These are now published to the website.

 

-- 
Jos Purvis ([email protected])
.:|:.:|:. cisco systems  | Cryptographic Services
PGP: 0xFD802FEE07D19105  | Controls & Trust Verification

 

 

From: Public <[email protected]> on behalf of CA/B Forum Public List 
<[email protected]>
Reply-To: Dean Coclin <[email protected]>, CA/B Forum Public List 
<[email protected]>
Date: Tuesday, 17 November, 2020 at 11:43
To: CA/B Forum Public List <[email protected]>
Subject: [cabfpub] Minutes of F2F 51

 

Here are the approved minutes of F2F 51, including SCWG:

 

 
Wednesday, 21 October2020 - Plenary Meeting (Day 1)
CA/B Forum Plenary
The Antitrust statement was read. 

Attendees: Doug Beattie, Jeff Ward, Don Sheehy, Ryan Sleevi, Dean Coclin, 
Atsushi Inaba, Nick France (Sectigo), Dustin Hollenback, Aneta 
Wojtczak-Iwanicka, Tim Callan, Dimitris Zacharopoulos, Clemens Wanko, Tadahiko 
Ito, Andreas Henschel, Enrico Entschew, Devon O'Brien, Matthias Wiedenhorst, 
Eva Van Steenberge, Jos Purvis, Mike Reilly, Karina Sirota, Clint Wilson, 
Trevoli Ponds-White, Arno Fiedler, Vijay Kumar, Arvind Srinivasan, Saiprasad 
KP, Bruce Morton, Wayne Thayer, Stephen Davidson, Janet Hines, Hongquan Yin, 
Peter Miskovic, Hazhar Ismail, Wang Chunlan, Xiu Lei, Leo Grove, Chris 
Kemmerer, Tom Zermeno, Abdul Hakeem Putra, Ahmad Syafiq MD Zaini, Pedro 
Fuentes, Tobias Josefowitz, Kathleen Wilson, Ben Wilson, Wendy Brown, Michelle 
Coon, Li-Chun Chen, Matthias Wiedenhorst, Andrea Holland, Daniela Hood, Clint 
Wilson, Adrian Mueller, David Kluge, An Yin, Neil Dunbar, Curt Spann, Jan 
Völkel, Arnold Essing, Paul van Brouwershaven, Hiroshi Sakai, Andrew Whalley, 
Tim Hollebeek, Sooyoung Eo, Wei YiCai, Rae Ann Gonzales, Mads Henriksveen, 
Rebecca Kelley, Niko Carpenter, Rich Smith, Doug Hill, Mariusz Kondratowicz, 
George Sebastian, Aaron Poulsen (Digicert), Eric Mill, Hannah Sokol 
(Microsoft). 
Approval of CABF Minutes from last teleconference
The minutes were approved. 
Report from Code Signing Certificate Working Group
Presenters: Bruce Morton (Entrust Datacard), Dean Coclin (Digicert)
Note Taker: Dustin Hollenback (Microsoft) 

Dean Coclin presented 

Bruce Morton (Entrust Datacard) has been nominated for Vice Chair position 

Ballot CSC-4 is approved sent for IPR review. This ballot was mainly to push 
out some dates for key sizes to move to 3072 bit RSA. 

Conditional audit report update 
Audit criteria for Code Signing (CS) and EV Code Signing (EVCS) have been 
merged. 
Investigating how to handle audits that occurred in between the Code Signing/EV 
Code Signing reports being created
Don Sheehy, Mike Reilly, Karina Sirota, Ian McMillan and a few others will meet 
on next steps
Time-stamping to be discussed in more detail at next meeting 

Parking lot list started. Dean will add updated list here later. It will be 
discussed at next meeting. 
Report from S/MIME Certificate Working Group
Presenters: Stephen Davidson (Digicert) 
Note Taker: Andreas Henschel (D-TRUST) 
Presentation: SMCWG Update 

Notes other than presentation: 
Chance to create a worldwide standard because there are a lot of different 
standards and requirements in place
Many discussions within the group on the different use cases of s/mime 
certificates
Creating a parking lot on requirements for later discussions
Already identified key issues: key storage, key escrow, key archiving and other 
aspects of key management
First version of the draft: Certificate profiles for leaf and ca certificates, 
Verification of control over email addresses 
The main goal of the WG is to create a best practices standard based on the 
already identified requirements and standards like google, mozilla, etsi, us 
federal pki, etc.
Discussion after the presentation: 
Dean asked, if there are pending member applications to the WG
Stephen said, that google joined the WG on the last meeting and other members 
of the ca/b-forum with interets are welcome to join the WG as well
Report from Forum Infrastructure subcommittee
Presenter: Jos Purvis (Cisco) 
Note Taker: Wayne Thayer (Mozilla) 
Jos said that the subcommittee met yesterday and discussed the upcoming 
separation of the documents repo into separate repos in GitHub, one for each 
working group. History will be maintained in the migration. Wayne sent an email 
to the management list describing the plan, and no feedback has been received. 
The SC plans to make the changes during their Nov 4 meeting.
Ryan is working on moving artifact rebuild code from Travis-CI to GitHub 
actions. He has a prototype in place. When this is in place, we will be able to 
securely create artifacts upon each pull request, allowing for review of the 
new Word/pdf documents before merging the pull request.
We discussed the need to revamp the current cabforum.org website. We encourage 
involvement from anyone interested in website design. We also discussed the 
intended audience, breaking the site into working groups, and cases where the 
WordPress conversion jumbled content. If you find issues on the site, please 
report it to an infrastructure SC member or email questions@.
Jos said that we are soliciting feedback on the new wiki that we began using 
about 1 year ago. If you have any comments, please let Jos know.
We discussed membership management, which is currently a very manual process. 
We agreed that this is the next to-do. We want to create a standardized place 
to request changes first, then implement some automation for implementing the 
changes.
We discussed the migration of the mailing lists from GoDaddy to AWS. GoDaddy is 
planning this to happen in the next month, but we will do it at a time when 
there are no ballots in the voting period to ensure that votes are not lost. 
Please let the SC know if you are planning to bring forth any ballots soon.
We moved passwords into Bitwarden so that they are accessible to the SC and WG 
leaders.
Question in chat: What about group photo from last F2F meeting? Jos said that 
these photos will be posted to the wiki today. 
Discussion on possible Bylaws issues
Presenters: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) 
Note Taker: Dean Coclin (Digicert) 

Most of these issues were tackled during a recent Bylaws update. 

Issue 1: Who must sign the IPR Agreement?

Issue 2: Consider removing the need to “READ” the antitrust statement before 
each meeting

Issue 3: Consider adding minimum days for review of minutes for regular 
teleconferences and F2F meetings

Issue 4: Consider review and alignment of WG Charters 

Issue 5: Resolve ambiguity for where to send/post CWG minutes 

We have a doc listing open Bylaws issues 
Summary of accomplishments (2018-11-01 to 2020-10-31)
Presenters: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) 
Note Taker: Dean Coclin (Digicert) 
Presentation: Summary of accomplishments 2018-11-01 to 2020-10-31 
Guest Speaker #1
Presenters: Doug Hill (RealRandom) 
Presentation: What's All the Fuss About Randomness 
Any Other Business
No other business was discussed. 

Adjourned 
Server Certificate WG Plenary
Attendees: Doug Beattie, Jeff Ward, Don Sheehy, Ryan Sleevi, Dean Coclin, 
Atsushi Inaba, Nick France (Sectigo), Dustin Hollenback, Aneta 
Wojtczak-Iwanicka, Tim Callan, Dimitris Zacharopoulos, Clemens Wanko, Tadahiko 
Ito, Andreas Henschel, Enrico Entschew, Devon O'Brien, Matthias Wiedenhorst, 
Eva Van Steenberge, Jos Purvis, Mike Reilly, Karina Sirota, Clint Wilson, 
Trevoli Ponds-White, Arno Fiedler, Vijay Kumar, Arvind Srinivasan, Saiprasad 
KP, Bruce Morton, Wayne Thayer, Stephen Davidson, Janet Hines, Hongquan Yin, 
Peter Miskovic, Hazhar Ismail, Wang Chunlan, Xiu Lei, Leo Grove, Chris 
Kemmerer, Tom Zermeno, Abdul Hakeem Putra, Ahmad Syafiq MD Zaini, Pedro 
Fuentes, Tobias Josefowitz, Kathleen Wilson, Ben Wilson, Wendy Brown, Michelle 
Coon, Li-Chun Chen, Matthias Wiedenhorst, Andrea Holland, Daniela Hood, Clint 
Wilson, Adrian Mueller, David Kluge, An Yin, Neil Dunbar, Curt Spann, Jan 
Völkel, Arnold Essing, Paul van Brouwershaven, Hiroshi Sakai, Andrew Whalley, 
Tim Hollebeek, Sooyoung Eo, Wei YiCai, Rae Ann Gonzales, Mads Henriksveen, 
Rebecca Kelley, Niko Carpenter, Rich Smith, Doug Hill, Mariusz Kondratowicz, 
George Sebastian, Aaron Poulsen (Digicert), Eric Mill, Hannah Sokol 
(Microsoft). 
Approval of SCWG Minutes from last teleconference
The minutes were approved. 
Apple Root Program Update
Presenter: Clint Wilson (Apple) 
Note Taker: Curt Spann (Apple) 
Presentation: Apple Root Program Update 
Presentation about Apple’s Root Program updates presented by Clint Wilson
A recap of upcoming changes to the Apple CT Policy (see presentation for 
details)
Timeline for new CT Policy: April 1, 2021
Discussion/Questions 

Are the changes going to be published somewhere? 
Been published in the CT Policy mailing list
Will also be published to Apple’s CT Policy page
What is the audit scheme for SMIME sub CAs chaining up to root trusted for 
other uses (TLS server auth)? 
Apple will provide a response at later time
Details of question from Li-Chun: What is the audit scheme if an intermediate 
S/MIME CA chain up to a Root with website and secure-email trust bit/EKU ? The 
intermediate S/MIME CA's CA & EE certificates are with e-mail protection and 
clientauth EKU. 
Besides WebTrust for CA, does this intermediate S/MIME CA need to pass 
principle 4 of WebTrust for CA-SSL Baseline Requirement with Network Security 
Audit?
Principle 4 of WebTrust for CA-SSL Baseline Requirement with Network Security 
Audit is corresponding to Network and Certificate System Security Requirements. 
Or Principle 4 of WebTrust for CA-SSL Baseline Requirement with Network 
Security Audit is only for a CA with anyEKU in CA certificates but not issues 
to SSL certificates.
Cisco Root Program Update
Presenter: Jos Purvis (Cisco) 
Note Taker: Vijay Kumar (eMudhra) 

Presentation: Cisco Root Program Update 

Notes other than presentation:
Conversion to CCADB: This has been happening in Cisco Root Program for about an 
year now. It has been finished the first wave of conversion to CCADB content in 
Cisco intersect and union root stores. Cisco is doing its regular releases 
using CCADB content, which is the primary source for root inclusion now. This 
is based on the common trust by other trust stores. The next step on this one 
is to move to principal inclusion instead of trusting other root stores, which 
needs direct interfacing with CAs. This is tentatively expected by Spring. CAs 
should expect a brief request from CCADB channels to confirm their continued 
inclusion in Cisco Trust Stores. We will then be working on third phase, which 
includes some sort of contractual relationship with CAs that are included.
Miscellaneous updates: In reviewing the issues that arose in the summer with 
OCSP and PKIX no-check OCSP Signer flag issues, the tentative plan at this 
point is to look at establishing a flag date somewhere in the mid-2021 range, 
by when CAs need to be fixing this problem for TLS certificate roots that is 
included in Cisco root program. Will circulate the dates way in advance than 
the deadline. CAs are to be prepared for the same. Planning to work with CAs 
one-on-one. Will be sharing more in next face-to-face. 
Some adjustments to code on intersect and Union, we are doing some more 
aggressive removal of expiring roots. There were some past problems with Add 
Trust, etc. What it means is that CAs should be on top of things in getting 
their newer replacement roots in place, so that it can be made sure that these 
are included. 
Microsoft Root Program Update
Presenter: Karina Sirota (Microsoft) 
Note Taker: Rae Ann Gonzales (GoDaddy) 
Presentation: Microsoft Root Program Update 

Notes other than presentation: 

All key points available in slide deck. 

Dimitris asked for more detail on the flighting releases. Karina replied that 
it is for different MS “rings”, early releases for selected users that want to 
test what's coming early. 
Google Root Program Update
Presenter: Eric Mill, Devon O'Brien, Ryan Sleevi (Google) 
Note Taker: Michelle Coon (OATI) 

Presentation: Chrome Root Program Update 

Notes other than presentation: 

TLS 1.0/1.1 Deprecation delayed, but still rolled out on schedule. 
DNS over HTTPS support is not on for everyone by default, but if a browser is 
already set to use a custom DNS provider, and we know that the custom DNS 
provider also supports a secure channel, then Chrome will, without changing the 
provider, enable a secure connection to the user's already chosen DNS provider. 
Blocking insecure downloads from secure pages - staged plan available in slides 
and the blog post. 
Forms on secure page posting to insecure URL - Show strong warning to users 
within the form before they submit (full page interstitial to confirm they want 
to submit insecurely). Disable auto-fill; exception for password forms.
URL Display Experiment - Attempting to tackle misleading domains (used in 
phishing and deceptive campaigns). Just show domain name on URL and cut off the 
full path. Measuring whether or not limiting to just domain name helps with 
phishing precautions. May also hide the sub-domain depending on length 
(deceptive use of sub-domains). Results will be out in 2021. 

Certificate Transparency
Substantive re-write presented at CT days in September. 
Sharding required in CT logs in order to become qualified in Chrome.
Certificates logged multiple times to a CT log could be issued duplicate SCTs 
that did not actually then get included in the log.
Exclusively embedded SCTs or exclusively OCSP or TLS SCTs - no longer allow via 
policy “mixed” SCT; rarely used mechanism. Chrome behavior has not changed, but 
no longer endorsed by policy.
Edge and Chrome compatibility with other browser programs.
Chrome Root Program Updates 
Revamp of Chrome Root Program Policy.
Timeline for Chrome Root Store is TBD yet; follow the root store page.
Prioritization for inclusion requests.
Questions: 

Dean asked about incident reporting and where to disclose incidents and whether 
or not this needs to be in addition to disclosure on Mozilla list. Ryan 
responded that this is in addition to the Mozilla list. 

Dean asked how the Chrome Root certificate list was populated. Ryan answered 
that the principles there are captured within the policy - bolded list. 

Doug asked if root policy is only for TLS roots or does it include S/MIME? Ryan 
said that they are focused on Chrome root policy right now. Primary focus right 
now is on the roll out of Chrome Certificate Verifier in the Chrome Root Store 
across the various Chrome platforms. 

Doug asked if S/MIME Roots are TBD or inherited from the platform in which the 
browser is operating? Ryan noted that the browser does nothing with S/MIME 
today. Doug: Use the roots that are known to be trusted globally and not just 
Chromium Roots. Ryan: Multiple google root stores for multiple google products 
and teams. S/MIME is separate as they don't have this in Chrome - close 
collaboration with other teams and gmail. 

Ryan: Prioritizing inclusions of CAs and replacement of CAs, focused on CAs for 
single trust meaning that for a given certificate and everything beneath it is 
used for a consistent singular purpose. Previous discussion on having a root 
trusted for TLS and S/MIME - for Chrome Root Store, ensuring that the hierarchy 
is for a singular purpose.
Andrew mentioned that for S/MIME there are help center articles on the Google 
workspace admin help center that discuss how they are used in gmail which is 
managed independently from Chrome. 
Mozilla Root Program Update
Presenter: Ben Wilson (Mozilla) 
Note Taker: Neil Dunbar (Trustcor) 
Presentation: Mozilla Root Program Update 

Dimitris recommended following any questions with the Mozilla team regarding 
the Bugzilla CA-compliance statistics, owing to the level of detail in the 
presentation, and regarding the pressure of maintaining meeting schedule. 
CCADB Update
Presenter: Kathleen Wilson (Mozilla) 
Note Taker: Devon O'Brien (Google) 
Presentation: CCADB Update 

Topics: 
Update for multiple CP/CPS documents with a many to many mapping to root 
certificates
Discussion of ALV and guides on how to use
Add field called “Full CRL issued by this CA”
Clint: Apple would like CAs to publish links to full CRLs 

Discussion being taken to M.D.S.P. due to running behind schedule. 
Report from SCWG Network Security Subcommittee
Presenter: Neil Dunbar (Trustcor) 
Minute Taker: Trevoli Ponds-White (Amazon Trust Services) 
Presentation: Network Subcommittee Update (Summary) 
Presentation: Network Subcommittee Update (Main) 

Notes other than presentation:
A new Net Sec sub team to explore usage of cloud service providers is forming 
and would like new participants. The Net Sec group will also be re-organizing 
the meeting schedule for the sub teams to better align with the primary 
meetings. 
Thursday, 22 October 2020 - Plenary Meeting (Day 2)
Server Certificate Working Group
Attendees: Jeff Ward, Don Sheehy, Ryan Sleevi, Dean Coclin, Atsushi Inaba, Nick 
France (Sectigo), Dustin Hollenback, Tim Callan, Dimitris Zacharopoulos, 
Clemens Wanko, Tadahiko Ito, Andreas Henschel, Enrico Entschew, Devon O'Brien, 
Matthias Wiedenhorst, Eva Van Steenberge, Jos Purvis, Mike Reilly, Karina 
Sirota, Clint Wilson, Trevoli Ponds-White, Arno Fiedler, Vijay Kumar, Arvind 
Srinivasan, Saiprasad KP, Bruce Morton, Wayne Thayer, Janet Hines, Hongquan 
Yin, Peter Miskovic, Hazhar Ismail, Xiu Lei, Leo Grove, Chris Kemmerer, Abdul 
Hakeem Putra, Ahmad Syafiq MD Zaini, Pedro Fuentes, Tobias Josefowitz, Ben 
Wilson, Wendy Brown, Michelle Coon, Li-Chun Chen, Matthias Wiedenhorst, Andrea 
Holland, Daniela Hood, Clint Wilson, Adrian Mueller, David Kluge, Neil Dunbar, 
Nikolaos Soumelidis, Jan Völkel, Arnold Essing, Paul van Brouwershaven, Hiroshi 
Sakai, Andrew Whalley, Tim Hollebeek, Wei YiCai, Mads Henriksveen, Rebecca 
Kelley, Niko Carpenter, Rich Smith, Michael Jahnich, Mariusz Kondratowicz, 
Aaron Poulsen (Digicert), Tsung-Min Kuo, Julie Olson (Globalsign), Christoph 
Broter. 
Report from SCWG Validation Subcommittee
Presenter: Tim Hollebeek (Digicert) 
Minute Taker: Julie Olson (GlobalSign) 
Presentation: Validation Subcommittee Update 

On the topic of moving from Trello to Github 
Dean: Is there a way to automatically propagate github to a public list? 
Tim has asked a few people if there are significant github discussions and has 
tried to get cross discussions going through that platform, would be a useful 
resource for all to employ 

Dimitris: It’s difficult to follow conversation/discussion on github. From his 
perspective, it would be better to see changes/proposals on github, but 
conversations/discussions should be on the mailing list. 

Paul VB: Migrating to github is better because keeps everything in one spot. 
Mailing list doesn't have any search functionality, github is easier to track 
changes/search for topics. 

Tim: Mailing list archives ARE searchable, but not the most intuitive. If the 
mailing list could automatically insert archived posts in each new message from 
prior discussion that would be helpful. 

Paul: Would also be good to mirror all mailing list discussions to 
googlegroups. 

Ryan: Mailing lists have search functionality. It could be useful to send out 
digest summaries, google has tools available to accommodate this. There’s room 
for improvement from infra side and google is researching. You can also 
subscribe to CABF github and get notified on poll requests etc. 

Tim: Will be moving subcommittee items (missed which ones) form trello to 
github, into appropriate issues, in the next few weeks. 
Report from Quantum Cryptography liaisons
Presenters: Tadahiko Ito (Secom), Tim Hollebeek (Digicert) 
Note Taker: Tobias Josefowitz (Opera) 
Presentation: Update on Post-Quantum Cryptography 
Presentation2: Update on Post-Quantum Cryptography Tarahiko 

Notes other than presentation: 

(Tim Hollebeek presents (see first Presentation)) 

Tim Hollebeek: Questions? 

Dimitris: Things are still quite safe? 

Tim Hollebeek: Yes, but it is important to keep up to date on this. It depends 
on your timeline. If you are producing signatures for highly trusted 
applications that you want to be able to verify ten years into the future, the 
timeline is suddenly looking a lot less safe. You have to look at individual 
use cases, they will need different transition dates. 

(Tadahiko presents (see second Presentation)) 

Dimitris: Is there any algorithm that is a very strong candidate to be used for 
quantum-safe authentication? Tadahiko: In my opinion, FALCON or DILITHIUM. 
There are maybe a few more, but there are not that many quantum-safe signature 
algorithms. 

Dimitris: The authentication ones would be the most appropriate and compatible 
with this working group because we focus on authentication? 

Tadahiko: Our authentication data does not have a very long lifetime, it is in 
fact rather short, so for our use case it may not be extremely relevant yet, in 
my opinion. 

Ryan Sleevi: The term “authentication” might be a bit ambiguous here, we are 
talking about either key exchange or dignital signatures, and digital 
signatures is as Tadahiko was saying the question of how long that digital 
signature needs to be valid. In a TLS exchange for example, digital signature 
of the key material only needs to be valid minimally for the duration of that 
session. The digital signature of the certificate used in that negotiation 
needs to be valid longer, but that is still bounded by say one year. The use of 
digital signatures for code signing maybe needs to be valid for, say, a decade, 
and so there are differences there. When we say “authentication”, it may help 
to be precise here, to talk about “key exchange”, “digital signature”, and how 
long these things things need to be valid. Dimitris: Thanks for the 
clarification, that is exactly what I had in mind. I was wondering if there is 
any differentiation or any different candidate algorithms for this particular 
case, and for the longterm case, mainly if there is any approach in NIST or 
other research. 

Tadahiko: It seems NIST is concerning itself with the key encryption purpose, 
but not so much with the digital signature case, so for digital signature, the 
easiest way is using extended signature schemes. I think hash based signature 
scheme seems to work a bit better than the next best one, for large inputs. I 
think we need to think about this; it seems there is not that much discussion 
about it, currently, and we need to think about it here. 

Tim Hollebeek: From my perspective, NIST has started talking the approach that 
the long term ones are also perfectly appropriate for more shorter termed 
things, so there is a split between key exchange and signatures and things like 
that, but other than that they are trying to do something like AES where we 
have a small number of use case based well-vetted algorithms that work for all 
of the use cases that they need to, instead of trying to fracture it up and 
have several different schemes. 
ETSI Update
Presenter: Arno Fiedler (ETSI ESI) 
Note Taker: Enrico Entschew (D-TRUST) 
Presentation: ETSI ESI Activities Update 

Notes other than presentation: All key points available in slide deck. Main 
highlight for CAB-Forum is the updated version of ETSI TS-119 403-2 (Part 2: 
Additional requirements for Conformity Assessment Bodies auditing Trust Service 
Providers that issue Publicly-Trusted Certificates). 
ACAB'c Update
Presenters: Clemens Wanko (TÜV AUSTRIA) 
Minute Taker: Mads Henriksveen (Buypass) 
Presentation: ACAB'c Update 

Notes other than presentation: 

No additional discussion. 
WebTrust Update
Presenters: Jeff Ward (BDO), Don Sheehy (WebTrust)
Minute Taker: Andrea Holland (SecureTrust) 
Presentation: WebTrust Update 

Notes other than presentation: 

- WebTrust Temporary Seal is meant to be stop sign or caution sign used if the 
auditor cannot complete audit procedures within the 90 day deadline due to 
COVID-19 restrictions. 

- Reporting Templates are being updated for consistency of reporting as some 
standards have changed or been modified slightly. This is in the review stage. 

- Updated WebTrust Documents: Discuss effective date with primary certificate 
users on how these reports are handled for the transition of EV Code Signing 
merged into Publicly Trusted Code Signing version 2.0. Standard transitional 
recommendation would be for new audit periods commencing on or after but with 
an asterisk to contact the certificate users to get agreement on what the 
transitional report should be for 2020. 

- Historically all the WebTrust documents have been on the CPA Canada website 
this is going to change due to the AODA. CPA Canada decided to only include the 
latest document on the website and the historical documents will be removed. 
CPA Canada is working out an effective solution to handle the hyperlinks in the 
audit reports. One possible solution is a password protected link that is 
hidden from the public, so that the users of the report can understand what 
criteria was used. 

- CPA Canada figuring out how to handle validating the qualification of 
auditors. Potential option for practitioner guidance to require passing an 
exam, this is not expected until late 2021. 

No additional discussion. 
Guest Speaker #2
Presenters: Michael Jahnich (achelos) 
Presentation: Compliance testing of electronic certificates 
Any Other Business
Arrangements for Next Meeting
Next F2F meeting is taking place Feb-March virtually. 

Adjourn. 

 

 

Attachment: smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature

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