D-TRUST votes Yes on ballot 2018, version 2
As documented in our CP/CPS we currently use both methods in our current 
validation practice. The underlying processes are audited by an independent 
conformity assessment body (TÜV IT) against the specifications of the BR as 
well as the European regulation eIDAS.
As D-TRUST issues no DV certificates, however our applied validation processes 
are always significantly more extensive than the sole application of validation 
method or

We will adapt our testing processes and introduce further validation methods. 
The conversion of the processes includes changes to  manual and automated 
processes as implemented by us especially in our managed service platform.
Of course, we aim to carry out the adjustments and to put them into operation 
as quickly as possible.
However, we certainly need sufficient time to:
-          re-validate domains within our managed service that used this method 
well before the August 1st date, and
-          Implement system updates in order to enable all our managed service 
customers to use the newly implemented methods.

We thus agree with GlobalSign that the August date is tight, but achievable.

Finally we agree with the view expressed that we do need a more formal and 
rigorous evaluation of the risks and vulnerabilities inherent in the use of 
each validation method and would be happy to contribute to this.


Von: Public [mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org] Im Auftrag von Tim Hollebeek 
via Public
Gesendet: Montag, 29. Januar 2018 22:52
An: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List
Betreff: [cabfpub] Voting begins: Ballot 218 version 2

I'm highly skeptical that discussing this for another month will change 
anybody's minds.  It has already been discussed for over a month, including at 
three validation working group meetings and once on the management call, with 
extensive discussion on this list as well.

There have been a number of clever attempts to distract from the matter at 
hand.  Everybody seems to agree that methods #1 and #5 as currently written are 
insufficient to validate certificates, and efforts to improve method #1 have 
all either been shown to be similarly weak, or have turned the validation 
method into one of the other existing validation methods.  In fact, this 
demonstrates an obvious transition path for CAs currently using method #1: use 
method #2 or method #3.

Since methods #1 and #5 do not sufficiently validate certificates, they should 
not be used, and six months should be more than enough time to cease using them.

Here is the final version of the ballot, with voting times.  A redlined 
document is attached (I encourage other proposers to post ballot redlines, even 
if it isn't required).


----- Ballot 218 version 2: Remove validation methods #1 and #5 -----

Purpose of Ballot: Section says that it "defines the permitted 
processes and procedures for validating the Applicant's ownership or control of 
the domain."  Most of the validation methods actually do validate ownership and 
control, but two do not, and can be completed solely based on an applicant's 
own assertions.

Since these two validation methods do not meet the objectives of section, and are actively being used to avoid validating domain control or 
ownership, they should be removed, and the other methods that do validate 
domain control or ownership should be used.

The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and 
endorsed by Ryan Sleevi of Google and Rich Smith of Comodo.


This ballot modifies the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management 
of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" as follows, based upon Version 1.5.4:

In Section 1.6.1, in the definition of "Domain Contact", after "in a DNS SOA 
record", add ", or as obtained through direct contact with the Domain Name 

In Section, add text at the end: "For certificates issued on or after 
August 1, 2018, this method SHALL NOT be used for validation, and completed 
validations using this method SHALL NOT be used for the issuance of 

In Section, add text at the end: "For certificates issued on or after 
August 1, 2018, this method SHALL NOT be used for validation, and completed 
validations using this method SHALL NOT be used for the issuance of 

After Section, add following two new subsections:
" Any Other Method

This method has been retired and MUST NOT be used. Validating Applicant as a Domain Contact

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by validating the Applicant is 
the Domain Contact. This method may only be used if the CA is also the Domain 
Name Registrar, or an Affiliate of the Registrar, of the Base Domain Name.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the CA MAY also issue 
Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated 
FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names."

In Section 4.2.1, after the paragraph that begins "After the change to any 
validation method", add the following paragraph: "Validations completed using 
methods specified in Section or Section SHALL NOT be 
re-used on or after August 1, 2018."


For the purposes of section 4.2.1, the new text added to 4.2.1 from this ballot 
is "specifically provided in a [this] ballot."

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)
  Start Time: 2017-01-22  21:30:00 UTC
  End Time: 2017-01-29 21:50:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)
  Start Time: 2017-01-29 21:50:00 UTC
  End Time: 2017-02-05 21:50 UTC

Public mailing list

Reply via email to