The New Yorker
 
 
 
October 25, 2011
Where Is the New Keynes?
Posted by _John Cassidy_ 
(http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/bios/john_cassidy/search?contributorName=John
 Cassidy) 





 
On Monday, I was on Leonard Lopate’s WNYC radio show talking about my 
recent  article on John Maynard Keynes. (The piece is no longer behind a 
firewall. You  can _read it here_ 
(http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/10/10/111010fa_fact_cassidy) , and 
listen to the interview _here_ 
(http://www.wnyc.org/shows/lopate/2011/oct/24/what-would-john-maynard-keynes-tell-us-do/)
 .) At 
the end of the show, Leonard asked me an interesting  question: Has the 
financial crisis and Great Recession produced any big new  economic ideas? My 
immediate response was that it hasn’t, or, if it has, I  wasn’t aware of 
them. After the show, I thought about the question a bit  more. 
 
I still think the answer is no. There is nothing to compare with 
Keynesianism  or Monetarism or even the so-called Washington Consensus of the  
nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties. Certainly, there is no new Keynes. But 
 I 
do think that some important ideas have been discovered—or, rather,  
rediscovered. Here are six of them, together with some tips for further 
reading,  
one of which is rather self-serving:  
1. Finance matters. This lesson might seem  obvious to the man in the 
street, but many economists somehow managed to forget  it. Two who didn’t were 
Hyman Minsky and Wynne Godley, both of who were  associated with the Levy 
Institute for Economics at Bard College. Minksy’s  now-famous “Financial 
Instability Hypothesis” _can be found  here_ 
(http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf) , and one of Godley’s warnings 
about excessive household debt _can 
be found  here_ (http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/sevenproc.pdf) . (It is 
from 1999!)  
2. Credit busts are different from ordinary  recessions. On this, the most 
widely quoted work is Carmen Reinhart and Ken  Rogoff’s historical survey, “
_This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/This-Time-Different-Centuries-Financial/dp/0691142165) 
,”  which 
details how debt overhang in the public and private sectors tends to  produce “
lost decades.” For an old but still very readable account of how debt  
overhang can create deep recessions, I would recommend _Irving  Fisher’s famous 
essay from 1933_ (http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/meltzer/fisdeb33.pdf) . 
For something more recent, I recommend _this essay by  Ray Dalio_ 
(https://www.bwater.com/ViewDocument.aspx?f=44) , the head of Bridgewater 
Associates, 
the world’s biggest hedge  fund.  
3. Positive feedback and multiple equilibria have to be taken  seriously. 
With the rise of rational expectations theory, the idea that  financial 
markets and entire economies can spiral into bad outcomes—and for no  very good 
reason—was relegated to a mathematical curiosity: so called  “sunspots.” 
Now, the notion is back, and for good reason. It appears to describe  the world 
pretty well.  
The role positive feedback played in amplifying the credit crisis of 2008 
has  been studied extensively, and _this article by Princeton’s Markus 
Brunnermeier_ 
(http://scholar.princeton.edu/markus/files/liquidity_credit_crunch.pdf)  
provides a good  survey. Turning to what is happening in Europe, _Paul 
De  Grauwe_ (http://www.ceps.be/book/governance-fragile-eurozone) , of the 
Brussels-based Center for European Policy Studies, and _Paul Krugman_ 
(http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/wonking-out-about-the-euro-crisis-very-
wonkish/#more-23109)  have both written interesting analyses of the Euro  
system from a multiple equilibrium perspective.  
4. Especially in financial markets,  self-regarding rational behavior isn’t 
necessarily socially optimal. I wrote  a lot about this in my book, “_How 
Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/How-Markets-Fail-Economic-Calamities/dp/0312430043/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1
319491322&sr=1-1) .” For those  seeking a more technical analysis, I would 
recommend “_Risk and Liquidity_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/Risk-Liquidity-Clarendon-Lectures-Finance/dp/0199546363/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1319491365&;
sr=1-1) ,” by Princeton’s Hyun Song Shin.  
5. Monetary policy doesn’t always work very well. This lesson should  have 
been relearned in Japan. One person who did relearn it was Paul Krugman. 
_This essay of his from 1998_ (http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/japtrap.html)  
explains how economies can get stuck  in a “liquidity trap,” and is still 
worth reading, as his book “_The Return of Depression Economics_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/Return-Depression-Economics-Crisis-2008/dp/B0051BNVIG/ref=ntt_at_ep_
dpt_1) ,” an updated version of which  was reissued in 2008.  
6. Fiscal stimulus programs don’t provide a panacea for deep recessions,  
but the alternatives—do-nothing policies or austerity—are much worse. If you 
 doubt this, I would suggest you look at what is happening in Greece and 
the  United Kingdom, where austerity programs have been in effect for more 
than a  year. As for the Obama stimulus, most serious studies show it did have 
a  positive impact on G.D.P. growth and job creation—as detailed in _this 
helpful post by Dylan Matthews_ 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/did-the-stimulus-work-a-review-of-the-nine-best-studies-on-the-subject
/2011/08/16/gIQAThbibJ_blog.html)  on the Washington  Post’s Wonkblog.  
Looking at this list, anyone familiar with Keynes will quickly realize that 
 almost all of the points on it can be found in his writings, at least in 
embryo  form. If economics is about building internally consistent models of 
toy  economies from first principles, he wasn’t a great economist. If it is 
about  providing telling insights into how real economies function and 
malfunction, he  still has few rivals. That is why he never goes away.  
Endnote: Others will have different ideas about the lessons learned in  the 
past few years. I’d be interested in seeing them. But please, spare 
yourself  the effort of posting a comment to say that Keynesian stimulus 
programs 
don’t  work or that a return to the Gold Standard is our only salvation. 
Those are old  canards, not new insights. 



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