On Wednesday, January 17, 2018 at 10:29:18 PM UTC+1, Ilpo Järvinen wrote:
> On Wed, 17 Jan 2018, Lorenzo Lamas wrote:
> > On Thursday, January 11, 2018 at 3:57:50 PM UTC+1, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> > > ## Qubes 3.2
> > > 
> > > For Qubes 3.2, we plan to release an update that will make almost all
> > > VMs run in a fully-virtualized mode. Specifically, we plan to backport
> > > PVH support from Qubes 4.0 and enable it for all VMs without PCI
> > > devices. After this update, all VMs that previously ran in PV mode (and
> > > that do not have PCI devices) will subsequently run in PVH mode, with
> > > the exception of stub domains. Any HVMs will continue to run in HVM
> > > mode.
> > 
> > Is this the shim-based approach from XSA-254?
> No, it won't be a shim-based approach (see also the Marek's mail in this 
> thread).
> > Then it should be made clear that the VM's will be more vulnerable to 
> > Meltdown: 
> Even if shims would be used, that "more" claim is false as Meltdown 
> against the host hypervisor from PVs that are currently used in R3.2 
> expose both host and also the guest through the host hypervisor (its 
> memory). With shims only the guest is still vulnerable, this time through 
> the intermediate xen instance running in the HVM/PVH encapsulating the PV 
> guest. Clearly it's "less" vulnerable rather than "more".
> Qubes has been trying to migrate away from PVs altogether (rather than 
> e.g., placing PVs into those shims) due to PV vulnerabilities in general. 
> In fact, even before these HW vulnerabilities were discovered, the process 
> towards PVH was ongoing which is why R4.0 rcs as is are much better 
> protected already. These vulnerabilities only accelerated this process.
> There will be, unfortunately, be one limitation to this migration still 
> due to PCI passthrough: VMs with PCI devices need to remain PV (or their 
> stubdoms in R4.0).
> > "Note this shim-based approach prevents attacks on the host, but leaves
> > the guest vulnerable to Meltdown attacks by its own unprivileged
> > processes; this is true even if the guest OS has KPTI or similar
> > Meltdown mitigation."
> > https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/xsa254/README.which-shim
> Also, note that one of the fundamental assumption with Qubes security 
> model is that the VMs _will get compromised_ (regardless of HW exploits). 
> What Qubes aims to protect against is escalation from a compromised VM
> to host or to another VM.
> -- 
>  i.

Thank you for clarifying this.

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to