Does Qubes offer a method of securing /boot? not just against USB evil maid attacks, but from tampering in general?
for example, while a laptop is off, what would stop a malicious user from live booting to an arbitrary distro and altering kernel or xen images located on the unencrypted /boot partition? Does qubes offer options for encrypting /boot? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/1735810b-d749-43de-a80d-54c8cc2f362c%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
