On 04/09/2019 15.13, Ullfig, Roberto Alfredo wrote:
While this might be true:
"..then the trusted AP would force the end user to start authentication
from the scratch"
That user's device is still going to send that UDP packet to the new AP
and end up on our server no?
It won't be sending UDP directly. See, for example below, for diagrams
and how it the user's device must use EAPOL, not UDP, to send and
receive authentication messages.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_802.1X
I was just thinking about WLAN gear that does not enforce port control
correctly. Most likely these kinds of legimate devices would be
malfunctioning if they pass through messages that do not follow the
expected authentication sequence.
Also, it doesn't have to be a rogue AP
does it, it could be someone else's legitimate AP that just happens to
be near one of our APs.
I'd still say that correctly functioning APs would not pass any EAP
messages through but would force the end user to start with
EAPOL/EAP-Request/Identity. However, I'm not that familiar ways various
devices work to say exactly what's possible.
Thanks,
Heikki
--
Heikki Vatiainen <[email protected]>
Radiator: the most portable, flexible and configurable RADIUS server
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