Dear Ryan,

My remark was not tailored to SwissSign as we don't provide code signing 
certificates/services. It was just to understand the change in scope. Your 
explanation was very clear and detailed and I now understand where the gap was 
that this change closes. 👍

Thanks a lot & kind regards
Roman

From: Ryan Dickson <[email protected]>
Sent: Freitag, 13. Februar 2026 17:00
To: Roman Fischer <[email protected]>
Cc: public <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Further Improving the CCADB Policy and Incident Reporting 
Guidelines (FEEDBACK REQUESTED)


Hi Roman,


Thank you for reviewing the proposed CCADB Policy updates.


> We noticed the increase in scope to also cover Time Stamping. This is a 
> significant change and will also require us to change the scope of our audits 
> and internal controls. Can you help us understand the reasoning behind this 
> major change?


Adding the “Time 
Stamping<https://github.com/mozilla/www.ccadb.org/blob/policy_2-1/policy.md#5-audit-disclosures>”
 trust purpose to the “Audit Disclosures” table in Section 
5<https://www.ccadb.org/policy#5-audit-disclosures> was intended to close an 
unintended gap in the existing CCADB audit disclosure expectations.


Background:

  *   Each CA certificate disclosed to the CCADB is associated with “derived 
trust bits.” For simplicity and as we standardize terminology across the CCADB 
and CCADB Policy with other ecosystem tools (like crt.sh) these are sometimes 
referred to as “trust purposes.” A general description of how those values are 
set in the CCADB is available 
here<https://www.ccadb.org/cas/fields#system-generated-fields>.
  *   The CCADB Policy aims to describe common audit disclosure expectations 
for the trust bit values assigned to CA certificates by the CCADB. Today’s 
policy references Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, 
and Secure Email.


The gap:

My understanding is that the Code Signing BRs establish third-party audit 
expectations<https://cabforum.org/working-groups/code-signing/requirements/#841-ca-assessment>
 for issuing certificates containing both the id-kp-timeStamping EKU and the 
CA/Browser Forum Reserved Certificate Policy Identifier for timestamping 
(2.23.140.1.4.2).


Since “Time Stamping” is not listed in the audit disclosure table within 
Section 5 of the CCADB Policy, it could be interpreted to mean that for a PKI 
Hierarchy that only issues timestamping certificates (i.e., does not also have 
the Code Signing trust bit assigned), there are no CCADB audit disclosure 
expectations.


Expectations:

We expected the following outcomes from the change.


For CA certificates…


  1.  …with the Time Stamping trust purpose and issuing time stamping 
certificates, we’d expect they are already following the Code Signing BR audit 
expectations. This change now promotes improved transparency of those audit 
statements by ensuring their disclosure.


  1.  …with the Time Stamping trust purpose but not issuing time stamping 
certificates, we’d expect this change to highlight this point and result in the 
CA Owner requesting the removal of the unused trust purpose from the “granting” 
Root Store Operator. If the CA Owner wishes to retain the trust bit, they’d 
need to ensure the relevant audit expectations are satisfied.


  1.  …without the Time Stamping trust purpose, no change.


Specific to SwissSign, we do not see any CA certificates 
disclosed<https://ccadb.my.salesforce-sites.com/ccadb/AllCertificateRecordsCSVFormatv4>
 to the CCADB that contain the “Time Stamping” trust purpose. Can you help us 
better understand how this update would result in new changes to your audit 
scope(s) and internal controls?


Thanks,

Ryan


On Fri, Feb 13, 2026 at 7:24 AM 'Roman Fischer' via CCADB Public 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Dear Ryan,

Thanks for the opportunity to comment on the draft.

We noticed the increase in scope to also cover Time Stamping. This is a 
significant change and will also require us to change the scope of our audits 
and internal controls. Can you help us understand the reasoning behind this 
major change?

Thank you
Roman

From: 'Ryan Dickson' via CCADB Public 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Sent: Freitag, 23. Januar 2026 21:48
To: public <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Subject: Further Improving the CCADB Policy and Incident Reporting Guidelines 
(FEEDBACK REQUESTED)


Hi everyone,


Following the set of updates made to the CCADB 
Policy<https://www.ccadb.org/policy> last 
June<https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/J8aVHEWrMYs/m/bFM2shcrBgAJ>,
 the CCADB Steering Committee has collaborated on a set of updates to further 
clarify Root Store Operator expectations related to CCADB disclosures.


Updates are also planned for the CCADB Incident Reporting 
Guidelines<https://www.ccadb.org/cas/incident-report> (IRGs).


The set of proposed updates is available 
here<https://github.com/mozilla/www.ccadb.org/pull/214> (“clean” 
policy<https://github.com/mozilla/www.ccadb.org/blob/policy_2-1/policy.md> / 
IRG<https://github.com/mozilla/www.ccadb.org/blob/policy_2-1/cas/incident-report.md>).


Change summary:


Policy

  *   Clarify expectations for subordinate CA ownership disclosure.
  *   Effective September 15, 2026, require additional disclosures within PKI 
policy documents to more clearly establish the scope and applicability of 
policy documents.
  *   Clarify audit expectations for CAs serving time-stamping use cases.
  *   Clarify expectations related to explanatory letter disclosures for 
delayed audit statements.
  *   Encourage Qualified Auditors to review public incident reports and offer 
an opinion on incident handling and remediation.
  *   For audit periods beginning on or after January 15, 2027, audit 
statements must disclose sampling methodologies.
  *   Clarify CRL disclosure expectations. Specifically, this policy update 
considers a new field (i.e., "All Full CRL URIs for This Hierarchy") being 
added to the CCADB that will expect a a properly formatted JSON array for the 
complete set of distinct HTTP URLs appearing in the `crlDistributionPoints` 
extension of the unexpired certificates issued by that CA. CA Owners can expect 
separate standard CCADB Enhancement Request communications regarding the 
deployment of this field, which will occur before the updated policy becomes 
effective.


IRGs

  *   Clarify that audit findings must be the subject of an incident report.
  *   Describe how Qualified Auditors can be involved in the incident reporting 
process.
  *   Highlight that CA Owners should request a nextUpdate date “whiteboard” 
label to align with the soonest Action Item.
  *   Highlight how CA Owners may add additional data fields to incident report 
appendices.


These proposals should not be considered “final”, but instead a “work 
in-progress” that we hope to enhance through community contributions. We 
welcome community feedback on these proposed updates and recommendations by 
March 1, 2026. Please share your thoughts by replying to this email or, 
preferably, by suggesting edits directly on GitHub.


Thank you,

Ryan (on behalf of the CCADB Steering Committee)

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