-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hi Luke,
And thanks for the post :) pls see additional comments below... On 11/30/2010 05:01 PM, LW wrote: > In a direct response to the domain seizures by US authorities during the > last few days, a group of established enthusiasts have started working on a > DNS system that can’t be touched by any governmental institution. > Full Article: > http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-based-dns-to-counter-us-domain-seizures-101130/ > Dot p2p: http://dot-p2p.org/index.php?title=Main_Page Yes we've been talking about this interestingly enough, however, there remains the issue of the allocation of IP space. With a court order, a site can be shut down at 'many' ISPs, and NET-BLKs can be yanked too, altough this has never happened (The closest thing to it was not letting North Korea administer their TLD). Blacklisting in the routing tables has been a problem ever since CerfNET was acquired by Sprint, who dropped the routing of all /24's for a while, in an effort to alleviate competition from smaller ISPs in the early 90's. I had a heck of a time w/that one. At times my network was visible, and at other times not - depending on the route taken by the surfers on the far end. We got that resolved, however, before Jon died. There already exists several resources which are not *easily* affected by such tyranical tactics which deny the accused of due process, yet in order to build something which is almost impervious to SLD theft by Govt's, you need to AXFR each TLD zone and master it. I've done this - even w/.COM, and when I did we ran into issues surrounding the size of the zonefile and EXT2 filesystem limits at the time, LOL! The problem that laypeople don't understand, is that in order to safeguard against this type of *Domain Hijacking*, the provider has to master the TLD zones themselves. That's not so much a problem in the technical sense, but I used to have to maintain contracts w/NetSol in order to have this access, something which can be severed simply by the cancellation of the contract. This is something that OUR industry has avoided in the past: Mastering .COM/NET/ORG/etc..., at least where *The PacificRoot* was concerned, was an answer to the possibility of a catastrophic failure of USG DNS - a layer of redundancy, if you will, that we were prepared to immediately toggle over to, yet never ran as a production offering. The perspective I look at this from is as a technologist, and not someone engaged in taking sides in policy. Theft of a domain is a technical issue just as much as it is a political or legal one, yet if the activities of organizations w/an online presence are to be scrutinized in the legal sense, then *Due Process* applies equally to them as well. Yes, it seems that at least some of these sites were engaged in activities which may have resulted in them being eventually shutdown anyway (had the legal system in place been strictly adhered to), but this is not what is happening. Therefore, from a technical standpoint, the seizure of these domains were outside the scope of what is technically permissive. I've been saying for over thirty years now that the Internet is a private enterprise of private interconnected internetworks that engage in an implied agreement to pass each others traffic from end point to end point. It is owned by those who own the routers, fiber, copper, and peering points - as large or small as they may be. There is NOTHING to prevent new protocols from being permitted to traverse this internetwork of internetworks except for the lack of available software and hardware being loaded on machinery and of course, the implied agreement to allow these new protocols to traverse each owners network centers. Simple as pie. Sort of ;) I applaud the efforts of those who seek to implement protocols other than IP, and even at the higher levels, DNS, although DNS is not the vulnerable point - IP is, since it is almost universally the monopolistic transport (IPv4 and IPv6) incorporated. I am working on a couple of other transports currently, and Operate/Manage a few of these network nodes globally, as a research group member in the IRTF, and although these protocols are as capable as IP, it is not likely that they'll be universally deployed on routers across the Internet. The problem again, is the same as it is w/IPv6 - it requires tunnelling at certain points by being encapsulated inside of other transport protocol packets at several points between A, and B. Thanks again for your post Luke, and we've been working on a couple of draft articles to address this latest bout of technical mayhem arising from what appears to be a flawed legal approach. My main concern with what you proclaim in your post, however, begs me to ask why these so-called *established enthusiasts* have merely "Started" on this problem, instead of having been actively engaged in the development of such technical solutions prior to this - Like the TLDA membership has for a couple of decades now. After all, it's not like no one could have seen this coming, and there's really no time like tomorrow to get started when it might already be too late ;) Kindest regards, - -- Bradley D. Thornton Manager Network Services NorthTech Computer TEL: +1.760.666.2703 (US) TEL: +44.702.405.1909 (UK) http://NorthTech.US -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Find this cert at x-hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net iQEcBAEBAwAGBQJM9ahgAAoJEE1wgkIhr9j3HWYIAI2fVpLidhYXQSgutS6INSpw 5dRcxgYgN01br0u84yvb9PeSu1i7YLf563WgnaDuOWZAShKLoHpPCYZYdzP/F/HE XYwfJPimp/D6xhGRvnTwqNgwbWoheh3YPwAWV1IMEbpB4p8poqbhV/2Ql8AzUNzU +zjI5EqJLmfIpgx59lp24reqA/Jaq3NZtJmKcRfyYpI+KVp+IjG5+TKPyE2AvqtV 1vY5BhZibYttnLlvaXT0ICF6TZ6VXQveQQFHEHVXo+1E69MJ9fxMNyX+VDrbTjv1 Y3HRMVJ8VTYUvFtLJJlZ+e/lUj1GBQudwjokXJD6pTKaKxfLQ8ivMDXafXQoy1w= =UcJu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] http://tldainc.org/mailman/listinfo/public_tldainc.org
