Hi Peter,
> V8 always implies V7, so we only need to check V7 here.
>From silicon perspective - yes, but as I see in qemu,
ARM_FEATURE_V7 and ARM_FEATURE_V8 are independent bits which do not affect
each
other in arm_feature() and set_feature() so they should be tested
separately.
Did I miss something?

Thanks
Best regards
Timofey



On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 4:45 PM Peter Maydell <peter.mayd...@linaro.org>
wrote:

> On Wed, 19 Oct 2022 at 13:15, Timofey Kutergin <tkuter...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > - synchronize PSTATE.PAN with changes in CPSR.PAN in aarch32 mode
> > - set PAN bit automatically on exception entry if SCTLR_SPAN bit
> >   is set
> > - throw permission fault during address translation when PAN is
> >   enabled and kernel tries to access user acessible page
> > - ignore SCTLR_XP bit for armv7 and armv8 (conflicts with SCTLR_SPAN).
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Timofey Kutergin <tkuter...@gmail.com>
> > ---
> >  target/arm/helper.c |  6 ++++++
> >  target/arm/ptw.c    | 11 ++++++++++-
> >  2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> Thanks for this patch. I think you've caught all the places
> we aren't correctly implementing AArch32 PAN handling.
>
> > diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
> > index dde64a487a..5299f67e3f 100644
> > --- a/target/arm/helper.c
> > +++ b/target/arm/helper.c
> > @@ -9052,6 +9052,11 @@ void cpsr_write(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t val,
> uint32_t mask,
> >      }
> >      mask &= ~CACHED_CPSR_BITS;
> >      env->uncached_cpsr = (env->uncached_cpsr & ~mask) | (val & mask);
> > +    if (env->uncached_cpsr & CPSR_PAN) {
> > +        env->pstate |= PSTATE_PAN;
> > +    } else {
> > +        env->pstate &= ~PSTATE_PAN;
> > +    }
>
> This approach means we're storing the PAN bit in two places,
> both in env->uncached_cpsr and in env->pstate. We don't do
> this for any other bits as far as I can see. I think we should
> either:
>  (1) have the code that changes behaviour based on PAN look
>      at either env->pstate or env->uncached_cpsr depending
>      on whether we're AArch64 or AArch32
>  (2) always store the state in env->pstate only, and handle
>      this in read/write of the CPSR the same way we do with
>      other "cached" bits
>
> I think the intention of the current code is (1), and the
> only place we get this wrong is in arm_mmu_idx_el(),
> which is checking env->pstate only. (The other places that
> directly check env->pstate are all in AArch64-only code,
> and various AArch32-only bits of code already check
> env->uncached_cpsr.) A function like
>
> bool arm_pan_enabled(CPUARMState *env)
> {
>     if (is_a64(env)) {
>         return env->pstate & PSTATE_PAN;
>     } else {
>         return env->uncached_cpsr & CPSR_PAN;
>     }
> }
>
> and then using that in arm_mmu_idx_el() should I think
> mean you don't need to change either cpsr_write() or
> take_aarch32_exception().
>
> >      if (rebuild_hflags) {
> >          arm_rebuild_hflags(env);
> >      }
> > @@ -9592,6 +9597,7 @@ static void take_aarch32_exception(CPUARMState
> *env, int new_mode,
> >                  /* ... the target is EL1 and SCTLR.SPAN is 0.  */
> >                  if (!(env->cp15.sctlr_el[new_el] & SCTLR_SPAN)) {
> >                      env->uncached_cpsr |= CPSR_PAN;
> > +                    env->pstate |= PSTATE_PAN;
> >                  }
> >                  break;
> >              }
> > diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
> > index 23f16f4ff7..204a73350f 100644
> > --- a/target/arm/ptw.c
> > +++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
> > @@ -659,6 +659,13 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env,
> uint32_t address,
> >              goto do_fault;
> >          }
> >
> > +        if (regime_is_pan(env, mmu_idx) && !regime_is_user(env,
> mmu_idx) &&
> > +            simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap >> 1, 1) &&
> > +            access_type != MMU_INST_FETCH) {
> > +            fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
> > +            goto do_fault;
> > +        }
>
> This assumes we're using the SCTLR.AFE==1 simplified
> permissions model, but PAN should apply even if we're using the
> old model. So we need a ap_to_rw_prot_is_user() to check the
> permissions in that model.
>
> The check is also being done before the Access fault check, but
> the architecture says that Access faults take priority over
> Permission faults.
>
> > +
> >          if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V6K) &&
> >                  (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_AFE)) {
> >              /* The simplified model uses AP[0] as an access control
> bit.  */
> > @@ -2506,7 +2513,9 @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env,
> target_ulong address,
> >      if (regime_using_lpae_format(env, mmu_idx)) {
> >          return get_phys_addr_lpae(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
> >                                    is_secure, false, result, fi);
> > -    } else if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_XP) {
> > +    } else if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V7) ||
> > +               arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8) || (
>
> V8 always implies V7, so we only need to check V7 here.
>
> > +               regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_XP)) {
> >          return get_phys_addr_v6(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
> >                                  is_secure, result, fi);
> >      } else {
>
> thanks
> -- PMM
>

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