If people have any problems with this ballot, please discuss them in the next day or two. I'm going to do a version 2, but I don't want to do a version 3 unless I have to.
-Tim From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Tim Hollebeek via Public Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2018 7:01 PM To: Bruce Morton <[email protected]>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] [EXTERNAL] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements Good question, Bruce. My intent in this ballot is that the ballot is permissive immediately. As of the effective date, CAs that are able to do so can adopt sane policies, instead of the currently required insane policies. My intent is also to recognize that it may take some CAs longer to make that transition . up to two years. I don't think that's a bad thing, it's just a consequence of the fact that some of them are operated by large, complicated organizations that are being audited to a variety of sometimes conflicting requirements. It is also worth mentioning that Mozilla policy, which CAs are required to comply with at all times, says [2.1 (3)]: "enforce multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of causing certificate issuance or performing Registration Authority or Delegated Third Party functions, or implement technical controls operated by the CA to restrict certificate issuance through the account to a limited set of pre-approved domains or email addresses;" I'm not horribly inclined to help out people who are out of compliance with Mozilla policy; instead I'd prefer to harmonize the BRs with Mozilla policy on this issue so that the BRs are a one stop shop for compliance requirements. I find the handful of bespoke requirements in various root program requirements annoying and hard to follow, and I have more time to follow them than most CAs do. I'd appreciate if people pointed out any text in the ballot that is inconsistent with these principles, so we can fix the ballot. I have no illusions that the Network Security WG and I got this right on the first try. Please look closely at the ballot and offer constructive improvements if you spot problems. -Tim From: Bruce Morton [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2018 5:44 PM To: Tim Hollebeek <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL][cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements Tim, As this ballot may require a CA to make a technical change or change a procedure, should we state a future effective date to allow CAs to ensure they are compliant? Bruce. From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Tim Hollebeek via Public Sent: March 28, 2018 3:26 PM To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: [EXTERNAL][cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements Purpose of Ballot: The Network Security Working Group met a number of times to improve the Network Security Guidelines requirements around authentication, specifically by requiring two-factor authentication, and improving the password requirements in line with more recent NIST guidelines. While CAs are encouraged to improve their password requirements as soon as possible, a two year grace period is being given to allow organizations to develop and implement policies to implement the improved requirements, especially since some organizations may have to simultaneously comply with other compliance frameworks that have not been updated yet and are based on older NIST guidance about passwords. The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and endorsed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica and Neil Dunbar of TrustCor. - MOTION BEGINS - This ballot modifies the "Network and Certificate System Security Requirements" as follows, based upon Version 1.1: In the definitions, add a definition for Multifactor Authentication: "Multi-Factor Authentication: An authentication mechanism consisting of two or more of the following independent categories of credentials (i.e. factors) to verify the user's identity for a login or other transaction: something you know (knowledge factor), something you have (possession factor), and something you are (inherence factor). Each factor must be independent. Certificate-based authentication can be used as part of Multifactor Authentication only if the private key is stored in a Secure Key Storage Device." Add a definition for Secure Key Storage Device: "Secure Key Storage Device: A device certified as meeting at least FIPS 140-2 level 2 overall, level 3 physical, or Common Criteria (EAL 4+)." In section 1.j., capitalize Multi-Factor Authentication, and strike the parenthetical reference to subsection 2.n.(ii). In section 2.f., add "(for accountability purposes, group accounts or shared role credentials SHALL NOT be used)" after "authenticate to Certificate Systems". Change section 2.g. to read: "g. If an authentication control used by a Trusted Role is a username and password, then, where technically feasible, implement the following controls: i. For accounts that are accessible only within Secure Zones or High Security Zones, require that passwords have at least twelve (12) characters; ii. For accounts that are accessible from outside a Secure Zone or High Security Zone, require Multi-Factor Authentication, with passwords that have at least eight (8) characters and are not be one of the user's previous four (4) passwords; and implement account lockout for failed access attempts in accordance with subsection k; iii. When developing password policies, CAs SHOULD take into account the password guidance in NIST 800-63B Appendix A. iv. If passwords are required to be changed periodically, that period SHOULD be at least two years. Effective April 1, 2020, if passwords are required to be changed periodically, that period SHALL be at least two years." In section 2.h., change "Require" to "Have a policy that requires" In section 2.i., change "Configure" to "Have a procedure to configure" Change section 2.k. to read: "k. Lockout account access to Certificate Systems after no more than five (5) failed access attempts, provided that this security measure: i. is supported by the Certificate System, ii. Cannot be leveraged for a denial of service attack, and iii. does not weaken the security of this authentication control;" Change section 2.n. to read: "Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for all Trusted Role accounts on Certificate Systems (including those approving the issuance of a Certificate, which equally applies to Delegated Third Parties) that are accessible from outside a Secure Zone or High Security Zone; and" - MOTION ENDS - The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows: Discussion (7+ days) Start Time: 2018-03-28 15:30:00 EDT End Time: after 2018-04-04 15:30:00 EDT Vote for approval (7 days) Start Time: TBD End Time: TBD
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