Hi Kurt,

FWIW, these Root CA certificates have not been accepted into the Apple Root 
Program.

Cheers,
-Clint

> On Jun 2, 2023, at 10:03 AM, 'Kurt Seifried' via CCADB Public 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> I'm curious, can we get any information from the other major browser vendors 
> as to whether or not they are removing these certificates, and if not why 
> not? Thanks!
> 
> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 6:17 AM Ryan Dickson <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> All,
>> 
>> We’d like to extend our appreciation to Ian Carroll for reporting this issue 
>> to us, and for Ian’s continued availability during the incident’s discussion 
>> (both here and on Bugzilla).
>> 
>> After full consideration of the available information related to the 
>> vulnerabilities disclosed at https://ian.sh/etugra, including that of 
>> incident reports and other public responses, we have decided that in order 
>> to appropriately protect and safeguard Chrome users, the following e-Tugra 
>> Root CA certificates will be removed from the Chrome Root Store: 
>> 
>> E-Tugra Global Root CA ECC v3 
>> <https://crt.sh/?q=873F4685FA7F563625252E6D36BCD7F16FC24951F264E47E1B954F4908CDCA13>
>>  
>> E-Tugra Global Root CA RSA v3 
>> <https://crt.sh/?q=EF66B0B10A3CDB9F2E3648C76BD2AF18EAD2BFE6F117655E28C4060DA1A3F4C2>
>> Most Chrome users will automatically receive these updates via Component 
>> Updater 
>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/lkgr/components/component_updater/README.md>
>>  immediately after publication of Version 11 of the Chrome Root Store 
>> (expected no later than June 15, 2023). In the event that a Chrome user has 
>> disabled Component Updater, these changes will be enabled by default 
>> beginning in Chrome Version 115 (stable release approximately July 18, 
>> 2023). No additional Chrome user action is required.
>> 
>> We only observe test certificates chaining to the roots listed above 
>> (examples [1 
>> <https://search.censys.io/search?resource=certificates&q=parsed.extensions.authority_key_id%3A+c75515756c8ba0e3f76f6d26bfb36a7dabad6bf9>],
>>  [2 
>> <https://search.censys.io/search?resource=certificates&q=parsed.extensions.authority_key_id%3A+baab83568fb245a9dc59e42880a537a02748a162>],
>>  and [3 
>> <https://search.censys.io/search?resource=certificates&q=parsed.extensions.authority_key_id%3A+c47f06cfaf010dacc54a19df51f41fc3a5a26186>]).
>>  Consequently, it is our understanding that there is no impact to e-Tugra 
>> subscribers or Chrome users as a result of this change. 
>> 
>> We may take further action, or accelerate the timeline described above, as 
>> additional information becomes available to us.
>> 
>> - Ryan
>> On behalf of the Chrome Root Program
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 2:12 PM 'Kurt Seifried' via 
>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> 
>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> 
>> wrote:
>>> On Sun, Feb 26, 2023 at 2:22 AM Ryan Hurst <[email protected] 
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> This thread and associated bug have been silent for an 
>>>> uncharacteristically long time, and I am curious as to when this issue 
>>>> will be closed.
>>>> 
>>>> Furthermore, I would like to understand what changes will be put into 
>>>> place to clarify appropriate incident handling behavior. It is important 
>>>> that Mozilla establishes a clear protocol for handling security incidents 
>>>> and communicates this effectively to all participants.
>>>> 
>>>> I am also curious in how Mozilla will choose to interpret the facts that 
>>>> have been made available. The way in which this incident is handled will 
>>>> establish a precedent for future security incidents, and it is important 
>>>> that Mozilla approaches this with a clear and consistent stance.
>>>> 
>>>> Ryan Hurst
>>> 
>>> So my take on this is: we're still in the 2000 era of "apply to be a root 
>>> ca, get in by default, stay in by default", that is to say, if you have all 
>>> the paperwork and don't do something terrible, well you're good to go. 
>>> Witness:
>>> 
>>> SERPRO issued numerous malformed/bad certificates indicating a lack of the 
>>> most basic controls and voluntarily withdrew their application and can 
>>> re-apply later. 
>>> 
>>> BJCA.cn has links to what appears to be spyware, but has said "it's fine" 
>>> and they have been approved:
>>> 
>>> This is notice that I am closing public discussion and that I am 
>>> recommending that we approve BJCA’s inclusion request. 
>>> This begins a 7-day "last call" period for any final objections.  
>>> 
>>> Also no mention or suggestion of limiting them to e.g. .cn for example. 
>>> 
>>> TRUSTCOR not only crossed some lines but then publicly made statements that 
>>> were later found to be false, I'm guessing had they "fallen on their sword" 
>>> and apologized they'd still be a CA.
>>> 
>>> Mailing list participation is another good indicator that nobody really 
>>> cares, the same 20-30 people are posting, on issues that affect the entire 
>>> world. 
>>> 
>>> The reality is that nobody really cares, nothing that bad has happened (at 
>>> least in the western world, ignoring the spyware and dead journalists, and 
>>> repression in various countries). I have a briefing on this and it boils 
>>> down to "if you want to be especially paranoid do what VISA does 
>>> (https://developer.visa.com/pages/trusted_certifying_authorities), there's 
>>> no point in trying to prevent bad CAs from getting in or staying in".
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>>> On Monday, November 28, 2022 at 2:52:47 AM UTC-8 Peter Gutmann wrote:
>>>>> Ian Carroll <[email protected] <>> writes:
>>>>> 
>>>>> >There are many statements about M of N, HSM access, etc which do not 
>>>>> >appear
>>>>> >to be relevant to this issue.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> That's not specific to e-Tughra though, that's standard for CAs where what
>>>>> gets audited is all the fancy security mechanisms around the CA's private
>>>>> key(s) and what barely, or not at all, gets audited is the various RAs 
>>>>> that
>>>>> pull the CA's strings.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Years ago I saw a cartoon lampooning a certain country's defence policy 
>>>>> which
>>>>> had lifeguard-style flags set up on a piece of open ground and a sign 
>>>>> between
>>>>> them saying "Please attack between the flags". With CA's it'd be "please
>>>>> audit between the flags".
>>>>> 
>>>>> Not defending or criticising e-Tughra, just pointing out that this isn't 
>>>>> their
>>>>> fault, it's How CAs Are Done.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Peter. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> Kurt Seifried (He/Him)
>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
>>> 
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> 
> -- 
> Kurt Seifried (He/Him)
> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
> 
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