commit 428c3ece97179557f2753071fb0ca97a03437267 ("fix MSI injection on Xen")
inadvertently enabled the xen-specific logic unconditionally.
Limit it to only when xen is enabled.
Additionally, msix data should be read with pci_get_log
since the format is pci little-endian.
Reported-by: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berra...@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabell...@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com>
---
hw/pci/msix.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/pci/msix.c b/hw/pci/msix.c
index eb4ef11..537fdba 100644
--- a/hw/pci/msix.c
+++ b/hw/pci/msix.c
@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector)
static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask)
{
unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
- uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset +
PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
+ uint8_t *data = &dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
/* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking
* and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */
- if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) {
+ if (xen_enabled() && xen_is_pirq_msi(pci_get_long(data))) {
return false;
}
return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] &
--
MST
