It raises a lot of questions though. Can I email the Random Value to a reseller who forwards it on to the end entity? Can I display it on a website without them logging in? Right now, no security or controls is built on delivery of Random Value.
-----Original Message----- From: Ben Wilson Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 3:33 PM To: geo...@apple.com Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org>; Gervase Markham <g...@mozilla.org>; Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>; Rich Smith <richard.sm...@comodo.com>; Peter Bowen <p...@amzn.com> Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Random value reuse I suppose you're right, since the definition of "Random Value" is "A value specified by a CA to the Applicant that exhibits at least 112 bits of entropy." -----Original Message----- From: geo...@apple.com [mailto:geo...@apple.com] Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 3:30 PM To: Ben Wilson <ben.wil...@digicert.com> Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org>; Gervase Markham <g...@mozilla.org>; Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>; Rich Smith <richard.sm...@comodo.com>; Peter Bowen <p...@amzn.com> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Random value reuse > On 9 Aug 2017, at 2:24 pm, Ben Wilson <ben.wil...@digicert.com> wrote: > > Agreed. And each method should stand on its own without cross-referencing > among methods (otherwise tracking the particular method used will be too > complicated). So I'm OK without cross-referencing methods. > > But are we clear enough? For example, the currently proposed method 10 could > probably benefit from better language on how the applicant obtains the random > value. Currently it only says, "Confirming the Applicant's control over the > FQDN by confirming the presence of a Random Value within a Certificate on the > Authorization Domain Name which is accessible by the CA via TLS over an > Authorized Port." The other methods seem to specify the process more > thoroughly. I think it doesn’t matter, in this case, how the Random Value gets to the Applicant—we don’t want to overspecify things like this, because that limits the ability of CAs to innovate. > > -----Original Message----- > From: geo...@apple.com [mailto:geo...@apple.com] > Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 3:11 PM > To: Ben Wilson <ben.wil...@digicert.com>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion > List <public@cabforum.org> > Cc: Gervase Markham <g...@mozilla.org>; Jeremy Rowley > <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>; Rich Smith <richard.sm...@comodo.com>; Peter > Bowen <p...@amzn.com> > Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Random value reuse > > I think that’s where the ‘single communication’ rule really helps. Then this > is taken care of by the descriptions of the methods: if you have to send the > random value to a particular place, then obviously that can’t be combined > with a random value sent some other way; if you have to put it in a > particular place, then it doesn’t matter how it was sent… > >> On 9 Aug 2017, at 1:54 pm, Ben Wilson via Public <public@cabforum.org> wrote: >> >> Putting the issue of "reuse" aside, do we need to clarify this issue of >> which random value methods can be used in combination with others? It seems >> that a random value could be provided to the domain contact / admin under >> methods 2, 3 (if you wanted) or 4 and then used within 30 days for methods >> 2, 4, 6, 7 and 10, but not vice versa. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Public [mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Gervase >> Markham via Public >> Sent: Monday, July 31, 2017 9:02 AM >> To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>; CA/Browser Forum Public >> Discussion List <public@cabforum.org>; Rich Smith >> <richard.sm...@comodo.com>; 'Peter Bowen' <p...@amzn.com> >> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Random value reuse >> >> On 28/07/17 14:53, Jeremy Rowley via Public wrote: >>> I think the random value should be tied to a single communication >>> without reuse. For example, a single email sent to the constructed >>> emails, a single API call, a single phone call, etc. The random value >>> shouldn’t be tied to a method, but should be tied to a specific >>> communication from the CA that is tied to a request. By getting rid of >>> the reuse language, we can simplify the process and eliminate the risk >>> associated with reuse. >> >> Right. New random values are cheap :-) >> >> Gerv >> _______________________________________________ >> Public mailing list >> Public@cabforum.org >> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public >> _______________________________________________ >> Public mailing list >> Public@cabforum.org >> https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public >
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