Jeremy’s proposal was discussed in the Validation working group.  You were 
there, and spoke up to oppose it.

 

I’m also fine with discussing it again, which we will do tomorrow.  But there 
is no requirement that ballots go through working groups.

 

If people oppose the ballot, that’s fine, but they should do so on the merits.

 

-Tim

 

From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Bruce Morton via 
Public
Sent: Wednesday, January 3, 2018 3:27 PM
To: Rich Smith <[email protected]>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion 
List <[email protected]>; 'Ryan Sleevi' <[email protected]>; Kirk Hall 
<[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] [EXTERNAL]Re: Ballot 218: Remove validation methods #1 
and #5

 

I disagree.

 

Removing, changing and adding back in method #1 is not a productive exercise. 
This method has been used for probably 20 years and yet we never see any 
notifications, articles, alerts, etc. of how this method was defeated by an 
attacker.

 

Note, I agree that method #1 can be approved in the BRs, but please advise 
which CAs have not already improved this method in practice? If a CA finds a BR 
requirement to be weak, they should either not use it or improve the process in 
their own practices. I assume that many BR requirements were not intended to 
have loopholes, but were written to allow competitiveness in the way they are 
adopted. 

 

I think that the current ballot 218 is bypassing the working group process 
where a working group was created by ballot to improve the validation methods. 
Is this the intension?

 

If we are going to support abrupt ballots, then I would suggest that they at 
least be split into one topic and discuss method #1 and #5 independently.

 

Finally, what is the rush? Why can’t this change be discussed at the bi-weekly 
CAB Forum meeting or Validation Working Group meeting at least once before a 
pre-ballot is produced? And why effective March 1, 2018? Not only has method #1 
been highly effective for 20 years, but we have also just updated the 
validation methods to support ballot 190. More time would allow CAs to add 
changes to their release cycles and allow Subscribers to learn new validation 
processes they will now have to adopt.

 

I am open to change BR requirements, but do not support ballot 218.

 

Bruce.   

 

From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Rich Smith via 
Public
Sent: January 3, 2018 4:44 PM
To: 'Ryan Sleevi' <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >; 'CA/Browser 
Forum Public Discussion List' <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> 
>; Kirk Hall <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> >
Subject: [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 218: Remove validation methods #1 and #5

 

I agree with Ryan on this and stand by my endorsement of this ballot to move 
forward.  I’m not opposed to adding 3.2.2.4.1 back in if it can be made much 
more secure and brought up to equivalent level with the other methods, but I 
also have my doubts as to whether or not that is possible in the broad sense 
across all TLDs and registrars.  That being the case I think the best course is 
to remove it for now because in it’s present form is extremely weak and add 
back later if and when it has undergone sufficient revisions to make it secure.

 

Regards,

Rich

 

From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via 
Public
Sent: Wednesday, January 3, 2018 2:24 PM
To: Kirk Hall <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> >; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion 
List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 218: Remove validation methods #1 and #5

 

Hi Kirk,

 

We had two endorsers for the discussion. As I mentioned, there's nothing 
inherent in needing to direct this to VWG. As DigiCert has pointed out, there 
are CAs today that are doing validations that are patently insecure.

 

While we can understand and appreciate that some members may wish to introduce 
new validation methods that are limited in scope and applicability (for 
example, Mads' example only applies to a limited subset of ccTLDs, and cannot 
be done safely generically), in order to reduce that risk, I think it's 
entirely appropriate to take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of the 
Internet at large.

 

This does not prevent or inhibit the issuance of certificates that have 
appropriate controls - that is, these methods could be argued as an 
'optimization' - and thus we should not unduly delay progress. Regarding 
passing it to the VWG, could you indicate where you saw that was suggested? The 
only mention of it I saw was from you, on a separate thread, and I'm curious if 
perhaps I've missed additional discussion. Certainly, our workmode does not 
require sending such discussions "to committee"

 

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 3:10 PM, Kirk Hall via Public <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

Tim, I thought this issue was going to be discussed first by the VWG, as 
several CAs have indicated they would like to keep (but improve) Method 1.  

 

From: Public [mailto:[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of Tim Hollebeek via Public
Sent: Wednesday, January 3, 2018 11:22 AM
To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> >
Subject: [EXTERNAL][cabfpub] Ballot 218: Remove validation methods #1 and #5

 

 

Ballot 218: Remove validation methods #1 and #5

 

Purpose of Ballot: Section 3.2.2.4 says that it “defines the permitted 
processes and procedures for validating the Applicant’s ownership or control of 
the domain.”  Most of the validation methods actually do validate ownership and 
control, but two do not, and can be completed solely based on an applicant’s 
own assertions.

 

Since these two validation methods do not meet the objectives of section 
3.2.2.4, and are actively being used to avoid validating domain control or 
ownership, they should be removed, and the other methods that do validate 
domain control or ownership should be used.

 

The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and 
endorsed by Ryan Sleevi of Google and Rich Smith of Comodo.

 

-- MOTION BEGINS –

 

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management 
of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based upon Version 1.5.4:

 

In Section 3.2.2.4.1, add text at the end: “For certificates issued on or after 
March 1, 2018, this method SHALL NOT be used for validation, and completed 
validations using this method SHALL NOT be used for the issuance of 
certificates.”

 

In Section 3.2.2.4.5, add text at the end: “For certificates issued on or after 
March 1, 2018, this method SHALL NOT be used for validation, and completed 
validations using this method SHALL NOT be used for the issuance of 
certificates.”

 

In Section 4.2.1, after the paragraph that begins “After the change to any 
validation method”, add the following paragraph: “Validations completed using 
methods specified in Section 3.2.2.4.1 or Section 3.2.2.4.5 SHALL NOT be 
re-used on or after March 1, 2018.”

 

-- MOTION ENDS –

 

For the purposes of section 4.2.1, the new text added to 4.2.1 from this ballot 
is “specifically provided in a [this] ballot.”

 

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

 

Discussion (7+ days) 

  Start Time: 2017-01-03  19:30:00 UTC  

  End Time: Not Before 2017-01-10 19:30:00 UTC

 

Vote for approval (7 days) 

  Start Time: TBD   

  End Time: TBD

 


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