(http://www.thenation.com/article/162698/europes-turn-right#) 





 
 
 
 
Europe's Turn to the Right 
_Ian  Buruma_ (http://www.thenation.com/authors/ian-buruma)  
August 10,  2011   |    from  the Aug 29 / Sept 5  issue 


 
Right-wing gunmen are a rarity in postwar Europe. There have, of course, 
been  instances of right-wing violence. In the 1990s, gangs composed mostly of 
former  East German youths, prey to neo-Nazi fantasies, set upon Turks and 
other clearly  identifiable immigrants, beating people up in the streets and 
torching refugee  shelters. 
 
 


 
Soccer hooligans, too, from a number of  countries—especially Germany, 
Britain and Russia—like to scream racist or  nationalist slogans while brawling 
in stadiums or smashing city centers. There  is even evidence of some 
organizational links between political fringe groups,  such as the English 
Defence 
League, and gangs of soccer  hooligans.



Anders Behring Breivik, who murdered seventy-six people in the name of his  
war against “Islamization” and “multiculturalism,” was never, so far as 
we know,  a soccer hooligan. But he did have relations with the English 
Defence League.  His rambling manifesto, titled “2083—A European Declaration of 
Independence,”  contains a lot of gobbledygook about medieval knights, but 
also negative views  on Muslims and liberals (“cultural Marxists”), which 
echo to a disconcerting  degree what certain populists closer to the European 
mainstream are saying. He  quotes Dutch politician Geert Wilders, among 
others, as an inspiration,  especially on the evils of multiculturalism. One or 
two politicians on the far  right have returned the compliment. Francesco 
Speroni of Italy’s Northern  League, which is part of Silvio Berlusconi’s 
government, claimed that “Breivik’s  ideas are in defense of Western 
civilization.” A new anti-immigrant Romanian  party has even accorded him the 
singular honor of borrowing his name. 
Even so, most right-wing populists who share many of Breivik’s opinions, 
such  as Wilders, have quickly distanced themselves from the killer and 
dismissed him  as a madman. Wilders tweeted: “That a psychopath has abused the 
battle against  Islamization is disgusting and a slap in the face of the 
worldwide anti-Islam  movement.” This is a smart way to avoid being tainted, 
but 
is it right? Is  Breivik just a crazy loner, or is there a link between his 
murderous acts and  the ideas that inspired them? 
Even if far-right violence in postwar Europe has been sporadic so far, and  
without serious political significance, there have always been radical  
right-wing parties, mostly operating on the margins of national politics. The  
nature of these parties differs from country to country, depending on 
national  histories and traditions. The National Front in France, for instance, 
was  founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen, a veteran of anticolonial wars, whose views 
on  World War II (the Nazi occupation was “not especially inhumane”) are 
in line  with an antiliberal, anti-Semitic tradition in France. 
The Flemish nationalists in Belgium owe much of their animus against  
foreigners to a long socioeconomic struggle with the French-speaking Walloons,  
who dominated them for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During 
 the war, this made many of them sympathetic to Nazi ideas of Aryan 
supremacy.  Now it is immigrants, especially Muslims, who are seen as the enemy 
by 
the  far-right Vlaams Belang party. 
In Germany, especially, it has been impossible to escape from the past. The 
 right-wing Republikaner Party was founded in 1983 by the late Franz 
Schönhuber,  a former officer in the Waffen SS, who blamed foreigners for most 
of 
the  problems in West Germany. In the ’90s he had hoped to merge his party 
with the  even more radical, but equally marginal, German People’s Union, 
whose leader  advocated racial purity and violence against immigrants. 
Even though Austrians had an easy ride after the war, absolving themselves  
from German war guilt, a certain nostalgia for Nazi times still lurks in  
right-wing corners there too. The late Jörg Haider, former leader of the  
Austrian Freedom Party, a far more mainstream party than the German  
Republikaner, pandered to older members by praising the virtues of the wartime  
generation, especially the Waffen SS. 
At least two important radical right-wing parties emerged directly from the 
 sump of Mussolini’s Italy. The National Alliance, under Gianfranco Fini, 
and the  Tricolor Flame came from the Italian Social Movement, founded by 
neo-Fascists in  1946. Before tacking more to the center in the ’90s, Fini was 
given to such  statements as “Fascism has a tradition of honesty, 
correctness and good  government.” 
The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries are less tainted by the 
past,  even though they produced their share of National Socialists and Nazi  
collaborators. Right-wing fringe parties in the postwar Netherlands were  
antiliberal and sometimes nativist. One notorious figure, Hans Janmaat, spoke  
out against immigrants. But neither he nor other right-wingers could be  
described as fascists. In Denmark, Sweden and Norway, right-wing parties, until 
 
recently, were more interested in lowering taxes than in the threat of  
foreigners to the purity of the native folk. 
One reason radical right-wing parties were marginalized for a long time in  
Europe is that they were simply too disreputable. It was worse than uncouth 
to  agitate openly against minorities, let alone to flirt with ideologies 
that had  caused the death of millions. Even to suggest that large-scale 
immigration could  be a problem was considered racist until not so long ago. In 
such countries as  Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands and France, mainstream 
parties have tended to  gang up against radical right-wing parties, blocking 
them behind what the French  call a cordon sanitaire. On the whole, voters 
for the far right hovered  between 10 percent and 15 percent—more than is 
desirable, perhaps, but few  people worried that they would ever get much 
more. 
The cordon first began to crack in Austria and Italy, during the  ’90s. 
This was not so much because Austrians were rediscovering their Nazi  
sympathies. Indeed, by the late ’90s most politicians on the democratic far  
right in 
Europe had tried to distance themselves from Nazi or fascist  antecedents. 
The reason for the Freedom Party’s success was that the Social and  
Christian Democrats had been in government too long. People voted against a  
sclerotic establishment. Many Italians felt the same way about the Christian  
Democrats, who had been propped up for decades, with the help of the United  
States, to keep the left out. But once the Christian Democrats finally lost  
power, it wasn’t the left that leapt into the vacuum but Berlusconi, backed by  
neo-Fascist and anti-immigrant parties, such as Fini’s National Alliance 
and  Umberto Bossi’s Northern League. 
Governments of the European Union were outraged in 2000, when the Austrian  
Freedom Party garnered enough votes to form part of a coalition government. 
 Boycotts were threatened. Austrian officials were snubbed. This was a 
mistake.  It only helped to burnish the right’s anti-establishment credentials. 
After all,  the AFP was democratically elected, as were the right-wing 
Italian parties in  1994. 
Perhaps being part of a government had a civilizing effect. In 1995 Fini  
disavowed his party’s Fascist heritage. But when it comes to immigration and, 
 especially, “the Muslim problem,” Fini and his right-wing allies in 
Berlusconi’s  coalition, as well as the Austrian AFP, are if anything even more 
ferocious than  before. In this, they are not alone. 
* * * 
Already by the late ’90s, anti-immigrant feelings were simmering in several 
 European countries, where relatively large numbers of “guest workers,” 
former  colonial subjects and refugees were beginning to make the native 
majorities feel  nervous. Neighborhoods were changing. Jobs were thought to be 
in 
peril. Welfare  states were felt to be under strain. 
And then 9/11 happened, and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh,  and the bombings in Madrid and London—all these atrocities perpetrated 
by 
 terrorists acting in the name of a violent Islamist revolution. This 
finally  gave right-wing populists a cause with which to crash into the center 
of 
 European politics. 
European civilization, frightened citizens were being told, had to be  
defended against “Islamization,” against fanatical aliens who breed so fast 
that  white Europeans will soon be outnumbered. And the promoters of this cause 
were  not nostalgic old SS men dreaming of the good old days, or 
neo-Fascists pining  for black shirts and military marches, or skinheads 
itching for a 
brawl. Quite  the opposite: Europe’s new populists are smartly dressed 
modern men and women  who claim to be defending our freedoms. And they are 
persuasive because people  are afraid and resentful, blaming economic and 
social 
anxieties on “liberal  elites.” But if the fears are vague and various, the 
focal point is Islam. 
The most successful politician of this new type is Geert Wilders, whose  
Freedom Party was described by Anders Breivik, the Norwegian killer, as “the  
only real conservative party in existance.” There are sane reasons to be 
worried  about mass immigration, Islamist extremism or the failures of 
multiculturalism.  But Wilders goes much further than that. He likes to speak 
in 
apocalyptic terms,  of “lights going out over Europe,” of “the final stages of 
the Islamization of  Europe,” of the “threat to America and the sheer 
survival of the West.” And all  this not just because of a particular strain of 
violent revolutionary Islam but  because of Islam itself: “If you want to 
compare Islam to anything, compare it  to communism or National Socialism—a 
totalitarian ideology.” 
Yet the Europe to be fought for, in Wilders’s rhetoric, bears no relation 
to  the dreams of Hitler or Mussolini. It is modern, and at the same time ill 
 defined. Sometimes it is “Judeo-Christian civilization” that must be 
defended,  sometimes “the Enlightenment” and sometimes liberal values mostly 
achieved since  the 1960s, such as gay rights and gender equality. These are 
not the kinds of  ideals typical right-wingers normally espouse, but since 
conservative Muslims  tend to oppose them, they can be held up as pillars of 
Western civilization. 
The perception of a Muslim threat allowed the populist right to turn the  
tables on the old liberal elites. Now it was the new right who were defending 
 the West against the new fascists. And the liberals were the “collaborators
” of  “Islamofascism.” 
Wilders and others in the “anti-Islamization movement” have even replaced  
anti-Semitism, associated with the old European far right, with what looks 
like  its opposite, a fervent form of Zionism. Indeed, they are great 
friends of  Israel—that is, of a certain kind of Israel, the one associated 
with 
figures  such as right-wing foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman. Wilders makes 
frequent  trips there, dining with Lieberman and telling settlers on the 
West Bank that  “Judea and Samaria” are rightfully theirs. So does 
Heinz-Christian Strache, of  the Austrian Freedom Party. What they like about 
the 
Israeli government is its  anti-Arab militancy. Israel, in Wilders’s phrase, is 
on the “front line” of the  war to save Western civilization. 
Even the new leader of the French National Front, Marine Le Pen, daughter 
of  Jean-Marie, would not dream of defending French fascism or indulge in her 
 father’s barely veiled anti-Semitism. And yet, in an odd way, the legacy 
of  World War II still haunts us, which is why critics of the apocalyptic 
view of  Islam in Europe are routinely denounced as “appeasers.” Europe, in 
the words of  an American admirer of Wilders, has entered another “Weimar 
moment.” 
In short, we are facing another war. The new right-wing populists in Europe 
 see not only Muslims as their enemies but also “liberal elites,”  “
multiculturalists” and “appeasers” who are fatally undermining the West and  
selling Europe out to the Islamofascists. 
So far, this is just a war of words. Wilders’s Freedom Party, as well as 
the  Danish People’s Party and the Austrian Freedom Party, are not advocating  
violence. On the contrary, by playing by the rules of democracy, they have  
successfully pushed more centrist parties to the right. Neither the Dutch 
nor  the Danish government could survive without the official support of the  
populists. And Marine Le Pen’s National Front appears to be gaining 
strength in  France. In Norway, the right-wing Progress Party, of which Breivik 
was 
a member  until 2006, is the second-biggest party in the country. 
This move of right-wing populist parties to the mainstream could be a 
reason  for the kind of savagery displayed by the Norwegian terrorist. Violent  
extremists might feel that parties they once admired are losing their purity 
by  tacking toward the center. But this explanation lets the populists off 
the hook  a little too easily. Even though they don’t promote violence, they 
are  exploiting fears in a dangerous manner. When the right claims that the 
future of  our civilization, our democracies, our countries, is at stake, 
and that all the  Muslims living in our midst are driven by “a totalitarian 
ideology,” it is  surely not surprising that some people might interpret this 
as a call to  arms. 
Perhaps Anders Breivik is a madman, even though there is no evidence so far 
 of clinical insanity. Maybe the men who flew airplanes into the Twin 
Towers, who  stabbed Theo van Gogh to death, who laid bombs in the London 
subway, 
were crazy  too. But different times produce different pathologies. If the 
hateful words of  radical Muslims bear any relation to extreme acts, carried 
out in name of Islam,  then surely the words of people who warn us that we 
are at war with Islam and  its liberal appeasers must be held accountable 
too. 
Ideology can be random. In other times, Breivik might have killed in the 
name  of fascism, anarchism or communism. Some murderous dreamers, Muslims as 
well as  Christians, might well use any ideological excuse to perpetrate 
their crimes. In  which case we cannot blame right-wing, anti-Muslim populists 
directly for the  murders in Oslo, just as anti-Western Muslim clerics can’t 
be blamed for 9/11.  But hate-filled words surely have an influence on 
murderous minds, and on the  targets they  pick.





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