On 12/29/2016 02:25 AM, HiringQubesExperts wrote:
Hi all,

I am planning on buying a 13.3 - 15.6 laptop that I will specifically use for running qubes, and containing lots and lots of highly sensitive files.

I will also be using tor allot, and for me the main things I care about is being able to get my setup as secure as possible.


Things i've thought about so far;


OPAL SED SSD for HW based drive encryption. (Second FDE ofcourse)
USB PGP-Key for authentication and stuff., also contains (hidden) storage.
Keypad encrypted USB for hardware encrypted USB with bootfiles/keyfiles etc.


Hi,

FYI, OPAL should be considered inferior to regular LUKS encryption that is protected by something like Qubes AEM. I'd say don't rely on it.

A USB drive with a keypad is fine as an extra measure, but the security it offers is limited.

Now for the laptop itself;


Is TPM worth it? Im hearing mixed opinions... Also, I definately do not want to put all my eggs in one basket, so would using TPM be possible in a way that it is just one of several parts of the whole security-chain ? I would hate it if someone has a TPM backdoor and compromises my whole system that way, any way to design something with 2 or better yet; 3 way authentication ?


TPM is probably worth it, given the role Qubes Anti Evil Maid gives to it: Stopping quick or mediocre attempts to subvert the boot process. It raises the bar for tampering quite a bit.


What about the processor and bios? Are there any secure/open bioses that work with recent intel processors?


Libreboot appears to work fine with some models from the Ivy Bridge (c. 2012) generation, and probably later. But AEM doesn't work with it.

As for the processor; are the SGX and other new features that skylake CPU's offer any good? Would it be possible to make use of these features in Qubes?


Joanna (Qubes founder) has written articles on SGX, which can be summed-up with this:
https://twitter.com/rootkovska/status/821298935834824704

OTOH, the TXT feature is already used in Qubes AEM.


If not, what processor would you guys recommend? I guess Intel right? Are there any laptops out there that have onboard security-hardware that offers any real solid security benefits? I've read allot of posts from Joanna where she kinds of debunks the Cortex M-3 security chip, so I am wondering; are there any other chips like these that are truly open source, and really add some security?


Not really venturing into alternative architectures, a Qubes user can try their luck with AMD. Not many have been trying, but most of them seem successful.

However, I am a believer in the eventual necessity of an open hardware platform for personal computing. And that probably means non-x86. OTOH, I think the POWER8 effort was a lark... a very poor fit for potential users and poorly conceived.


What kind of laptop comes to mind when I'm asking for this kind of features? I'm having a very very hard time finding a laptop that I can setup in a way that would make me feel truly secure. I hope you guys can share some advice on these matters.


I heard the Thinkpad P series offers Xeon as an option.

In the near term for use with Qubes, I suggest not getting hung up on raw power and instead look to the business class offerings of the top-tier laptop makers (excluding Apple). These will tend to have a good mix of power and security features that are properly implemented (instead of messed-up by a bug-ridden BIOS) and have decent open-source support. Intel i5 and i7 processors are the mainstays. Apps don't get GPU access in Qubes, so Iris graphics won't really help. Don't pay more than $600-700 overall.

Mobile Xeon processors are not very mobile as they require larger housings and generate lots of heat. IMO, the one attractive feature they have for a Qubes user is parity ECC RAM support which is more resistant to rowhammer-type attacks.

Finally, remember that Qubes 4.0 will have additional hardware requirements that most Qubes 3.x laptops supposedly already support, but its generally untested. This is the main reason why I wouldn't spend a lot on a Qubes laptop until R4 comes out.


P.S.
I'm using the PGP-key stick, and USB-keypad-usb as my "extra security-weapons" are there any other reliable open source hw-security devices out there that you guys would recommend?

Would it be possible to add say some biometric security hardware and then have the full disk encryption work in such a way that 3 way authentication would be needed ?


It may be possible to setup 3 way auth with biometrics. You will find that most/all business laptops that offer a TPM also include the fingerprint reader.

Also, we have the software based full disk encryption, and also the HW based OPAL full disk encryption, even though I trust the software based one the most, I would still like to also maximize the security of the samsung SED based one. Would it be possible to have 3-way authentication for both, while having unique keys each?


What would be the best way to implement 3-way authentication? Most people advise me on using the combined output of all 3 hw keys, maybe even with some mechanism which unlocks a keyfile or something like that. But to me these things sound like they are not really thought trough; there has to be a better way to implement 3-way (or even 2 way) authentication, at-least for the software based FDE, and maybe even for the samsung OPAL one , right ?


Also, what would you guys recommend me to use as encryption method? LVM-LUKS won't let me encrypt the boot partition, and it wont really allow me to use 2-way authentication aswell.


The default Qubes method (IIRC using the default LUKS cipher), combined with AEM, is probably the best right now. But multi-factor is a slightly different story.... possible with AEM but not yet implemented. Here is a regular Linux example of 2FA with LUKS: https://twitter.com/rootkovska/status/821298935834824704

Chris

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