For this specific purpose, md5 is just as good as a proper hash. But all else being equal, it would still be better to use a proper hash, just so people don't have to go through the whole security analysis to check that.
Of course all else isn't equal: switching from md5 to sha-whatever would require someone do the work. Is anyone volunteering? On Fri, Dec 7, 2018, 11:56 Devin Jeanpierre <jeanpierr...@gmail.com wrote: > On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 10:48 AM Antoine Pitrou <solip...@pitrou.net> > wrote: > >> If the site is vulnerable to modifications, then TLS doesn't help. >> Again: you must verify the GPG signatures (since they are produced by >> the release manager's private key, which is *not* stored on the >> python.org Web site). >> > > This is missing the point. They were asking why not to use SHA512. The > answer is that the hash does not provide any extra security. GPG is > separate: even if there was no GPG signature, SHA512 would still not > provide any extra security. That's why I said "more to the point". :P > > Nobody "must" verify the GPG signatures. TLS doesn't protect against > everything, but neither does GPG. A naive user might just download a public > GPG key from a compromised python.org and use it to verify the > compromised release, see everything is "OK", and still be hosed. > > -- Devin > _______________________________________________ > Python-ideas mailing list > Python-ideas@python.org > https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-ideas > Code of Conduct: http://python.org/psf/codeofconduct/ >
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