>> 1) XEN is developed by people working for a company based in >> the U.S.
Some fun stats for Xen 4.6 changesets, as used by Cubes: Lines of Code: ~150,000 This is from https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_4.6_Acknowledgements and related pages (and similar pages with 4.6 replaced by 4.x): Lines of code added/removed: Vers People Empl Added Rempved NSA-Add NSA-Rem 4.4 81 29 38048 25989 121 4.5 102 39 80906 141593 6714 2645 4.6 96 30 124035 90299 459 193 4.7 102 36 106606 37160 ? ? Now, about 4.7. Note that the page for only lists individual names, does not list any company affiliations or employers at all. An odd change/omission? So the NSA barely contributed for 4.4, contributed a significant amount for 4.5, a bit for 4.6, and then either stopped contributing, or are doing so in a non-transparent way through individuals for 4.7. :( I can't say that's confidence-inspiring. Xen's change from 4.6 to 4.7 to not listing employers almost has a slight "warrant canary" feel to it. :S The source is open, I guess, but still, smart people can sneak in subtle backdoor bugs. As we have seen. Also, out of those 100 individuals, what are the odds that the NSA could sneak in a few apparently unaffiliated "representatives" to submit some subtle changes. Now, I'm sure a good many of the people at NSA just want a stable, reliable, professional operating system to use for their work, and contribute back to Linux in turn to make it better. It'd be refreshing and inspiring to see them fixing our critical tech tools rather than hopelessly busting them. Go America. But given their history of sneaking in back doors through subtle code bugs, it does make one a bit, err, cautious. Xen is a much bigger and faster-moving target than I ever expected for a hypervisor. After discovering I was being victimized by some keylogging and some other covert surveillance hw/sw, I spend a fair bit of time about how to use a computer with confidence, assuming that you can't necessarily trust the hardware nor software. Is it possible to have a secure environment, where you don't fully trust the hardware/software? And unless you've designed the hardware and software yourself (or they're both open and heavily and transparently reviewed), and your never let either out of your sight and protection, how can you ever fully trust hardware/software? (For example, things such as a password safe on a memory key can help partially thwart even a hardware keylogger, since online/etc. passwords are never typed. Can this type of small success be achieved for a whole system? It's daunting.) Related: http://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/bh08/part2-full.pdf JJ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/6fc41c35e0c90896e50fc5892626c230.webmail%40localhost. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.