Good article Billy.  We know that a collapses of derivatives can bring down the 
economy like a house of cards.  An invisible and unknown risk in Greece/Europe 
is, indeed, cause for concern.

 

Chris

 

 

 

  _____  

From: [email protected] 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of [email protected]
Sent: Thursday, October 27, 2011 11:49 AM
To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: [RC] Europe Crisis averted ? Maybe, but maybe not

 

 

 

Washington Post

 


Europe’s debt crisis and 


the danger we can’t see


By  <http://www.washingtonpost.com/matt-miller/2011/02/24/ABBcOYN_page.html> 
Matt Miller, Published: October 26, 2011


There are plenty of reasons to be freaked out by the banking and sovereign debt 
crisis now 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/europe-struggles-toward-rescue-plan/2011/10/25/gIQAoGZFGM_story.html?hpid=z3>
  reaching a crescendo in Europe. But one factor that’s gotten little attention 
could turn this Very Bad Situation into a True Calamity.

It’s this: Regulators here and in Europe have no idea — repeat, no idea — of 
the full extent of the derivatives exposure that could be triggered by an 
“official” Greek default, or by the failure of a major French bank. And if the 
people in charge have no clue as to the fallout from what may be trillions of 
dollars in side bets waiting to be triggered in a catastrophic cascade, they’re 
basically flying blind. 

If it strikes you as insane that officials don’t know the exposure of these 
derivatives, given the havoc these “financial weapons of mass destruction” 
wreaked last time, you’re thinking clearly. The idea that we could be back on 
the edge of a Lehman/AIG-style implosion, just three years after the near-death 
experience of 2008, defies all presumptions about the human species’ capacity 
for learning. But then, Darwinian optimism leaves little room for the greed and 
myopia driving the global banking lobby today — or for the industry’s 
destructive power to kill or defer common-sense reform.

Remember, it was always odd that problems in the relatively small market for 
subprime mortgages could have brought the global economy low. The reason they 
did was because these subprime woes were massively amplified by trillions in 
side bets placed on these mortgages via exotic derivatives. “Naked credit 
default swaps” allowed parties with no interest in the underlying mortgages to 
place huge bets on whether borrowers would or would not perform. Fear of the 
explosive power of this casino — and its hidden concentration in a reckless, 
“too-interconnected-to-fail” giant like AIG — led U.S. officials to cough up no 
less than $180 billion in taxpayer money to pay off these bets in full. These 
officials, fearing a meltdown, treated sophisticated derivatives traders 
exactly as they would treat innocent consumer depositors in a failing bank, as 
people to be protected at 100 cents on the dollar. 

It was, and is, grotesque.

Today, Greece’s economy is roughly the size of the economy of Massachusetts. 
The notion that its debt problems could bring down the global financial system 
seems absurd.

Except for two things. First, many European banks holding Greek debt are so 
thinly capitalized (another way of saying “so imprudently managed”) that even 
tiny Greece’s default could wipe them out. Yet Europe’s emerging plan to cover 
this capital shortfall is tragically inadequate. 

As Douglas Elliott, a former investment banker now at the Brookings 
Institution, points 
<http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2011/1025_euro_crisis_elliott.aspx>  out, 
the plan to add 
<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-20/austria-says-europe-banks-need-100-billion-euros-of-capital.html>
  100 billion euros in capital represents a 10 percent capital boost for the 
top 90 banks, which have about a trillion euros in capital today. But since 
they also have around 27 trillion euros in assets, this new capital would 
protect them against a further decline of less than half a percentage point in 
the value of their assets. 

In other words, this is not a serious plan.

Yet the derivatives black hole makes matters worse. Exactly how much worse? We 
don’t know, because the big banks don’t have to disclose this information. The 
derivatives markets’ opacity is precisely what lets banks make a killing. If 
such trading becomes transparent and standardized, bank profits from 
derivatives will plummet. So they resist.

Even more outrageous, the chief negotiator for the banks being asked to take a 
deeper loss on their reckless loans to Greece uses this unknown derivatives 
exposure as a negotiating ploy. “Nice little global economy you’ve got here,” 
he’s basically saying. “Be a shame if something bad were to happen to it, if 
you make us say there’s been a ‘default.’ ”

To be sure, in the United States, once the Dodd-Frank implementing rules are 
written, traders will have to disclose a good chunk of their derivatives 
activity sometime in . . . 2013. A bit late for today’s crisis, but there’s 
always the next one. 

In the meantime, U.S. officials obviously talk to the banks they supervise. I’m 
told they have a better sense of U.S. banks’ derivatives exposure than was the 
case in 2008, and that they’re not frightened by what they see. But taking 
comfort here requires one to believe that banks are telling regulators the 
truth today, and that they actually know their own risk positions (which even 
their CEOs didn’t understand in 2008).

Even then, you can take comfort only if you think U.S. banks are the major 
holders of the relevant derivatives, when it’s almost certain that European 
firms are. And analysts tell me the Euro-banks’ books are monuments of deceit 
that make our own banks’ faulty financial statements look like models of truth 
in accounting.

Where does that leave us? There are more than $22 of derivatives for every 
dollar of goods and services produced in the U.S. economy. Some of these are 
harmless hedges; others, bombs waiting to detonate. Nobody knows. As one hedge 
fund manager told me: “All the bad lending is like a keg of dynamite, and all 
of the derivatives are like little fuses running from one house to another to 
another, and in each house is another keg of dynamite.”

One thing is certain. If it all goes kaboom, the banking elites who’ve sniffed 
dismissively at Occupy Wall Street ain’t seen nothing yet.

-- 
Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org

-- 
Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org

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