Move the function vfio_get_xlat_addr to softmmu/memory.c, and change the name to memory_get_xlat_addr().So we can use this function in other devices,such as vDPA device.
Signed-off-by: Cindy Lu <l...@redhat.com> --- hw/vfio/common.c | 92 ++----------------------------------------- include/exec/memory.h | 4 ++ softmmu/memory.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/vfio/common.c b/hw/vfio/common.c index ace9562a9b..2b5a9f3d8d 100644 --- a/hw/vfio/common.c +++ b/hw/vfio/common.c @@ -574,92 +574,6 @@ static bool vfio_listener_skipped_section(MemoryRegionSection *section) section->offset_within_address_space & (1ULL << 63); } -/* Called with rcu_read_lock held. */ -static bool vfio_get_xlat_addr(IOMMUTLBEntry *iotlb, void **vaddr, - ram_addr_t *ram_addr, bool *read_only) -{ - MemoryRegion *mr; - hwaddr xlat; - hwaddr len = iotlb->addr_mask + 1; - bool writable = iotlb->perm & IOMMU_WO; - - /* - * The IOMMU TLB entry we have just covers translation through - * this IOMMU to its immediate target. We need to translate - * it the rest of the way through to memory. - */ - mr = address_space_translate(&address_space_memory, - iotlb->translated_addr, - &xlat, &len, writable, - MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED); - if (!memory_region_is_ram(mr)) { - error_report("iommu map to non memory area %"HWADDR_PRIx"", - xlat); - return false; - } else if (memory_region_has_ram_discard_manager(mr)) { - RamDiscardManager *rdm = memory_region_get_ram_discard_manager(mr); - MemoryRegionSection tmp = { - .mr = mr, - .offset_within_region = xlat, - .size = int128_make64(len), - }; - - /* - * Malicious VMs can map memory into the IOMMU, which is expected - * to remain discarded. vfio will pin all pages, populating memory. - * Disallow that. vmstate priorities make sure any RamDiscardManager - * were already restored before IOMMUs are restored. - */ - if (!ram_discard_manager_is_populated(rdm, &tmp)) { - error_report("iommu map to discarded memory (e.g., unplugged via" - " virtio-mem): %"HWADDR_PRIx"", - iotlb->translated_addr); - return false; - } - - /* - * Malicious VMs might trigger discarding of IOMMU-mapped memory. The - * pages will remain pinned inside vfio until unmapped, resulting in a - * higher memory consumption than expected. If memory would get - * populated again later, there would be an inconsistency between pages - * pinned by vfio and pages seen by QEMU. This is the case until - * unmapped from the IOMMU (e.g., during device reset). - * - * With malicious guests, we really only care about pinning more memory - * than expected. RLIMIT_MEMLOCK set for the user/process can never be - * exceeded and can be used to mitigate this problem. - */ - warn_report_once("Using vfio with vIOMMUs and coordinated discarding of" - " RAM (e.g., virtio-mem) works, however, malicious" - " guests can trigger pinning of more memory than" - " intended via an IOMMU. It's possible to mitigate " - " by setting/adjusting RLIMIT_MEMLOCK."); - } - - /* - * Translation truncates length to the IOMMU page size, - * check that it did not truncate too much. - */ - if (len & iotlb->addr_mask) { - error_report("iommu has granularity incompatible with target AS"); - return false; - } - - if (vaddr) { - *vaddr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(mr) + xlat; - } - - if (ram_addr) { - *ram_addr = memory_region_get_ram_addr(mr) + xlat; - } - - if (read_only) { - *read_only = !writable || mr->readonly; - } - - return true; -} - static void vfio_iommu_map_notify(IOMMUNotifier *n, IOMMUTLBEntry *iotlb) { VFIOGuestIOMMU *giommu = container_of(n, VFIOGuestIOMMU, n); @@ -682,7 +596,8 @@ static void vfio_iommu_map_notify(IOMMUNotifier *n, IOMMUTLBEntry *iotlb) if ((iotlb->perm & IOMMU_RW) != IOMMU_NONE) { bool read_only; - if (!vfio_get_xlat_addr(iotlb, &vaddr, NULL, &read_only)) { + if (!memory_get_xlat_addr(iotlb, &vaddr, NULL, &read_only, + &address_space_memory)) { goto out; } /* @@ -1359,7 +1274,8 @@ static void vfio_iommu_map_dirty_notify(IOMMUNotifier *n, IOMMUTLBEntry *iotlb) } rcu_read_lock(); - if (vfio_get_xlat_addr(iotlb, NULL, &translated_addr, NULL)) { + if (memory_get_xlat_addr(iotlb, NULL, &translated_addr, NULL, + &address_space_memory)) { int ret; ret = vfio_get_dirty_bitmap(container, iova, iotlb->addr_mask + 1, diff --git a/include/exec/memory.h b/include/exec/memory.h index bfb1de8eea..282de1d5ad 100644 --- a/include/exec/memory.h +++ b/include/exec/memory.h @@ -713,6 +713,10 @@ void ram_discard_manager_register_listener(RamDiscardManager *rdm, void ram_discard_manager_unregister_listener(RamDiscardManager *rdm, RamDiscardListener *rdl); +bool memory_get_xlat_addr(IOMMUTLBEntry *iotlb, void **vaddr, + ram_addr_t *ram_addr, bool *read_only, + AddressSpace *as); + typedef struct CoalescedMemoryRange CoalescedMemoryRange; typedef struct MemoryRegionIoeventfd MemoryRegionIoeventfd; diff --git a/softmmu/memory.c b/softmmu/memory.c index 7ba2048836..8586863ffa 100644 --- a/softmmu/memory.c +++ b/softmmu/memory.c @@ -2121,6 +2121,90 @@ void ram_discard_manager_unregister_listener(RamDiscardManager *rdm, rdmc->unregister_listener(rdm, rdl); } +/* Called with rcu_read_lock held. */ +bool memory_get_xlat_addr(IOMMUTLBEntry *iotlb, void **vaddr, + ram_addr_t *ram_addr, bool *read_only, + AddressSpace *as) +{ + MemoryRegion *mr; + hwaddr xlat; + hwaddr len = iotlb->addr_mask + 1; + bool writable = iotlb->perm & IOMMU_WO; + + /* + * The IOMMU TLB entry we have just covers translation through + * this IOMMU to its immediate target. We need to translate + * it the rest of the way through to memory. + */ + mr = address_space_translate(as, iotlb->translated_addr, &xlat, &len, + writable, MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED); + if (!memory_region_is_ram(mr)) { + error_report("iommu map to non memory area %" HWADDR_PRIx "", xlat); + return false; + } else if (memory_region_has_ram_discard_manager(mr)) { + RamDiscardManager *rdm = memory_region_get_ram_discard_manager(mr); + MemoryRegionSection tmp = { + .mr = mr, + .offset_within_region = xlat, + .size = int128_make64(len), + }; + + /* + * Malicious VMs can map memory into the IOMMU, which is expected + * to remain discarded. device will pin all pages, populating memory. + * Disallow that. vmstate priorities make sure any RamDiscardManager + * were already restored before IOMMUs are restored. + */ + if (!ram_discard_manager_is_populated(rdm, &tmp)) { + error_report("iommu map to discarded memory (e.g., unplugged via" + " virtio-mem): %" HWADDR_PRIx "", + iotlb->translated_addr); + return false; + } + + /* + * Malicious VMs might trigger discarding of IOMMU-mapped memory. The + * pages will remain pinned inside device until unmapped, resulting in a + * higher memory consumption than expected. If memory would get + * populated again later, there would be an inconsistency between pages + * pinned by device and pages seen by QEMU. This is the case until + * unmapped from the IOMMU (e.g., during device reset). + * + * With malicious guests, we really only care about pinning more memory + * than expected. RLIMIT_MEMLOCK set for the user/process can never be + * exceeded and can be used to mitigate this problem. + */ + warn_report_once("Using device with vIOMMUs and coordinated discarding" + " of RAM (e.g., virtio-mem) works, however, malicious" + " guests can trigger pinning of more memory than" + " intended via an IOMMU. It's possible to mitigate " + " by setting/adjusting RLIMIT_MEMLOCK."); + } + + /* + * Translation truncates length to the IOMMU page size, + * check that it did not truncate too much. + */ + if (len & iotlb->addr_mask) { + error_report("iommu has granularity incompatible with target AS"); + return false; + } + + if (vaddr) { + *vaddr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(mr) + xlat; + } + + if (ram_addr) { + *ram_addr = memory_region_get_ram_addr(mr) + xlat; + } + + if (read_only) { + *read_only = !writable || mr->readonly; + } + + return true; +} + void memory_region_set_log(MemoryRegion *mr, bool log, unsigned client) { uint8_t mask = 1 << client; -- 2.34.3