On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 09:39:47AM +0100, 799 wrote: > Am Sa., 26. Jan. 2019, 04:33 hat Andrew David Wong <a...@qubes-os.org> > geschrieben: > > > > > Please take a look at this issue: > > > > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571 > > > > Happy to see that this topic (no clipboard from dom0) is at least known. > I don't agree that copying from dom0 is dangerous because "The user could > have secrets in dom0, e.g., keyfiles". > > > My passwords are in a vault VM and if someone messes up handling from dom0 > it is very likely that he/she didn't understand the security concept behind > Qubes and therefore the user is likely the biggest attack surface NOT the > clipboard. > > Please offer a solution where the user can choose (free software!!) to > enable/disable the clipboard (choosing means freedom). > > It seems there is a workaround, can this be bound to a key (maybe also > using xclip in dom0)? > echo -n dom0 > qubes-clipboard.bin.source . > Of course there's a workaround: <some command> | tee file qvm-copy-to-vm <qube> file
You can script this and create a key binding yourself. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20190127005844.umz6ewf36xnyozwm%40thirdeyesecurity.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.