On 23.05.2015 05:31, Michael Torrie wrote: > Sigh. I blame this as much on the browser. There's no inherent reason > why a connection to a site secured with a self-signed certificate is > insecure.
The problem is *not* that the certificate is self-signed. It's that it's unknown previously to being encountered within the TLS handshake. And that *does* make it inherently insecure. Not algorithmically, obviously. I can still do a DH-handshake with the remote peer that will generate a shared secret no eavesdropper will know. The browser just can't be sure that whoever it negotiated the DH with is really the endpoint (i.e. the webserver). That is the problem. I dislike CAs as much as the next guy. But the problem of distributing trust is just not easy to solve, a TTP is a way out. Do you have an alternative that does not at the same time to providing a solution also opens up obvious attack surface? Cheers, Johannes -- >> Wo hattest Du das Beben nochmal GENAU vorhergesagt? > Zumindest nicht öffentlich! Ah, der neueste und bis heute genialste Streich unsere großen Kosmologen: Die Geheim-Vorhersage. - Karl Kaos über Rüdiger Thomas in dsa <hidbv3$om2$1...@speranza.aioe.org> -- https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-list