Dear Qubes Community,

We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 079: Two IOMMU-
related Xen issues (XSA-399, XSA-400). The text of this QSB is
reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying signatures will always
be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View QSB-079 in the qubes-secpack:

<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-079-2022.txt>

In addition, you may wish to:

- Get the qubes-secpack: <https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/>
- View all past QSBs: <https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/>
- View the XSA Tracker: <https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/>

```

             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 079 ]===---

                             2022-04-05

            Two IOMMU-related Xen issues (XSA-399, XSA-400)


User action required
---------------------

Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:

  For Qubes 4.0, in dom0:
  - Xen packages, version 4.8.5-39

  For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
  - Xen packages, version 4.14.4-4

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.


Summary
--------

The following security advisories were published on 2022-04-05:

XSA-399 [3] "race in VT-d domain ID cleanup":

| Xen domain IDs are up to 15 bits wide.  VT-d hardware may allow for only
| less than 15 bits to hold a domain ID associating a physical device with
| a particular domain.  Therefore internally Xen domain IDs are mapped to
| the smaller value range.  The cleaning up of the housekeeping structures
| has a race, allowing for VT-d domain IDs to be leaked and flushes to be
| bypassed.


XSA-400 [4] "IOMMU: RMRR (VT-d) and unity map (AMD-Vi) handling
issues":

| Certain PCI devices in a system might be assigned Reserved Memory
| Regions (specified via Reserved Memory Region Reporting, "RMRR") for
| Intel VT-d or Unity Mapping ranges for AMD-Vi.  These are typically used
| for platform tasks such as legacy USB emulation.
|
| Since the precise purpose of these regions is unknown, once a device
| associated with such a region is active, the mappings of these regions
| need to remain continuouly accessible by the device.  This requirement
| has been violated.
|
| Subsequent DMA or interrupts from the device may have unpredictable
| behaviour, ranging from IOMMU faults to memory corruption.


Impact
-------

The precise impact of XSA-399 and XSA-400 is system-specific but
would typically be a denial of service (DoS) affecting the entire
host. Privilege escalation and information leaks cannot be ruled out.

XSA-399 affects only Qubes OS 4.1. Qubes OS 4.0 is not affected due to
the version of Xen it uses. This issue affects only qubes with assigned
PCI devices, which are sys-net and sys-usb in the default Qubes OS
configuration.

XSA-400 affects both Qubes OS 4.0 and 4.1. It affects only qubes with
assigned PCI devices that have an associated RMRR or unity map. This
usually applies to USB controllers, which are assigned to the sys-usb
qube in the default Qubes OS configuration.


Credits
--------

See the original Xen Security Advisory.


References
-----------

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-399.html
[4] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-400.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

```

This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/04/05/qsb-079/

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