Mozilla votes Yes to ballot SC6 v3. - Wayne
On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 11:54 AM Wayne Thayer <[email protected]> wrote: > This ballot entered the voting period late on Friday. Voting ends this > Friday 2018-09-14 at 20:00 UTC. > > On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 12:51 PM Wayne Thayer <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Here is version 3 of this ballot, incorporating changes to v2 suggested >> by Bruce and Ryan (thanks!). >> >> I noticed that our current bylaws have reverted back to a fixed-length >> discussion period, so I have changed this version to comply. >> >> ========================================== >> >> Ballot SC6 version 3: Revocation Timeline Extension >> >> Purpose of Ballot: >> Section 4.9.1.1 of the Baseline Requirements currently requires CAs to >> revoke a Subscriber certificate within 24 hours of identifying any of 15 >> issues affecting the certificate. In cases where there is not an immediate >> threat of misuse of the certificate, this requirement can cause undue harm >> to a Subscriber that isn't capable of replacing the certificate prior to >> revocation. This ballot makes a number of improvements to the revocation >> rules imposed by the Baseline Requirements: >> * Primarily, it creates a tiered timeline for revocations. The most >> critical "reasons" still require revocation within 24 hours, but for many >> others 24 hours becomes a SHOULD and the CA has 5 days before they MUST >> revoke. >> * A new "reason for revocation" was added to address the fact that there >> is currently no requirement for CAs to revoke a certificate when requested >> by the domain name registrant. After considering some more specific >> language that required CAs to follow 3.2.2.4 to validate domain control, I >> settled on the following more general "reason": "The CA obtains evidence >> that the validation of domain authorization or control for any >> Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate should not be >> relied upon." >> * Reason #10 states "The CA determines that any of the information >> appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;" This ballot >> removes "or misleading" because that is a subjective judgement that could >> effectively be used to justify censorship, as discussed at length in >> relation to the "Stripe, Inc of Kentucky" EV certificates. >> * Current reasons #11 and #13 were removed from the section on subscriber >> certificates because they address cases where the intermediate and/or root >> must be revoked, so there isn't much sense (and some possible harm) in >> requiring revocation of all the leaf certs. >> * It requires CAs to disclose their problem reporting mechanisms in a >> standard location: CPS section 1.5.2. >> * Within 24 hours of receiving a problem report, the CA is now required >> to report back to both the entity reporting the problem and the Subscriber >> on the CA's findings, and to work with the reporter and Subscriber to >> establish a date by which the CA will revoke the certificate. >> >> The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and >> endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica. >> >> --- MOTION BEGINS --- This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for >> the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, >> based on Version 1.6.0: >> >> ** Modify the definition of Key Compromise as follows: ** >> Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has >> been disclosed to an unauthorized person or an unauthorized person has had >> access to it. >> >> ** Modify Section 4.9.1 to read as follows: ** >> >> 4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate >> >> The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the >> following occurs: >> 1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate; >> 2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request >> was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization; >> 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key >> corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key >> Compromise; or >> 4. The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or >> control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the >> Certificate should not be relied upon. >> >> The CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and MUST revoke a >> Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs: >> 1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Sections >> 6.1.5 and 6.1.6; >> 2. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused; >> 3. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its >> material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use; >> 4. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a >> Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer >> legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name >> Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services >> agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has >> terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain >> Name); >> 5. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to >> authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain >> Name; >> 6. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained >> in the Certificate; >> 7. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance >> with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification >> Practice Statement; >> 8. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information >> appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate; >> 9. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires >> or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to >> continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; >> 10. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or >> Certification Practice Statement; or >> 11. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes >> the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise, methods have been developed >> that can easily calculate it based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak >> key, see http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys), or if there is clear evidence >> that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed. >> >> 4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate >> >> The Issuing CA SHALL revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) >> days if one or more of the following occurs: >> 1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing; >> 2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original >> certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant >> authorization; >> 3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key >> corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key >> Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 >> and 6.1.6; >> 4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused; >> 5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in >> accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with this document >> or the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement; >> 6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in the >> Certificate is inaccurate or misleading; >> 7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and >> has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for >> the Certificate; >> 8. The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates under >> these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Issuing >> CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; or >> 9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy and/or >> Certification Practice Statement. >> >> ** Modify section 4.9.3 as follows: ** >> >> The CA SHALL provide a process for Subscribers to request revocation of >> their own Certificates. The process MUST be described in the CA's >> Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement. The CA SHALL >> maintain a continuous 24x7 ability to accept and respond to revocation >> requests and Certificate Problem Reports. >> >> The CA SHALL provide Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software >> Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions for reporting >> suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of >> fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter >> related to Certificates. The CA SHALL publicly disclose the instructions >> through a readily accessible online means and in section 1.5.2 of their CPS. >> >> ** Modify section 4.9.5 to read as follows: ** >> >> Within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report, the CA >> SHALL investigate the facts and circumstances related to a Certificate >> Problem Report and provide a preliminary report on its findings to both the >> Subscriber and the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report. >> >> After reviewing the facts and circumstances, the CA SHALL work with the >> Subscriber and any entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other >> revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the certificate will >> be revoked, and if so, a date which the CA will revoke the certificate. The >> period from receipt of the Certificate Problem Report or revocation-related >> notice to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in >> Section 4.9.1.1. The date selected by the CA SHOULD consider the following >> criteria: >> 1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, >> magnitude, risk of harm); >> 2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to >> Subscribers and Relying Parties); >> 3. The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular >> Certificate or Subscriber; >> 4. The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law >> enforcement official that a Web site is engaged in illegal activities >> should carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging that she >> didn't receive the goods she ordered); and >> 5. Relevant legislation. >> --- MOTION ENDS --- >> >> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. >> >> A comparison of the changes can be found at: >> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/master...wthayer:patch-1 >> >> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows: >> Discussion (7 days) >> Start Time: 2018-08-31 20:00 UTC >> End Time: 2018-09-07 20:00 UTC >> Vote for approval (7 days) >> Start Time: 2018-09-07 20:00 UTC >> End Time: 2018-09-14 20:00 UTC >> >
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