https://docs.python.org/3/library/random.html :
> Warning: The pseudo-random generators of this module should not be used for security purposes. For security or cryptographic uses, see the secrets module https://docs.python.org/3/library/secrets.html#module-secrets PEP 506 – Adding A Secrets Module To The Standard Library https://peps.python.org/pep-0506/#alternatives https://github.com/python/peps/blob/main/pep-0506.txt PEP 12: new PEP template: https://github.com/python/peps/blob/main/pep-0012/pep-NNNN.rst Pseudorandom number generator > Cryptographic PRNGs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandom_number_generator#Cryptographic_PRNGs Random number generator attack > Defenses https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_number_generator_attack#Defenses /? CSPRNG https://www.google.com/search?q=CSPRNG >From "THE LINUX CSPRNG IS NOW GOOD!" https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/linux-csprng/ : > [ get random() is from OpenBSD and LibreSSL ] > Performance and ChaCha20 > Some people would say they needed a userspace CSPRNG for PERFORMANCE. I never really believed most of them, but to be fair Linux was using a kinda slow SHA-1 extractor back then. However, since Linux 4.8 (2016) the default getrandom(2) source is a fast ChaCha20-based CSPRNG, with separate pools per NUMA node to avoid contention. (Just ignore the rude comments in the code about applications not running their own CSPRNG, this is still Linux after all.) > > There's even a neat trick XOR'ing some of the CSPRGN output back into the ChaCha20 state to prevent an attacker from recovering any past output from before the time of compromise. > > Some of these improvements came along thanks to the Wireguard work by Jason A. Donenfeld "Problems emerge for a unified /dev/*random" (2022) https://lwn.net/Articles/889452/ From https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/understanding-red-hat-enterprise-linux-random-number-generator-interface : """ How does the kernel initialize its CSPRNG? The kernel has an “entropy pool,” a place where unpredictable input observed by the kernel is mixed and stored. That pool serves as a seed to the internal CSPRNG, and until some threshold of estimated entropy is reached initially, it is considered uninitialized. Let’s now see how the kernel initializes its entropy pool. 1. After the kernel takes control on power-on, it starts filling its entropy pool by mixing interrupt timing and other unpredictable input. 2. The kernel gives control to systemd. 3. Next, systemd starts and initializes itself. 4. Systemd, optionally, loads kernel modules which will improve the kernel's entropy gathering process on a virtual machine (e.g., virtio-rng). 5. Systemd loads the rngd.service which will gather additional input entropy obtained via a random generator exposed by hardware (e.g., the x86 RDRAND instruction or similar) and jitter entropy1; this entropy is fed back into the kernel to initialize its entropy pool, typically in a matter of milliseconds. After the last step, the kernel has its entropy pool initialized, and any systemd services started can take advantage of the kernel’s random generator. Note that the virtio-rng kernel module loading in step (3), is an optional step which improves entropy gathering in a virtual machine by using the host's random generator to initialize the guest systems in KVM. The rngd.service loading at the final step (4) is what ensures that the kernel entropy pools are initialized on every scenario, and furthermore it continues mixing additional data in the kernel pool during system runtime. """ https://github.com/nhorman/rng-tools/blob/master/fips.c : ```c /* fips.c -- Performs FIPS 140-1/140-2 RNG tests ``` /? FIPS 140-1/140-2 RNG tests https://www.google.com/search?q=FIPS+140-1%2F140-2+RNG+tests /? CMVP "cprng" https://www.google.com/search?q=CMVP+%22cprng%22 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/3/final https://www.google.com/search?q=rng+tests - https://www.johndcook.com/blog/rng-testing/ : > We test RNGs using the standard test suites: PractRand, TestU01 (BigCrush), DIEHARD(ER), NIST SP 800-22. Randomness tests: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randomness_test#Notable_software_implementations : - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diehard_tests - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TestU01 - /? NIST 800-22 https://www.google.com/search?q=nist+800-22 /? nist 800-22 site:github.com https://www.google.com/search?q=nist+800-22+site%3Agithub.com - https://github.com/google/paranoid_crypto/blob/main/docs/randomness_tests.md >From https://cryptography.io/en/latest/random-numbers/ https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/blob/main/docs/random-numbers.rst : ```rst Random number generation ======================== When generating random data for use in cryptographic operations, such as an initialization vector for encryption in :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.modes.CBC` mode, you do not want to use the standard :mod:`random` module APIs. This is because they do not provide a cryptographically secure random number generator, which can result in major security issues depending on the algorithms in use. Therefore, it is our recommendation to `always use your operating system's provided random number generator`_, which is available as :func:`os.urandom`. For example, if you need 16 bytes of random data for an initialization vector, you can obtain them with: .. doctest:: >>> import os >>> iv = os.urandom(16) This will use ``/dev/urandom`` on UNIX platforms, and ``CryptGenRandom`` on Windows. If you need your random number as an integer (for example, for :meth:`~cryptography.x509.CertificateBuilder.serial_number`), you can use ``int.from_bytes`` to convert the result of ``os.urandom``: .. code-block:: pycon >>> serial = int.from_bytes(os.urandom(20), byteorder="big") In addition, the `Python standard library`_ includes the ``secrets`` module, which can be used for generating cryptographically secure random numbers, with specific helpers for text-based formats. .. _`always use your operating system's provided random number generator`: https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/02/25/safely-generate-random-numbers/ .. _`Python standard library`: https://docs.python.org/3/library/secrets.html ``` On Mon, Nov 14, 2022, 10:57 AM Barry <ba...@barrys-emacs.org> wrote: > > > > On 14 Nov 2022, at 14:31, James Johnson <jj126...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > I wrote the attached python (3) code to improve on existing prng > functions. I used the time module for one method, which resulted in > disproportionate odd values, but agreeable means. > > > > I used the hashlib module for the second. It is evident that the code is > amateur, but the program might result in better PRN generation. > > > > The "app" lends itself to checking, using statistical tools (see > comments.) > > Have you used any cryptographic tools to prove the quality of your PRNG? > What results did you get? > How does your PRNG compare to what python already has? > > Without that this analysis this will be unlikely to be considered as a > candidate for python stdlib. > > Barry > > > > > I remain a fan, > > > > James Johnson > > <testrandom.py> > > _______________________________________________ > > Python-ideas mailing list -- python-ideas@python.org > > To unsubscribe send an email to python-ideas-le...@python.org > > https://mail.python.org/mailman3/lists/python-ideas.python.org/ > > Message archived at > https://mail.python.org/archives/list/python-ideas@python.org/message/VENAT2YTVYVHTBSEVHHMIURCU6MG2CEO/ > > Code of Conduct: http://python.org/psf/codeofconduct/ > > _______________________________________________ > Python-ideas mailing list -- python-ideas@python.org > To unsubscribe send an email to python-ideas-le...@python.org > https://mail.python.org/mailman3/lists/python-ideas.python.org/ > Message archived at > https://mail.python.org/archives/list/python-ideas@python.org/message/HWQV4AKQAUM7CY4NWS2IRIVLRAYMKR3V/ > Code of Conduct: http://python.org/psf/codeofconduct/ >
_______________________________________________ Python-ideas mailing list -- python-ideas@python.org To unsubscribe send an email to python-ideas-le...@python.org https://mail.python.org/mailman3/lists/python-ideas.python.org/ Message archived at https://mail.python.org/archives/list/python-ideas@python.org/message/TSU5XMSWIKNDKEVLRTUYY2KD5R7SCU6I/ Code of Conduct: http://python.org/psf/codeofconduct/
