On 03.05.2012, at 11:03, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: > On Thu, May 03, 2012 at 11:01:29AM +0200, Alexander Graf wrote: >> >> On 03.05.2012, at 10:57, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: >> >>> On Thu, May 03, 2012 at 10:51:15AM +0200, Alexander Graf wrote: >>>> >>>> On 03.05.2012, at 10:29, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 02, 2012 at 03:32:56PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: >>>>>> FIPS 140-2 requires disabling certain ciphers, including DES, which is >>>>>> used >>>>>> by VNC to obscure passwords when they are sent over the network. The >>>>>> solution for FIPS users is to disable the use of VNC password auth when >>>>>> the >>>>>> host system is operating in FIPS mode. >>>> >>>> So that means "no password" is more secure according to FIPS than >>>> "DES encrypted password"? >>> >>> No, FIPS is not making statements about the choice of auth methods. >>> FIPS is concerned with what encryption algorithms an application uses. >>> The requirements about whether authentication is required & what sort, >>> is upto other specifications (eg Common Criteria) to decide. >> >> Hrm, so short-term this fixes things. But long-term, I think the >> better solution would be to implement the tight security model and >> use a real cipher: > > That is certainly possible, but shouldn't have any bearing on whether > this patch is accepted. Note that QEMU already implements VeNCrypt > and SASL extensions both of which provide strong security
Hmm. Isn't the syslog message misleading then? Also, why would the whole password parameter be blocked then? Alex
