On Wed, 12 Oct 2016, Manuel Amador (Rudd-O) wrote:
> On 10/11/2016 09:47 PM, jan.f...@gmail.com wrote:
> > is there a way to connect to appvm console directly from qubes login
> > screen? The reason for doing this is to give access to internet to
> > other user while not giving him possibility to access anything else,
> > he will be locked in virtual machine, neither usb copying will be allowed.
> > What is your opinion on this? What about security issues?
> There might be a way to create a special user session that, all it does,
> is start a VM, connect to its Qubes GUID, and display whatever the
> session has. No controls, no terminals, no Qubes Manager. You just
> have to create your session as a script and add it to
> /usr/share/xsessions. The guest user you are thinking of must be a
> member of the qubes group, and under no circumstances may your guest
> session program open any sort of application on dom0.
Won't the login manager actually spawn another X with different DISPLAY
for the second user/session? At least earlier they seemed to work like
that. If so, it will likely fail as qubes_guid/shmoverride depend on
DISPLAY being :0?
It would be possible to extend qubes_guid/shmoverride to handle other
DISPLAYs too, however, the shmoverride tricks run so early in the init
chain that environment is not yet set up so the "DISPLAY" needs to be
acquired by parsing the commandline (also libc init seems incomplete
that early so I'm not sure if atoi()/strtol() can be safely called yet).