Martin Panter added the comment:
It might help if you explained why you want to make these changes. Otherwise I
have to guess. Is a compromise between strictly rejecting all non-URL
characters (not just control characters), versus leaving it up to user
applications to validate their URLs?
I guess it could partially prevent some newline injection problems like Issue
29606 (FTP) and Issue 30458 (HTTP). But how do we know it closes more security
holes than it opens?
I don’t understand the focus on these three functions. They are undocumented
and more-or-less deprecated (Issue 27485). Why not focus on the “urlsplit” and
“urlparse” functions first?
Some of the changes seem to go too far, e.g. in the
splithost("//hostname/u\nrl") test case, the hostname is fine, but it is not
recognized. This would partially conflict the patch in Issue 13359, with
proposes to percent-encode newlines after passing through “splithost”. And it
would make the URL look like a relative URL, which is a potential security hole
and reminds me of the open redirect bug report (Issue 23505).
----------
nosy: +martin.panter
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