Hi Daniel,

*       Is there an expectation that CRL URLs for inactive issuers should 
remain accessible? If not it may be less confusing to prune the inaccessible 
content.

 

I assume that “inactive” in this case means that all certificates issued to 
that CA (name, key tuple) and chain to an Apple- or Mozilla-trusted root are 
expired or revoked. Even if there were an expectation that such CAs continue to 
provide revocation information, I struggle to see how maintaining access to 
that CA’s published revocation information would be valuable to a Relying 
Party. Relying parties will perform certification path validation on presented 
certificate chains, and this will fail upon encountering no valid paths from 
that CA (name, key tuple) back to a trust anchor. Any revocation artifacts 
issued by the CA in question have no value to the RP, as the CA itself is not 
trusted.

 

Thanks,

Corey

 

From: Daniel McCarney <[email protected]> 
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2023 7:45 PM
To: CCADB Public <[email protected]>
Subject: Broken CRL URLs in CCADB

 

Hi folks,

Earlier today I posted a message with the same subject[0] to MDSP when it's 
likely a discussion better suited for this mailing list. Thanks to Rob 
Stradling for redirecting me to the right place.

Rob's replies on MDSP are also valuable, so I'm sad to have forked the 
discussion. As he notes I didn't do any filtering based on whether affected 
rows chain up to an active root in participating programs. 

Is there an expectation that CRL URLs for inactive issuers should remain 
accessible? If not it may be less confusing to prune the inaccessible content.

Thanks,

[0]: 
https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/LvbtTeBXRnI/m/lGS4uefZAAAJ

> 
> Hello MDSP community,
> 
> I've been attempting to collect a dataset of CRLs by fetching each CRL URL 
> present in the "Full CRL Issued By This CA" and "JSON Array of Partitioned 
> CRLs" columns of the "all certificate records" CSV report available from 
> CCADB[0].
>
> This has uncovered a handful of mis-configurations that I believe should be 
> remedied. They fall into three categories of failure:
> 
> 1) CRL URLs that return a 403 Forbidden response.
> 2) CRL URLs that return a 404 Not Found response.
> 3) CRL URLs that return an x509 certificate, not a CRL.
>
> The failures affect four distinct CA owners: Sectigo, GlobalSign nv-sa, 
> Entrust, and Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional.
> 
> I'm disappointed that this is still a problem given Andrew Ayer previously 
> shared similar results[1] back in September 2022. I would strongly encourage 
> affected CAs to invest in monitoring of disclosed CRL URLs so that it doesn't 
> fall to broader Mozilla community to do this work on a regular basis.
>
> Forbidden responses:
>
> * CA Owner: Sectigo
>  * Salesforce Record ID 001o000000poU6CAAU
>    * CRL URL: http://crl.nicecert.com/eBizNetworksCodeSigningCA.crl
>  * Salesforce Record ID 001o000000piSaqAAE
>    * CRL URL: http://crl.nicecert.com/eBizNetworksLASSLCA.crl
>
> Not found responses:
>
> * CA Owner: GlobalSign nv-sa
>  * Salesforce Record ID 0014o00001l1GHoAAM
>    * CRL URL: http://crl.globalsign.com/ca/gsatlaseccr5ovtlsca202012.crl
>  * Salesforce Record ID 0011J00001ha3YgQAI
>    * CRL URL: http://crl.globalsign.com/ca/dpdhlusercai5.crl
>  * Salesforce Record ID 0014o00001l1GGCAA2
>    * CRL URL: http://crl.globalsign.com/ca/gsatlaseccr5dvtlsca202012.crl
> * CA Owner: Entrust
>  * Salesforce Record ID 001o000000p2VbmAAE
>    * CRL URL: http://crl.entrust.net/class1.crl
>
> Not a CRL responses:
>
> * CA Owner: Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional
>   * Salesforce Record ID 0018Z00002nth12QAA
>     * CRL URL: http://crl.firmaprofesional.com/ica-a01-qwac.crt
>   * Salesforce Record ID 0018Z00002nth2KQAQ
>     * CRL URL: http://crl.firmaprofesional.com/ica-a02-noqwac.crt
>
> Thanks,
>
> - Daniel (@cpu)
>
> [0]: 
> https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/ccadb/AllCertificateRecordsCSVFormat
> [1]: 
> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/Wm9Sf1AEbig/m/ANbMpBVFBwAJ

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