is not prohibited from issuing a Wildcard Certificate to the Registrant of an entire gTLD, provided that control of the entire namespace is demonstrated in an appropriate way. L. REPLACE Section 7.1.4.2.1 of the Baseline Requirements in its entirety with: 7.1.4.2.1 Subject Alternative Name Extension Certificate Field: extensions:subjectAltName Required/Optional: Required Contents: This extension MUST contain at least one entry. Each entry MUST be one of the following types: 1. dNSName: the entry MUST contain either a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or Wildcard Domain Name that the CA has validated in accordance with section 3.2.2.4. FQDNs and the FQDN portion of Wildcard DNs must comply with RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 with the following exception: underscore characters ("_") are allowed in Domain Labels such that replacing all underscore characters with hyphen characters ("-") would result in a valid Domain Label. CAs MUST NOT include Domain Labels which have hyphens as the third and fourth characters unless the first character is "x" or "X", the second character is "n" or "N", and the fifth and later characters are a valid Punycode string. CAs MUST additionally validate that Wildcard DNs are consistent with section 3.2.2.6. The entry MUST NOT contain an Internal Name. 2. iPAddress: the entry MUST contain an IP address that the CA has validated in accordance with Section 3.2.2.5. The entry MUST NOT contain a Reserved IP Address. M. REPLACE subsection a. of Section 7.1.4.2.2 of the Baseline Requirements with: a. Certificate Field: subject:commonName (OID 2.5.4.3) Required/Optional: Deprecated (Discouraged, but not prohibited) Contents: If present, this field MUST contain a single IP address or Domain Name that is one of the values contained in the Certificate’s subjectAltName extension (see Section 7.1.4.2.1). When including a Domain Name in a common name, CAs MUST only use LDH labels as defined in RFC 5890 and MUST NOT use U-labels. When including an IPv6 address in a common name, CAs MUST use a format conforming to Section 4 or Section 5 of RFC 5952. When including an IPv4 address in a common name, CAs MUST encode the name as an IPv4Address as defined in RFC 3986. --Motion Ends-- The procedure for approval of this Final Maintenance Guideline ballot is as follows (exact start and end times may be adjusted to comply with applicable Bylaws and IPR Agreement): BALLOT 202 Status: Final Maintenance Guideline Start time (22:00 UTC) End time (22:00 UTC) Discussion (7 to 14 days) July 12, 2017 to July 19, 2017 Vote for approval (7 days) July 19, 2017 to July 26, 2017 If a vote of the Forum approves this ballot, the Chair will initiate a 30-day IPR Review Period by sending out an IPR Review Notice. After 30 days of announcing the IPR Review period by the Chair: (a) If Exclusion Notice(s) are filed, this ballot approval is rescinded and a PAG will be created; or (b) If no Exclusion Notices are filed, this ballot becomes effective at end of the IPR Review Period. >From Bylaw 2.3: If the Draft Guideline Ballot is proposing a Final Maintenance >Guideline, such ballot will include a redline or comparison showing the set of >changes from the Final Guideline section(s) intended to become a Final >Maintenance Guideline, and need not include a copy of the full set of >guidelines. Such redline or comparison shall be made against the Final >Guideline section(s) as they exist at the time a ballot is proposed, and need >not take into consideration other ballots that may be proposed subsequently, >except as provided in Bylaw Section 2.3(j). Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread on the Public list. A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting members are listed here: <https://cabforum.org/members/> https://cabforum.org/members/ In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Quorum is half of the number of currently active Members, which is the average number of Member organizations that have participated in the previous three Forum-wide meetings (both teleconferences and face-to-face meetings). Under Bylaw 2.2(g), at least the required quorum number must participate in the ballot for the ballot to be valid, either by voting in favor, voting against, or abstaining. <Ballot 202.pdf>_______________________________________________ Public mailing list <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] <https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public _______________________________________________ Public mailing list <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] <https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
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