On 03.05.2012, at 11:03, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:

> On Thu, May 03, 2012 at 11:01:29AM +0200, Alexander Graf wrote:
>> On 03.05.2012, at 10:57, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>>> On Thu, May 03, 2012 at 10:51:15AM +0200, Alexander Graf wrote:
>>>> On 03.05.2012, at 10:29, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, May 02, 2012 at 03:32:56PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>>>> FIPS 140-2 requires disabling certain ciphers, including DES, which is 
>>>>>> used
>>>>>> by VNC to obscure passwords when they are sent over the network.  The
>>>>>> solution for FIPS users is to disable the use of VNC password auth when 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> host system is operating in FIPS mode.
>>>> So that means "no password" is more secure according to FIPS than
>>>> "DES encrypted password"?
>>> No, FIPS is not making statements about the choice of auth methods.
>>> FIPS is concerned with what encryption algorithms an application uses.
>>> The requirements about whether authentication is required & what sort,
>>> is upto other specifications (eg Common Criteria) to decide.
>> Hrm, so short-term this fixes things. But long-term, I think the 
>> better solution would be to implement the tight security model and
>> use a real cipher:
> That is certainly possible, but shouldn't have any bearing on whether
> this patch is accepted. Note that QEMU already implements VeNCrypt
> and SASL extensions both of which provide strong security

Hmm. Isn't the syslog message misleading then? Also, why would the whole 
password parameter be blocked then?


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