Le mercredi 14 septembre 2016 05:30:30 UTC+2, 3n7r...@gmail.com a écrit :
> On Tuesday, September 13, 2016 at 11:56:53 PM UTC, nishi...@gmail.com wrote:
> > Le samedi 10 septembre 2016 20:36:38 UTC+2, 3n7r...@gmail.com a écrit :
> > > [First, a rant. I hate mailing lists. How am I supposed to attribute 
> > > quotes from earlier posts in the thread not contained in the previous 
> > > post?]
> > > 
> > > nishi:
> > > >Any advices on how to set up Qubes to have a VPN + sys-whonix working 
> > > >together (or VPN + a TorVM proxy) in a good anonymous way would be 
> > > >really appreciated :)
> > > 
> > > As you know, you can either connect to a VPN from a non-Whonix proxyVM or 
> > > set up the VPN directly in the Whonix-Gateway. Both methods have the goal 
> > > of preventing "unintentional" leaks and have the property of 
> > > failing-closed. IMO, since you are using Qubes already, the proxyVM 
> > > method is easier to configure and provides more flexibility. If you're 
> > > short on RAM and/or need to operate multiple Whonix-Gateways with each 
> > > having a separate VPN, you may be better off connecting to the VPN from 
> > > within the Gateway. From a security/anonymity perspective, neither is 
> > > obviously better than the other. A Gateway compromise would most likely 
> > > be game-over in either scenario.
> > > 
> > > Speaking generally, you've got a whole bunch of moving parts. You need to 
> > > troubleshoot by isolating each piece. 
> > > 
> > > **This step reveals that you use Tor. Only proceed if safe to do so.
> > > 
> > > 1. sys-net <- appVM: Do I have general connectivity?
> > > 2. sys-net <- vpn-VM <- appVM: Does my VPN work?
> > > 3.** sys-net <- appVM w/ Tor Browser Bundle: Does Tor work?
> > > 4.** sys-net <- whonix-gateway: Run whonixcheck. Does Whonix-Gateway work?
> > > 5. sys-net <- vpn-vm <- whonix-gateway
> > > 
> > > My suggestion is to start with a fresh proxyVM and follow Chris' Qubes 
> > > VPN documentation step by step. (Or take a look at his [git 
> > > repo](https://github.com/ttasket/Qubes-vpn-support) ). If the vpn-VM 
> > > allows successful connections from the appVM, then it's simply a matter 
> > > of assigning it to the Whonix-Gateway as its netVM. No Whonix-specific 
> > > configuration is necessary since it's all transparent to Whonix.
> > > 
> > > * Make sure that the Qubes firewall (Qubes VM Manager) is open on the 
> > > Whonix-Gateway. I don't remember what the default setting is.
> > > 
> > > * Both TCP and UDP are fine for upstream VPNs. Tor can not carry UDP but 
> > > it can be carried on UDP, if that makes sense.
> > > 
> > > * Don't add any additional firewalls until you can get this working.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > nishi:
> > > >Which gives in Qubes something a pattern like this one below (I don't 
> > > >know if all firewall VMs are really needed though) :
> > > >
> > > >AppVM => sys-vpn-firewall => sys-vpn => sys-whonix-firewall (or 
> > > >TorVM-firewall) => sys-whonix (or TorVM) => sys-firewall => sys-net
> > > 
> > > Firewalls have limited usefulness as described here: 
> > > https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/data-leaks/
> > > 
> > > rustybird's Corridor can ensure that all traffic goes to a Tor Entry 
> > > Guard (but obviously, can't guarantee that the Entry Guard is 
> > > trustworthy).
> > > 
> > > 
> > > nishi:
> > > >When I purchased a VPN subscription, I saw it as a way to improve 
> > > >anonymity, now I feel it is more a tool to provide security.
> > > 
> > > VPNs don't necessarily improve anonymity OR security. They simply shift 
> > > the trust that you place in your ISP to someone else. That may be good or 
> > > bad.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Chris:
> > > >Although its straightforward to get the opposite working (Tor -> VPN ->
> > > Internet -- just follow the Qubes vpn doc and connect sys-whonix to the
> > > vpn vm)
> > > 
> > > Just to clarify, to achieve user -> Tor -> VPN -> Internet, sys-whonix 
> > > needs to be connected as the *netVM* for the vpn-vm. If vpn-vm is the 
> > > netVM for sys-whonix, the resulting traffic is user -> VPN -> Tor -> 
> > > Internet. I may be forgetting something, but I believe both 
> > > configurations work out of the box.
> > 
> > Hello,
> > 
> > Thank you for your answer. Yes I agree with you, the proxyVM is easier to 
> > configure and provide more flexibility. I don't know if you can make your 
> > VPN autostart if you install it inside the whonix gateway, so I rather 
> > prefer to have it directly installed in an AppVM, because I find it is a 
> > great Qubes feature : )
> > 
> > Also as I said directly in the Whonix-forum site, I don't believe building 
> > a fortress in a gateway that will become the main target for hackers is 
> > what will necessarily will make us all more secure out there. Whonix or 
> > Qubes are targets right now... You have too many hacking intrusion exploits 
> > nowadays to build a fail-safe system for everyone. If you just type list in 
> > metasploit on kali Linux you know what I mean... I feel like people working 
> > on Whonix would be a really more usefull to random noobs like me and most 
> > of the internet community by trying to act like hackers, idea being to 
> > create a code able to send back nukes to people entering your own private 
> > space. I see global improvement of internet security this way. Btw Qubes is 
> > born on this idea (the "blue pill" attack), and even it is probably one of 
> > the most secured OS out there atm,  I wish you would have OS able to react 
> > to attacks by sending back the attack or to create a new one, to tell 
> > hackers "heeeeey leave me alone dude, ur gonna get nuked in return, don't 
> > waste your time :d" lol. But that's just a personal opinion and I am 
> > probably too naive on complexity required to make this happen one day...
> > 
> > Thanks again for all your explanations. To answer your questions :
> > 1. sys-net <- appVM: Do I have general connectivity? Yes
> > 2. sys-net <- vpn-VM <- appVM: Does my VPN work? Yes
> > 3.** sys-net <- appVM w/ Tor Browser Bundle: Does Tor work? Yes
> > 4.** sys-net <- whonix-gateway: Run whonixcheck. Does Whonix-Gateway work? 
> > Yes
> > 5. sys-net <- vpn-vm <- whonix-gateway Yes
> > 
> > In fact my only problem is that I need to run my VPN in TCP to have a 
> > connection with sys-whonix. It doesn't work in UDP in a user -> VPN -> Tor 
> > scheme and also in the other way always in UDP.
> > UDP is a bit faster than TCP but less secured, I don't really know if I 
> > should use either UDP or TCP just to browse the web.
> > 
> Both Whonix and Tor work fine over UDP. This is most likely a VPN-specific 
> configuration issue. Your provider may have different ports and/or ciphers 
> for TCP vs UDP.
> Conventional wisdom would argue against TCP over TCP over TCP. However, given 
> Tor's already massive latency and slow connections, it's hard to say whether 
> you'd even notice a difference between VPN over TCP vs UDP.
Yes indeed, I figured out I have an address resolving problem by trying to 
connect manually to my VPN instead of using the rc.local script from the 
documentation https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vpn/ with this command :
sudo openvpn --writepid /var/run/openvpn/openvpn-client.pid --cd 
/rw/config/openvpn/ --config openvpn.ovpn
It cannot resolve host adress, but after 2 mn... my VPN works xd

I thought latency on connection was created by the fact I am spoofing my MAC 
adress, but I was wrong 

I followed this line : # To override DHCP DNS, assign static DNS addresses with 
'setenv vpn_dns' in openvpn config;
# Format is 'X.X.X.X  Y.Y.Y.Y [...]' with quotes.
by adding in my openvpn.ovpn conf file this line but unfortunately it doesn't 
seem to work well (I have to kill my sys-vpn to shut down the connection) :
setenv vpn_dpns 'X.X.X.X X.X.X.X' (dns adress of my VPN provider)

If you could help me on this problem as well, that would be really great. 
Thanks again for your concern, I really appreciate and I hope that it might 
help others people struggling with their own VPNs.

In fact at first I followed this great guide done by cprise 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-users/-9gR1Va3BnY, I had no IP 
resolving problem, then I switched to official documentation because I wasn't 
sure with only those 2 lines added in /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script, I 
would be safe if my VPN would drop on a "sensitive" website. And let's be clear 
by what I called "sensitive" here : by "sensitive" I just mean that I don't 
really give a damn that my ISP is actually knowing that I go on some websites 
that criticize politics here in my country (like this one : https://la-bas.org/ 
), as they're legal, but of course I don't want my ISP to actually know what 
content I'm reading there.
> > Tanks a lot for sharing rustybird's Corridor, it looks like a very 
> > interesting program for people concerned about security on Tor 
> > https://github.com/rustybird/corridor
> > It looks a bit complicated to set it up on Qubes but I am gonna try it !
> > 
> > If you could explain to me how I could add firewalls between proxyVMs, that 
> > would help me. What I could go for is a scheme like this (on a user -> VPN 
> > -> Tor -> internet connection) :
> > sys-net <- sys-firewall <- sys-whonix <- sys-firewall2 <- sys-vpn <- 
> > sys-firewall3 <- AppVM.
> > 
> First of all, that VM configuration will result in user -> tor -> vpn so make 
> sure you've got that right.
OMG. I am completely confused right now about OSI model and the terminology you 
use. Please give me a link please so I can get what we're talking about, 
because I don't understand a thing about it. All I know is that OSI model goes 
this way : internet -> applications. And based on that, I can't understand what 
you said, because I have no idea what's is the precise difference between 
selecting a NetVM in a ProxyVM or data flowing with the arrow oriented 
terminology you used xd

I mean you could understand user -> Tor -> VPN -> internet is : I pick 
sys-whonix as NetVM for my VPN, but you could understand as well were are here 
in the OSI model and that would mean here that you pick your sys-net as a NetVM 
into your sys-vpn VM, which is the opposite.

Im am a complete newbie, and indeed I acknowledge I was wrong to make 
simplifications over 2 very complex projets (just look at this page : 
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others , if you're not an engineer, 
hf to make a good choice there, lol).
But still, making it harder to understand that it is already is not gonna make 
things easier for me :(
I noticed you said "Just to clarify, to achieve user -> Tor -> VPN -> Internet, 
sys-whonix needs to be connected as the *netVM* for the vpn-vm" and I 
appreciate your comment, but it doesn't clarify a lot if you use after arrows 
in the reverse order. I'm lost ;_;
> You can add explicit firewall VMs wherever you want or you can configure 
> firewall rules using Qubes VM Manager.
Yes that what I'm doing right now, I use Qubes manager : )
> Whether or not that makes any sense is a different discussion. As stated 
> previously, firewalls contain "inadvertent leaks", not "intentional leaks". ( 
> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/data-leaks/ ) The main purpose of a firewall is 
> to block upstream traffic. So the consensus location for a firewall would be 
> just inside sys-net. If sys-whonix is connected directly to sys-net, it 
> already has a restrictive firewall and doesn't really need another.
I understand better. Thank you very much for this explanation, this is clearer 
to me now. Ok so then you can think about Firewalls in Qubes manager as a way 
to avoid parts of the traffic routed from an upstream interface to your VM. To 
block ports inside this VM coming from this traffic, you have then to do it 
inside with iptables. That makes sense :)
> > I would probably allow all traffic on all the firewalls because Andrew 
> > David Wong who works a a community manager on Qubes told me here that it 
> > doesn't matter, you have to set up rules only after the proxys directly on 
> > the AppVM (or the next proxyVM). I am probably stupid or paranoid to add 
> > all those proxyVMs, I have no good idea bout what I'm doing, just playing 
> > with Qubes legos ^.^
> > 
> > https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation I tried to open ports 9150, 
> > 9110 and 9051 on the tcp protocl sys-whonix to reduce a bit the surface 
> > attack, but it didn't work. So I am gonna let it all opened but on the 
> > sys-vpn it seems to connect if I put a rule like accepting all the IP 
> > adresses only on the gateway port inside my openvpn client file : )
> > 
> [Whonix specific questions are probably better asked on Whonix.org, since 1. 
> that's where Patrick lives, and 2. that's where people will go to find 
> answers to Whonix questions.]
> I don't understand your question. You opened ports where? Stream Isolation is 
> in effect by default. It means that a pre-configured application running in 
> Whonix-Workstation, like Tor Browser, sends its traffic to a specific port on 
> Whonix-Gateway's inward-facing network adapter. Whonix-Gateway then routes 
> the traffic over a new Tor circuit. No ports need to be opened **or closed** 
> because following the same reasoning with firewalls/leaks, a compromised 
> Workstation could just switch traffic to an open port.
I was trying to understand if you necessarily need firewalls (using Qubes 
manager) between each proxyVM, or if you can just have 1 at the connection 
input (so before sys-net, in this order sys-net -> sys-firewall), which will 
filter both input and output. I'm just a retarded newbie, you know.

So my question was I don't understand that let's say if you apply iptables 
rules in a proxy using /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script (as documentation 
says it needs to be there because firewall constantly refresh on proxies, 
whereas on normal AppVM you can put them in rc.local on startup), what do you 
really need to do to make it work using in combination firewall in Qubes 

What I'm confused about is that if you want to redirect traffic to another 
AppVM, you are supposed to it directly inside the concerned VM using nat, this 
I can understand, but then you if you deny all traffic in the destination VM 
using the Qubes manager, you just have to add an exception traffic only for the 
service and the port used, is that right ?

I would appreciate that Qubes documentation contains something to explain 
better to noobs or retards like me (lol) how VMs communicate each others and 
how to use Qubes firewall to add exceptions to deny traffic for a specific VM.

I know few on gateways, for instance I know let's your VM IP is X.X.2.18 and 
your sys-firewall IP is X.X.3.12, I know that if you want your VM IP to allow a 
service like SSH listening on port 22 bypassing the firewall, you are always 
gonna go through your own gateway (X.X.2.1) to reach other local computer, and 
then the gateway routes traffic, but as traffic between VMs looks blocked by 
default for security reasons, it makes it really complicated to understand how 
nat works

But I just read man iptables, and it seems nat is used on Qubes all the times 
to make sure sys-net packets aren't blocked and can go through the chains, like 
on this script :
"iptables -t nat -F PR-QBS
if [[ -n "$vpn_dns" ]] ; then
    # Set DNS address translation in firewall:
    for addr in $vpn_dns; do
        iptables -t nat -A PR-QBS -i vif+ -p udp --dport 53 -j DNAT --to $addr
        iptables -t nat -A PR-QBS -i vif+ -p tcp --dport 53 -j DNAT --to $addr "

What I get here is you got this traffic coming from your vif bridge and is it 
blocked by default, but then if your DNS resolver in the openvpn file matches 
to the adress option, your firewall jumps to a DNAT rule, which is chinese to 
me xd haha.

> I'm assuming here that you mean to route your traffic: user -> vpn -> tor. If 
> in fact, you have your VM's setup like sys-net -> sys-whonix -> sys-vpn -> 
> appVM, then no, stream isolation is not possible. And this is precisely why I 
> stated that user -> tor -> vpn reduces anonymity. Your vpn connection, and 
> everything going through it will travel over 1 tor circuit for its active 
> lifetime unless a relay goes offline.
No offense, but why would you assume a fact that is clear coming from me since 
the very beginning ? I am trying indeed to connect to Tor from my VPN IP 
address. I don't know how to write it like you do so that in your AppVM you 
just have a Tor IP address that have been through your own VPN if you type 
"what's my ip" on Google. What I get about the way your write this connection 
model is that you reverse the order. Probably because the OSI model goes only 
from internet to applications. But still, I don't really understand very well 
the logic behind.

I didn't know that on user -> tor -> vpn configuration, Tor will route traffic 
into 1 tor circuit only for it's active lifetime (do you mean it will bypass 
every 10 mn refresh node changing on standard TBB because of the VPN ?), but I 
do know that your exit connection will not be encrypted on this configuration, 
whereas it is encrypted with only a VPN connected w/o Tor, or if you use it in 
the reverse order. I'm just trying to configure this set-up, it doesn't mean 
that I approve or disapprove it.

I think I kinda agreed with you in a way when you stated "user -> tor -> vpn 
reduces anonymity". On Whonix site, I was thinking this configuration would 
increase security, but at the cost of reducing anonymity. I was just thinking 
in the opposite way, not understanding a shit, lmfao.
Anyway I don't necessarily think it is a good way to use a VPN before Tor and 
to tell your VPN provider that's you're doing so... Whether you trust him or 
Whatever. As I told you, I am completely confused about the terminology you 
used. My idea on Whonix site was just simply that I rather prefer the idea not 
having my connection going unencrypted through one narrow tunnel that could be 
observed, and it might looks strange, but that's what I want to experiment 
right now, to test it out (a VPN before Tor). Even if it is less anonymous, I 
don't care, just trying things.

So I kinda agree with you that I would prefer the other configuration for 
anonymity reasons : user -> vpn -> tor, so if I'm not completely braindead 
right now, it would look like this (just delete the topic if I'm wrong I'll 
kill myself anyway lmao xd) : sys-net -> sys-vpn -> sys-whonix -> appVM, so you 
pick sys-vpn as a netVM for sys-whonix and you ends up with a TOR ip adress.
> > For the AppVM, I deny all traffic, I just add an exception to open http / 
> > https port for all adresses. And even if it worked during my tests without 
> > all the firewallVMs, I have an IP adress provided by my VPN if I google "ip 
> > address", which looks logic as I am connected first to the sys-vpn, which 
> > then connect to the TorVM. My IP should be probably different at the 
> > outside of the sys-whonix. But if I'm wrong and I have to run 
> > whonix-workstation or TBB installed into the AppVM, please tell me, I am a 
> > bit confused about this situation :v
> Again, denying all traffic except http/https just means that malware will 
> communicate over 80/443, which any decent malware should do anyway.
> The reason why google is showing you your vpn ip address is because your 
> traffic is flowing: user -> isp -> tor -> vpn -> destination (google)

Ok, thank you. So I'll just configure directly iptables into the AppVM, using 
-P INPUT DROP and then adding every service that I want to use, hoping default 
firewall Qubes firewall is not gonna give me too much trouble lol

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