On 10/14/2016 01:26 PM, 917832409173409178324097 wrote:
> Hello,
> can ASLR tech help to build a hard template VM for Qubes?
> https://securityetalii.es/2013/02/03/how-effective-is-aslr-on-linux-systems/
> checksec.sh: 
> How important it is that all libs and executables are PIE-compiled?
> Are 100% of the TVM PIE compliant?
> https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Marco-Gisbert-Exploiting-Linux-And-PaX-ASLRS-Weaknesses-On-32-And-64-Bit-Systems.pdf
> Will ASLR-NG mitigate the ASLR-weaknesses?
> The rerandomization should be fast enough or be able to detect some 
> brute-force attacks.
> There are other exploit-strategies, which sould be taken into account, so 
> that the TVM is hard enough to resist the contact with the web (ebanking) - 
> or the QAchitecture is adressing all of them?
> Heap-Spraying?
> Egg-Hunting?
> ROP?
> DEP?
> SafeSEZ?
> Stack Cockies?
> SEH overflows?
> stack overflows?
> or others?
> It looks that there are many methods around to inject shellcode in some way...
> https://www.corelan.be/index.php/2013/02/19/deps-precise-heap-spray-on-firefox-and-ie10/
> Kind Regards

This would be really nice, but basically you're talking about hardening
Fedora, so this should probably be done with upstreaming the work in
mind.  Perhaps we begin with a template on Qubes OS that we can use, and
piece by piece, the modifications to that template can get upstreamed. 
Eventually the template will no longer be necessary.


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