Mate Wierdl wrote:
>
> I am reading this book by B. Schneier, in particular, the section
> `Cracking and hacking contests'. He thinks that contests (like
> offering $1000 for finding a security hole in a product) are bad for
> four main reasons, the first reason being that the contests are
> usually unfair since the author of the software decides what he/she
> considers a "hole".
>
> He also thinks that even having a software out and used for a few
> years without incidence does not imply that it is secure. He says,
> the best way to evaluate the security of a product is to have it
> audited by security experts.
>
> So has any expert ever audited qmail or djbdns?
>
> Mate
Yeah! he is right! Just because you don't have runned into crash does
not mean i have no bug!
Although it's not possible to garantee software correctness, you can get
close to, by using a formal design approach. I would use the Z language
for that, the same used by QNX (very rigorous mission critical needs).
While UNIX does not get into a formal approach, developing secure
systems will be only a wish, not a fact (even considering openbsd).
