On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 09:39:47AM +0100, 799 wrote:
> Am Sa., 26. Jan. 2019, 04:33 hat Andrew David Wong <a...@qubes-os.org>
> geschrieben:
> 
> >
> > Please take a look at this issue:
> >
> > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571
> 
> 
> 
> Happy to see that this topic (no clipboard from dom0) is at least known.
> I don't agree that copying from dom0 is dangerous because "The user could
> have secrets in dom0, e.g., keyfiles".
> 
> 
> My passwords are in a vault VM and if someone messes up handling from dom0
> it is very likely that he/she didn't understand the security concept behind
> Qubes and therefore the user is likely the biggest attack surface NOT the
> clipboard.
> 
> Please offer a solution where the user can choose (free software!!) to
> enable/disable the clipboard (choosing means freedom).
> 
> It seems there is a workaround, can this be bound to a key (maybe also
> using xclip in dom0)?
> echo -n dom0 > qubes-clipboard.bin.source .
> 
Of course there's a workaround:
<some command> | tee file
qvm-copy-to-vm <qube> file

You can script this and create a key binding yourself.

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