This patch allows the hostfwd option to override the restrict=y setting in
the user network stack, as explicitly stated in the documentation on the
restrict option:
restrict=on|off
If this option is enabled, the guest will be isolated, i.e. it
will not be able to contact the host and no guest IP packets
will be routed over the host to the outside. This option does
not affect any explicitly set forwarding rules.
Qemu bug tracker:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/829455
diff -aur qemu-kvm-0.15.0+noroms/slirp/tcp_input.c
qemu-kvm-0.15.0+noromsnew/slirp/tcp_input.c
--- qemu-kvm-0.15.0+noroms/slirp/tcp_input.c 2011-08-09 14:40:29.000000000
+0200
+++ qemu-kvm-0.15.0+noromsnew/slirp/tcp_input.c 2011-11-11 12:42:31.000000000
+0100
@@ -316,16 +316,6 @@
m->m_data += sizeof(struct tcpiphdr)+off-sizeof(struct tcphdr);
m->m_len -= sizeof(struct tcpiphdr)+off-sizeof(struct tcphdr);
- if (slirp->restricted) {
- for (ex_ptr = slirp->exec_list; ex_ptr; ex_ptr = ex_ptr->ex_next) {
- if (ex_ptr->ex_fport == ti->ti_dport &&
- ti->ti_dst.s_addr == ex_ptr->ex_addr.s_addr) {
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!ex_ptr)
- goto drop;
- }
/*
* Locate pcb for segment.
*/
@@ -354,7 +344,23 @@
* the only flag set, then create a session, mark it
* as if it was LISTENING, and continue...
*/
- if (so == NULL) {
+ if (so == NULL) {
+ if (slirp->restricted) {
+ /* Any hostfwds will have an existing socket, so we only get here
+ * for non-hostfwd connections. These should be dropped, unless it
+ * happens to be a guestfwd.
+ */
+ for (ex_ptr = slirp->exec_list; ex_ptr; ex_ptr = ex_ptr->ex_next) {
+ if (ex_ptr->ex_fport == ti->ti_dport &&
+ ti->ti_dst.s_addr == ex_ptr->ex_addr.s_addr) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ex_ptr) {
+ goto dropwithreset;
+ }
+ }
+
if ((tiflags & (TH_SYN|TH_FIN|TH_RST|TH_URG|TH_ACK)) != TH_SYN)
goto dropwithreset;
Signed-off-by: Gertjan Halkes <q...@ghalkes.nl>
