On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 9:01:24 AM UTC, Bernhard wrote: > Hello, > > one of the most useful features of tor-browser is Ctl-Shift-L to change > the tor-path (and so, with high proba, the exit node IP) : this way, > websites that block a specific exit node for a certain time can be still > loaded (of course some fascist websites block all tor-exits and so that > this measure does not help) . > > I feel that the same feature would be useful in other applications (in > particular in thunderbird). How can this be done? Maybe a "forced > reconnect" of IMAP connections suffices, but apart totally restarting > thunderbird I don't see how this can be done. Any hints? Or is there > good reason not to torify mail-fetching? Or never via IMAP? > > thank you, Bernhard
This might seem slightly off-topic at first, but bare with me, it gets increasingly on-topic. What kind of e-mail are you trying to download over Tor though? Like in general, Tor hides who you are, but not necessarily what is send/received at exit/enter nodes. If any encryption, like SSL/https is poorly handled, i.e. by the server/website you visit, then it's not enough security through Tor exit/enter nodes. So for example, if your e-mail has at any point, whatsoever, in any way, been leaked with information linking it to you, or giving any clues that a detective can use to identify you, then it's game-over for that e-mail address, and you need to make a new address. Though it depends on your needs of course, for example if you don't care about governments, large corporations, or resourceful hacker groups, but only want to hide from the regular typical everyday hacker and businesses, mass surveillance, etc. then the e-mail is not compromised and can still be used on Tor. Aight, so the point, what exactly do you want to hide your e-mail from? In my experience, there are different approaches to different scenarios, which includes e-mails too. More specially towards the question at hand, I think it's tricky to do something like that in Thunderbird, but I'm not a programmer, so I wouldn't know for sure. However, if you think about how it works in Qubes/Whonix/Tor, then the Tor browser appears to be tunneling Tor-Browser within Tor(Sys-whonix), basically doubling the onion layers compared to a regular Tor browser. I'm not entirely sure if this is the case, it's just something I figured must be the case. In other words, when you do this exit node change in your Tor browser, this does change your exit from your Browser, but not the exit node from your sys-whonix Tor network. Basically, the middle link between the two onion Tor layers, remains the same until it changes on its own automatically like usual. In other words, the Tor Browser can do this, because it itself is tied directly tor the Tor network. But for applications, like Thunderbird, it has no means to communicate with the Tor network, and it seems unlikely something the whonix developers, or the Tor developers, would want to implement given the extra overhead or potential issues introduced through further complexity (but I wouldn't know, I'm guessing towards that). Also this is probably a better question asked on either the Whonix or Tor forums, probably most fitting for the whonix forums. The people over there know waaaaaay more, unless if lucky and one of them happens to drop by here. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/ffbe5b42-0554-48a4-913f-ec34d80eca2d%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
