Dear Qubes Community,
We have published [Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 089: Qrexec: Memory corruption
in service request
handling](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt).
The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are
reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for
authenticating this QSB, please see the end of this announcement.
## Qubes Security Bulletin 089
```
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 089 ]===---
2023-05-11
Qrexec: Memory corruption in service request handling
User action required
---------------------
Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:
For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- qrexec packages, version 4.1.21
These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [2]
Summary
--------
Due to a bug in qrexec [3], a malicious qube can cause memory corruption
in the qrexec-daemon. The Qubes Security Team is not aware of any way to
exploit this vulnerability in an attack (not even in a denial-of-service
attack that only crashes the process). However, we cannot completely
rule out such a possibility.
Impact
-------
While we consider the successful exploitation of this vulnerability to
be very unlikely, an attacker could theoretically use it to crash the
qrexec-daemon or execute arbitrary code in dom0.
Discussion
-----------
Qubes OS features a framework known as "qrexec," which allows different
qubes to communicate with each other in a controlled manner. [3][4]
These interactions are restricted by the system's RPC policies. [5] In
particular, qrexec can be used to allow less trusted qubes to
communicate with more trusted qubes, including dom0.
Incoming RPC calls are handled by the qrexec-daemon process. Qubes OS
4.1 introduced a new qrexec message type, `MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3`, which
allows much larger requests (theoretically up to 65000 bytes, compared
to 64 bytes in earlier versions). This message type uses a
dynamically-allocated buffer for the message body based on the request
length. The code used to validate the request length has an off-by-one
error that can cause memory corruption, as described below.
First, the incoming message is validated in the
`sanitize_message_from_agent()` function:
1177 static void sanitize_message_from_agent(struct msg_header
*untrusted_header)
1178 {
1179 switch (untrusted_header->type) {
...
1191 case MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3:
1192 if (protocol_version < QREXEC_PROTOCOL_V3) {
1193 LOG(ERROR, "agent sent (new) MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3 "
1194 "although it uses protocol %d", protocol_version);
1195 exit(1);
1196 }
1197 if (untrusted_header->len < sizeof(struct
trigger_service_params3)) {
1198 LOG(ERROR, "agent sent invalid MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3
packet");
1199 exit(1);
1200 }
1201 if (untrusted_header->len - sizeof(struct
trigger_service_params3)
1202 > MAX_SERVICE_NAME_LEN) {
1203 LOG(ERROR, "agent sent too large MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3
packet");
1204 exit(1);
1205 }
1206 break;
...
The second condition, on line 1197, verifies that the message sent by
the qrexec-agent (from a VM) is not shorter than the message header
defined in `struct trigger_service_params3`. However, it fails to
account for a mandatory NUL character at the end of the message payload
(the service name and its argument). Later on, the
`handle_message_from_agent()` function processes the message as follows:
1222 static void handle_message_from_agent(void)
1223 {
1224 struct msg_header hdr, untrusted_hdr;
1225 struct trigger_service_params untrusted_params, params;
1226 struct trigger_service_params3 untrusted_params3, params3;
1227 char *untrusted_service_name = NULL, *service_name = NULL;
1228 size_t service_name_len;
1229
1230 if (libvchan_recv(vchan, &untrusted_hdr, sizeof(untrusted_hdr))
1231 != sizeof(untrusted_hdr))
1232 handle_vchan_error("recv hdr");
1233 /* sanitize start */
1234 sanitize_message_from_agent(&untrusted_hdr);
1235 hdr = untrusted_hdr;
1236 /* sanitize end */
...
1241 switch (hdr.type) {
...
1262 case MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE3:
1263 service_name_len = hdr.len - sizeof(untrusted_params3);
1264 untrusted_service_name = malloc(service_name_len);
1265 if (!untrusted_service_name)
1266 handle_vchan_error("malloc(service_name)");
1267
1268 if (libvchan_recv(vchan, &untrusted_params3,
sizeof(untrusted_params3))
1269 != sizeof(untrusted_params3))
1270 handle_vchan_error("recv params3");
1271 if (libvchan_recv(vchan, untrusted_service_name,
service_name_len)
1272 != (int)service_name_len)
1273 handle_vchan_error("recv params3(service_name)");
1274
1275 /* sanitize start */
1276 ENSURE_NULL_TERMINATED(untrusted_params3.target_domain);
1277 ENSURE_NULL_TERMINATED(untrusted_params3.request_id.ident);
1278 untrusted_service_name[service_name_len-1] = 0;
1279 sanitize_name(untrusted_params3.target_domain, "@:");
1280 sanitize_name(untrusted_params3.request_id.ident, " ");
1281 sanitize_name(untrusted_service_name, "+");
1282 params3 = untrusted_params3;
1283 service_name = untrusted_service_name;
1284 untrusted_service_name = NULL;
1285 /* sanitize end */
...
The initial call to `sanitize_message_from_agent()` is visible in line
1234. Then, the function calculates the expected service name length in
line 1263, allocates memory for it in line 1264, and receives both the
rest of the header and its payload in lines 1268-1273. Since
`sanitize_message_from_agent()` allows the `hdr.len` to be equal to
`sizeof(untrusted_params3)`, `service_name_len` can be zero. This means
that adding the terminating NUL character in line 1278 can write outside
of the allocated buffer. Furthermore, in such a case, the
`untrusted_service_name` buffer is allocated with a size of zero, and
the `sanitize_name()` call in line 1281 can write beyond the buffer too.
The `sanitize_name()` function, listed below, replaces disallowed
characters with underscores (byte 0x5f) until it finds the terminating
NUL character:
759 static void sanitize_name(char * untrusted_s_signed, char
*extra_allowed_chars)
760 {
761 unsigned char * untrusted_s;
762 for (untrusted_s=(unsigned char*)untrusted_s_signed; *untrusted_s;
untrusted_s++) {
763 if (*untrusted_s >= 'a' && *untrusted_s <= 'z')
764 continue;
765 if (*untrusted_s >= 'A' && *untrusted_s <= 'Z')
766 continue;
767 if (*untrusted_s >= '0' && *untrusted_s <= '9')
768 continue;
769 if (*untrusted_s == '_' ||
770 *untrusted_s == '-' ||
771 *untrusted_s == '.')
772 continue;
773 if (extra_allowed_chars && strchr(extra_allowed_chars,
*untrusted_s))
774 continue;
775 *untrusted_s = '_';
776 }
777 }
This code runs in dom0. In Qubes OS 4.1, dom0 is based on Fedora 32
x86_64, which uses the GNU libc 2.31 library. In this implementation
[5], the `malloc()` call (line 1264) always allocates at least 32 bytes,
even if the requested size is 0. This means that the returned pointer is
not NULL in this case (which would be allowed by the specification for
zero-sized allocations), so the error handling in line 1266 does not
interrupt the processing. Consequently, the NUL character written in
line 1278 hits part of the malloc metadata, specifically the most
significant byte of the allocation size. Given that the size is small
(between the 32-byte `MIN_CHUNK_SIZE` and the 1024-byte
`MIN_LARGE_SIZE`), that byte is always zero already, so this write is
harmless.
The remaining concern is about the `sanitize_name()` function. For the
bug to be harmful, it must overwrite something beyond the allocated
buffer (at least 32 bytes). This means that there cannot be a zero byte
in this area. In our analysis, this is very unlikely to occur, for the
following reasons:
1. The `malloc()` call in `handle_message_from_agent()` is the one and
only call that occurs outside of startup and connection setup. No
other malloc call occurs in that process, not even an indirect one.
The connection setup allocations can be redone when the qrexec-agent
disconnects and connects again, but the points below also apply to
this reconnection sequence. (Perhaps the only exception is handling
an error message just before exit(1), but if the attacker hasn't
corrupted malloc metadata up to this point, the attacker won't have a
chance to do it after this point either.)
2. The qrexec-daemon handles only a single request at a time. At no
point are multiple buffers for `service_name` allocated in the
process at the same time. All remaining handling occurs in a separate
process (which also handles only a single request).
3. Due to how GNU libc's malloc works, if there is a small chunk
available, it will be used. It won't be split out of a bigger chunk.
And, due to point 2 above, if there was a small chunk initially, it
will get used again.
4. The allocations done during startup and reconnection leave a few
small free chunks that are interleaved with allocated areas (the
libvchan_t structure, something from libxengnttab, libxentoollog, and
a few others). These memory chunks can't be merged due to their
layout.
5. Every small allocation includes a NUL byte somewhere in the payload
before being freed. This applies to both initial areas as well as to
the buffers used for `service_name`.
Given all of these considerations, successfully exploiting this
vulnerability in an attack is very unlikely. However, due to the
complexity of the memory allocator, we cannot completely rule out such a
possibility.
Credits
--------
This issue was discovered by Demi Marie Obenour.
References
-----------
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[3] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/
[4] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec-internals/
[5] https://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/MallocInternals
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
```
*Source*:
<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt>
## [Marek
Marczykowski-Górecki](https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-górecki)'s
PGP signature
```
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=1b+G
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
```
*Source*:
<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt.sig.marmarek>
## [Simon Gaiser (aka
HW42)](https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)'s PGP signature
```
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=zjXb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
```
*Source*:
<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-089-2023.txt.sig.simon>
## What is the purpose of this announcement?
The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new
Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) has been published.
## What is a Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB)?
A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the [Qubes
security team](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB
typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more
recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching
to address them. A list of all QSBs is available
[here](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/).
## Why should I care about QSBs?
QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from
recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security
vulnerabilities are addressed by [updating
normally](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases,
special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are
detailed in QSBs.
## What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?
A [PGP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a
cryptographic [digital
signature](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance
with the [OpenPGP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP)
standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like
[GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)](https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team
cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to
check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is
authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.
## Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?
A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the
security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making
configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified
QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or
the status of the Qubes OS Project.
## How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?
The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with `git` and
`gpg` installed. (See
[here](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software)
for Windows and Mac options.)
1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:
```shell_session
$ gpg --fetch-keys
https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from
'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
```
(See
[here](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key)
for more ways to obtain the QMSK.)
2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: `gpg>`
indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when
prompted.)
```shell_session
$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
```
3. *Important*: At this point, you still don't know whether the key you just
imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure
to provide meaningful security benefits, you *must* authenticate the QMSK
out-of-band. *Do not skip this step*! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK
fingerprint from *multiple independent sources in several different ways* and
check to see whether they match the key you just imported. See
[here](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key)
for more details and ideas for how to do that.
*Tip*: Record the genuine QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so
that you don't have to repeat this step in the future.
4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level
to 5 ("ultimate"), then quit GnuPG with `q`.
```shell_session
gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users'
keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
```
5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
```shell_session
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
```
6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our [PGP key
policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for
important information about these keys.)
```shell_session
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS
signing key)" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)"
imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes
Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website &
Documentation Signing)" imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation
Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes
Documentation Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation
Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation
Signing Key)" imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing
Key)" imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS
documentation signing key)" imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing
Key)" imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key"
imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes
security pack)" imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack
signing key)" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 16
gpg: unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
```
7. Verify signed Git tags.
```shell_session
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)"
[full]
```
The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with
`gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. The `[full]`
indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed
by the QMSK.
8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:
```shell_session
$ cd QSBs/
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)"
[full]
$ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)"
[full]
$ cd ../canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)"
[full]
$ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)"
[full]
```
Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each
`gpg --verify` command should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...`
followed by an appropriate key.
For this announcement (QSB-089), the commands are:
```
$ gpg --verify qsb-089-2023.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-089-2023.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-089-2023.txt.sig.simon qsb-089-2023.txt
```
You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition
to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and
paste the QSB-089 text into a plain text file and do the same for both
signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above,
substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/05/11/qsb-089/
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