On Sun, Feb 26, 2017 at 11:42:34PM +0100, Greg Kurz wrote: > The local_llistxattr() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because > it calls llistxattr() which follows symbolic links in all path elements but > the rightmost one. > > This patch introduces a helper to emulate the non-existing flistxattrat() > function: it is implemented with /proc/self/fd which provides a trusted > path that can be safely passed to llistxattr(). > > local_llistxattr() is converted to use this helper and opendir_nofollow(). > > This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602. > > Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <gr...@kaod.org> > --- > v2: - introduce /proc based flistxattrat_nofollow() > --- > hw/9pfs/9p-xattr.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefa...@redhat.com>
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
