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On 2016-09-03 05:15, grzegorz.chodzi...@gmail.com wrote:
> W dniu sobota, 3 września 2016 14:11:04 UTC+2 użytkownik Andrew 
> David Wong napisał:
>> On 2016-09-03 04:58, grzegorz.chodzi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>> W dniu sobota, 3 września 2016 13:37:27 UTC+2 użytkownik pixel
>>>  fairy napisał:
>>>> On Saturday, September 3, 2016 at 2:32:54 AM UTC-7, 
>>>> grzegorz....@gmail.com wrote:
>>>>> I know that QubesOS is developed mostly with notebook use 
>>>>> in mind, however some users, me included, opt to run it on
>>>>>  desktop computers. The question is, is there any
>>>>> advantage of building a Qubes-dedicated machine on
>>>>> workstation/server components?
>>>> mostly ecc ram. its a shame non-ecc is so prevalent. in 
>>>> practice, i dont think the difference is worth it. there are 
>>>> many more important variables.
>>>>> Will Qubes be able to take advantage of higher core count 
>>>>> in Xeon processors? Or two processors if a user decides to 
>>>>> build a dual-CPU rig? Does the system performance scale 
>>>>> with the number of available cores/ clock speed?
>>>> yes.
>>>>> Can it take advantage of ECC RAM? Server hardware that is 
>>>>> few years old can be bought for dirt cheap (Xeon E5-2670 
>>>>> has 8 cores and costs about 75$).
>>>> it will benefit the same as any another machine from ecc 
>>>> ram.
>>>>> I'll be upgrading from my current PC and I'm seriously 
>>>>> considering building a rig around a Xeon processor and a 
>>>>> motherboard with ECC RAM but if there is no real benefit 
>>>>> then what's the point?
>>>> apparently price is the advantage, but think of your ears! 
>>>> server hardware is loud.
>>>> if your willing to spend more on good hardware, go for a good
>>>> ssd, and good ddr4 ram (G.Skill or Geil) in case bitflipping
>>>> attacks start showing up.
>>>> http://news.softpedia.com/news/rowhammer-attack-now-works-on-ddr4-m
>>> Xeon it is then. As for the rowhammering attack as far as I 
>>> know ECC RAM is not vulnereable to that.
>> Unfortunately, that's not true:
>> "Tests show that simple ECC solutions, providing single-error 
>> correction and double-error detection (SECDED) capabilities, are 
>> not able to correct or detect all observed disturbance errors 
>> because some of them include more than two flipped bits per 
>> memory word."
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row_hammer#Mitigation
> Back to the drawing board it is then. What other precautions can
> we take to mitigate this?

You may want to test memory (by hammering it and checking for bit
flips) or rely on the test results others have reported:


- -- 
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS


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