Al Jazeera
August 21, 2010
The geopolitics of passions By Pierre Hassner
Being neither an Arab nor a specialist on the Middle East, I can offer only
a few hesitant and provisional suggestions on the topic of the geopolitics
of passions in the Middle East.
They revolve around three themes:
1. The deepest and most intense passions among Arabs are those having to
do with
identity, recognition and dignity.
2. There exists a tension between two extreme passions: a religious one,
inspiring a
desire for sacrifice and martyrdom, and a worldly one, inspiring an
appetite for
worldly goods and wealth. This may be one explanation for the current
geopolitical situation in the Middle East, where, from a military
perspective, the
three most powerful countries are non-Arab: Israel, Iran, and Turkey. On
the other
hand, the Arab states, in spite of their excellent human talents and
considerable
wealth, have to rely on natural resources and on external help -
particularly for
their security, and have not, thus far, succeeded either in uniting or in
building a
series of viable, stable and powerful entities.
3. In the confrontation between Arab states or movements and Israel, as
well as
between al-Qaeda and the US, or, indeed, most insurrections and
counter-insurrections, a dialectic of passions is at work: each side seems
to be
animated either by the immediate imperative of survival in the face of a
ruthless
enemy, or by motives of justice, honour and self-respect; while it sees
the enemy,
whatever its original destructive motivations, as susceptible to a
utilitarian
calculus of fear and interest, or of punishment and reward, which should
make it
accept defeat. Neither side understands that its own actions provoke an
analogous
reaction of humiliation or resentment on the other side, which leads it to
more
resistance and more extreme actions, and leads them both to endless
escalation.
Pride, humiliation, dignity
Thucydides and Hobbes distinguish between three basic political passions:
1) fear; 2) the search for security, appetite, material goods, honour or
pride; and 3) the search for glory, status or recognition of one's merits or
rights. The denial of these passions leads to anger.
In the Middle East, the first two types of passions are present
everywhere, but, it seems to me, the third is particularly important.
To begin with, there is the passionate search for identity. All
individuals and peoples in the 21st century have multiple identities and face
a
choice.
Often, there is a clash between the identities, or, at least, there arises
the problem of the priority between the different feelings of belonging
and the different solidarities they entail.
This seems particularly acute in the case of Arabs. Between the individual
and the world, the number of alternative or complementary loyalties, which
vary according to time and place, is considerable. They can be familial or
tribal, national for the heirs of past empires or for the citizens of
recently-created states, or pan-Arab and pan-Islamic, animated by the hope of a
united Arab nation or a world Ummah of believers.
Some inner divisions and rivalries also acquire both an increasingly
passionate and an increasingly geopolitical character, like those between
Sunnis
and Shias, which cuts
across borders but also tends to pit two groups of Arab states against
each other, as well as pitting majorities and minorities against each other
within some Arab states.
Of course, the search for, and affirmation of, identity becomes truly
passionate when it has to do with reactions for or against past, present and
future inequalities, with humiliation for the present, nostalgia for the
past, and hope or fear for the future.
In this respect, the passion which, at the minimum, is most common to all
Arabs is the revolt against the invasion and occupation of Arab lands by
foreign powers, and against the suffering and humiliation imposed on their
populations.
This, of course, is centred on the occupation of Palestine by Israel, but
many extend it to the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and some to
the presence of American troops in Mecca.
An extreme version, propagated by al-Qaeda, sees a huge conspiracy of
Jews, Americans and the West, linking the crusades, colonisation, the creation
of Israel, globalisation, the spread of Western culture and values directed
against Islam, and, in particular, the Arab world.
A less systematic but still fairly comprehensive and widespread feeling
combines nostalgia for the former cultural and military primacy of the Arab
world, anger and humiliation for its fragmentation by the Western powers
after World War I and for its defeat at the hands of Israel since World War II,
for the treatment of Muslims in some Western countries, with hope for
long-term victory signalled by the withdrawal of French and British forces
from
the Maghreb and the Middle East, of Israel from South Lebanon and Gaza,
and of the progress both of Islam and of certain Arab states, based on the
example of the ultimate defeat of the crusaders.
Sacrifice, wealth, power
If one looks at the major passions - other than pride and humiliation - one
becomes aware of a split that occurred with the destruction of Saddam
Hussein's tyranny.
The split is between a religious and a worldly orientation, or between a
violent and an economic one.
To understand this, I appeal to the German philosopher Hegel, and to the
Arab historian and founding father of sociology Ibn Khaldun.
Hegel said that Islam was the only truly monotheistic religion, and
Muslims the only true believers. This may lead them, he argued, on the one
hand,
to a thirst for sacrifice and to an abstract fight which despises all human
differences and loses all moderation, or, on the other hand, to a no-less
intense turn towards physical enjoyment and financial possessions.
Ibn Khaldun distinguishes between the community of nomadic warriors and
that of settled townsmen who discover comfort and lose their fighting spirit.
These two oppositions are not identical since one applies to religion and
the other to social evolution. But they both seem to be confirmed by the
current duality between what one may call the human bomb and the Arab or
Islamic capitalist.
On the one hand, there is the sacrifice of those who choose martyrdom out
of despair, out of mystical devotion, or out of abstract hatred. On the
other hand, there is the success of states and social strata which, building
on national resources and commerce, become economic powers whose global
financial weight is increasing and whose architectural and cultural
achievements stand out.
Both ways may, in a sense, converge in reviving pride by challenging the
superiority of the West. But both the passions which inspire them and their
results point in diverging directions.
Suicide by itself may inspire grudging respect, but has been shown not to
shatter the power of the enemy (such as the Israeli occupation), nor even
to prevent its progress, and the use of indiscriminate killing of innocents
(among whom a majority are Muslims) jeopardises the initial support of Arab
public opinion even if it continues to inspire young converts or candidates
across the world.
The growth of economic power, particularly in the Gulf, impressive as it
is, has not yet
succeeded in building a political and military power comparable to that of
Iran or Turkey.
This creates new grounds for distrust, jealousy and insecurity. Until the
undeniable progress achieved in domestic security and in wealth gives rise
to a strong state or union of states capable of standing up diplomatically
and militarily to their neighbours, and to protect their citizens and
allies with dignity and moderation, there will be a geopolitical vacuum that
will be vulnerable to imperialism and to terrorism.
Utilitarian calculus or struggle for recognition?
My last point does not apply specifically to the Middle East. It is
equally valid for Vietnam and Afghanistan, as well as for past colonial wars
or
for any confrontation between a Western, capitalist power and a movement of
armed resistance or insurgency. But it applies perfectly to the conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians, and, in a different way, to the conflict
between the US and al-Qaeda.
It seems to me that in each case the insurrection or resistance movement
sees itself as motivated by heroic, patriotic or religious motives, or by
the search for glory and honour, while it sees the opponent as corrupt,
cowardly, and having lost the manly virtues of the warrior.
Osama bin Laden thought 9/11 would result in a withdrawal of the US from
the
Middle East, or, at least, from the Arabian Peninsula. Similarly,
Hezbollah thought Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon would be the beginning
of
its acceptance of defeat because, as Hafez al-Asad said to Kissinger:
"Israel is becoming like you. It no longer knows how to suffer and to die."
This calculus may well turn out to be true one day, especially for
Americans or Europeans who send expeditionary forces far away and must follow
their
public opinion. But the immediate effect on both Israel and George W.
Bush's America has been to increase their willingness to fight, and their
desire for vengeance.
Conversely, they think that their opponents, or at least the peoples they
claim to represent, will abandon the fight because of a Pavlovian
calculation of punishment and reward; that, for instance, a starved and
harassed
Gaza population will turn against Hamas.
They may be right about war fatigue, but they underestimate the reaction
of anger, indignation against the bombings and the humiliation, and the
desire for vengeance.
When both sides understand the mutual and central role of humiliation, the
result may be even worse.
When asked what should be done about the Muslims, Kissinger is reported to
have answered: "They want to humiliate us, we must humiliate them."
While patience and negotiation without passion and the willingness to
fight lead to dishonourable defeat, an escalation of mutual humiliation
without
respect for the other side can only lead to mutual suicide.
--
Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community
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