Yeah, I'll have some draft language ready for the next call and we can
discuss.

 

-Tim

 

From: Travis T Graham [mailto:tgra...@godaddy.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, April 4, 2018 4:59 PM
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com>; CA/Browser Forum Public
Discussion List <public@cabforum.org>
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password
Improvements

 

That makes sense to me, and in fact is how I would personally prefer it to
be interpreted.  My confusion came with 1.j sounding like it requires
everything that has the ability to do MFA must enforce it.

 

Should we refer this back to the WG?

 

Travis

 

From: Tim Hollebeek [mailto:tim.holleb...@digicert.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, April 4, 2018 12:00 PM
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com
<mailto:tim.holleb...@digicert.com> >; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion
List <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org> >; Travis T Graham
<tgra...@godaddy.com <mailto:tgra...@godaddy.com> >
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password
Improvements

 

Thinking about it a bit more, I think the intent is that any communication
channel that crosses the boundary into a Secure Zone must authenticate the
user using MFA.  But that channel may then be connected to other channels
that lead elsewhere within the Secure Zone.  Additional controls should be
present to control which hosts within the Secure Zone can talk to which, and
how they authenticate to each other, but that's beyond the scope of this
ballot.

 

Does that make sense to you?

 

-Tim

 

From: Public [mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Tim Hollebeek
via Public
Sent: Tuesday, April 3, 2018 3:20 PM
To: Travis T Graham <tgra...@godaddy.com <mailto:tgra...@godaddy.com> >;
CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org
<mailto:public@cabforum.org> >
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password
Improvements

 

This is a great question which the WG has not discussed.  I would appreciate
hearing people's opinions on what the intent should be.  It'll be easier to
tweak the language once we agree on the intent.   I personally would like to
not preclude bastion/portal setups.

 

-Tim

 

From: Travis T Graham [mailto:tgra...@godaddy.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 3, 2018 2:38 PM
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com
<mailto:tim.holleb...@digicert.com> >; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion
List <public@cabforum.org <mailto:public@cabforum.org> >
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password
Improvements

 

Tim,

 

I have a question regarding the intent of which systems/roles need MFA with
this change.  In 1.j it is stated that MFA is implemented to each component
of the certificate system that supports MFA, but in 2.n we're enforcing MFA
for trusted roles only if they're accessible from outside the defined
security zones.   Is the intent of the MFA changes to enforce it on all
parts of the certificate system, or is it to enforce it on a bastion/portal
level when logging into the secure zones?

 

Travis

 

From: Public [mailto:public-boun...@cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Tim Hollebeek
via Public
Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2018 12:26 PM
To: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public@cabforum.org
<mailto:public@cabforum.org> >
Subject: [cabfpub] Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password
Improvements

 

 

Ballot 221: Two-Factor Authentication and Password Improvements

 

Purpose of Ballot: The Network Security Working Group met a number of times
to 

improve the Network Security Guidelines requirements around authentication,

specifically by requiring two-factor authentication, and improving the
password 

requirements in line with more recent NIST guidelines.

 

While CAs are encouraged to improve their password requirements as soon as 

possible, a two year grace period is being given to allow organizations to 

develop and implement policies to implement the improved requirements,
especially

since some organizations may have to simultaneously comply with other

compliance frameworks that have not been updated yet and are based on older
NIST 

guidance about passwords.

 

The following motion has been proposed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and
endorsed 

by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica and Neil Dunbar of TrustCor.

 

- MOTION BEGINS -

 

This ballot modifies the "Network and Certificate System Security
Requirements" 

as follows, based upon Version 1.1:

 

In the definitions, add a definition for Multifactor Authentication:

 

"Multi-Factor Authentication: An authentication mechanism consisting of two
or 

more of the following independent categories of credentials (i.e. factors)
to 

verify the user's identity for a login or other transaction: something you
know 

(knowledge factor), something you have (possession factor), and something
you 

are (inherence factor).  Each factor must be independent.  Certificate-based


authentication can be used as part of Multifactor Authentication only if the


private key is stored in a Secure Key Storage Device."

 

Add a definition for Secure Key Storage Device:

 

"Secure Key Storage Device: A device certified as meeting at least FIPS
140-2

level 2 overall, level 3 physical, or Common Criteria (EAL 4+)."

 

In section 1.j., capitalize Multi-Factor Authentication, and strike the 

parenthetical reference to subsection 2.n.(ii).

 

In section 2.f., add "(for accountability purposes, group accounts or shared

role credentials SHALL NOT be used)" after "authenticate to Certificate
Systems".

 

Change section 2.g. to read:

 

"g. If an authentication control used by a Trusted Role is a username and
password, 

    then, where technically feasible, implement the following controls:

  i.           For accounts that are accessible only within Secure Zones or
High Security 

               Zones, require that passwords have at least twelve (12)
characters; 

  ii.          For accounts that are accessible from outside a Secure Zone
or High Security 

               Zone, require Multi-Factor Authentication, with passwords
that have at least 

               eight (8) characters and are not be one of the user's
previous four (4) 

               passwords; and implement account lockout for failed access
attempts in 

               accordance with subsection k;

  iii.        When developing password policies, CAs SHOULD take into
account the password 

               guidance in NIST 800-63B Appendix A.

  iv.         If passwords are required to be changed periodically, that
period SHOULD be 

               at least two years.  Effective April 1, 2020, if passwords
are required to 

               be changed periodically, that period SHALL be at least two
years."

 

In section 2.h., change "Require" to "Have a policy that requires"

 

In section 2.i., change "Configure" to "Have a procedure to configure"

 

Change section 2.k. to read:

 

"k. Lockout account access to Certificate Systems after no more than five
(5) failed access attempts, provided that this security measure:

  i.           is supported by the Certificate System,

  ii.          Cannot be leveraged for a denial of service attack, and

  iii.        does not weaken the security of this authentication control;"

 

Change section 2.n. to read:

 

"Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for all Trusted Role accounts on
Certificate

Systems (including those approving the issuance of a Certificate, which
equally

applies to Delegated Third Parties) that are accessible from outside a
Secure Zone

or High Security Zone; and"

 

- MOTION ENDS -

 

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

 

Discussion (7+ days)

 

Start Time: 2018-03-28  15:30:00 EDT

 

End Time: after 2018-04-04 15:30:00 EDT

 

Vote for approval (7 days)

 

Start Time: TBD

 

End Time: TBD

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