TrustCor votes YES on Ballot SC6v3. Regards,
Neil > On 31 Aug 2018, at 20:51, Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Here is version 3 of this ballot, incorporating changes to v2 suggested by > Bruce and Ryan (thanks!). > > I noticed that our current bylaws have reverted back to a fixed-length > discussion period, so I have changed this version to comply. > > ========================================== > > Ballot SC6 version 3: Revocation Timeline Extension > > Purpose of Ballot: > Section 4.9.1.1 of the Baseline Requirements currently requires CAs to revoke > a Subscriber certificate within 24 hours of identifying any of 15 issues > affecting the certificate. In cases where there is not an immediate threat of > misuse of the certificate, this requirement can cause undue harm to a > Subscriber that isn't capable of replacing the certificate prior to > revocation. This ballot makes a number of improvements to the revocation > rules imposed by the Baseline Requirements: > * Primarily, it creates a tiered timeline for revocations. The most critical > "reasons" still require revocation within 24 hours, but for many others 24 > hours becomes a SHOULD and the CA has 5 days before they MUST revoke. > * A new "reason for revocation" was added to address the fact that there is > currently no requirement for CAs to revoke a certificate when requested by > the domain name registrant. After considering some more specific language > that required CAs to follow 3.2.2.4 to validate domain control, I settled on > the following more general "reason": "The CA obtains evidence that the > validation of domain authorization or control for any Fully-Qualified Domain > Name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon." > * Reason #10 states "The CA determines that any of the information appearing > in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;" This ballot removes "or > misleading" because that is a subjective judgement that could effectively be > used to justify censorship, as discussed at length in relation to the > "Stripe, Inc of Kentucky" EV certificates. > * Current reasons #11 and #13 were removed from the section on subscriber > certificates because they address cases where the intermediate and/or root > must be revoked, so there isn't much sense (and some possible harm) in > requiring revocation of all the leaf certs. > * It requires CAs to disclose their problem reporting mechanisms in a > standard location: CPS section 1.5.2. > * Within 24 hours of receiving a problem report, the CA is now required to > report back to both the entity reporting the problem and the Subscriber on > the CA's findings, and to work with the reporter and Subscriber to establish > a date by which the CA will revoke the certificate. > > The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and > endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica. > > --- MOTION BEGINS --- > > This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements > for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, > based on Version 1.6.0: > > ** Modify the definition of Key Compromise as follows: ** > Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been > disclosed to an unauthorized person or an unauthorized person has had access > to it. > > ** Modify Section 4.9.1 to read as follows: ** > > 4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate > > The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the > following occurs: > 1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate; > 2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was > not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization; > 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to > the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise; or > 4. The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or > control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate > should not be relied upon. > > The CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and MUST revoke a > Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs: > 1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 > and 6.1.6; > 2. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused; > 3. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its > material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use; > 4. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a > Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer > legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name > Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services > agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has > terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain > Name); > 5. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to > authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain > Name; > 6. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in > the Certificate; > 7. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance > with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification > Practice Statement; > 8. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing > in the Certificate is inaccurate; > 9. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or > is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue > maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; > 10. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or > Certification Practice Statement; or > 11. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the > Subscriber's Private Key to compromise, methods have been developed that can > easily calculate it based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key, see > http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys <http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys>), or if there > is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key > was flawed. > > 4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate > > The Issuing CA SHALL revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) > days if one or more of the following occurs: > 1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing; > 2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original certificate > request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization; > 3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key > corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise > or no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6; > 4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused; > 5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in > accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with this document or > the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement; > 6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in the > Certificate is inaccurate or misleading; > 7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has > not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the > Certificate; > 8. The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates under > these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Issuing CA > has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; or > 9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy and/or > Certification Practice Statement. > > ** Modify section 4.9.3 as follows: ** > > > > The CA SHALL provide a process for Subscribers to request revocation of > their own Certificates. The process MUST be described in the CA's Certificate > Policy or Certification Practice Statement. The CA SHALL maintain a > continuous 24x7 ability to accept and respond to revocation requests and > Certificate Problem Reports. > > The CA SHALL provide Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software > Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions for reporting > suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of > fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related > to Certificates. The CA SHALL publicly disclose the instructions through a > readily accessible online means and in section 1.5.2 of their CPS. > > ** Modify section 4.9.5 to read as follows: ** > > > > Within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report, the CA > SHALL investigate the facts and circumstances related to a Certificate > Problem Report and provide a preliminary report on its findings to both the > Subscriber and the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report. > > After reviewing the facts and circumstances, the CA SHALL work with the > Subscriber and any entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other > revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the certificate will be > revoked, and if so, a date which the CA will revoke the certificate. The > period from receipt of the Certificate Problem Report or revocation-related > notice to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in > Section 4.9.1.1. The date selected by the CA SHOULD consider the following > criteria: > 1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, > risk of harm); > 2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to > Subscribers and Relying Parties); > 3. The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular > Certificate or Subscriber; > 4. The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law > enforcement official that a Web site is engaged in illegal activities should > carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging that she didn't > receive the goods she ordered); and > 5. Relevant legislation. > > --- MOTION ENDS --- > > This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. > > > > A comparison of the changes can be found at: > https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/master...wthayer:patch-1 > <https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/master...wthayer:patch-1> > > The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows: > Discussion (7 days) > Start Time: 2018-08-31 20:00 UTC > End Time: 2018-09-07 20:00 UTC > Vote for approval (7 days) > Start Time: 2018-09-07 20:00 UTC > End Time: 2018-09-14 20:00 UTC > _______________________________________________ > Servercert-wg mailing list > [email protected] > http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
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