I'd like to revisit short-lived certificates and see if there is an interest in adopting the previous proposal to permit removal of OCSP information from certificates with a 3 day or shorter validation period. I think there's been enough change over the past few years to warrant a fresh look. In particular, internet connected devices increasingly use trusted roots for connecting to smart phones. Some of these have certificate validity periods as short as 15 minutes. Pre-signing OCSP responses for these certs is a waste of time as they'll expire before the OCSP is ever delivered. When you are signing certs daily, even signing that first OCSP response eats up lots of processing power without providing any benefit to the user. Removing OCSP for short-lived certs eliminates an external call to the CA and makes the certificate smaller, both essential in device performance. Plus, Mozilla already supports not checking revocation for these certs, meaning the revocation info is completely useless in at least one browser.
Any takers on supporting this? Jeremy
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