NY Times
 
 
November 16, 2011, 1:21 am  
A ‘Radical Centrist’ View on Election Forecasting
By _NATE SILVER_ 
(http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/author/nate-silver/) 
 
Ron Klain, the former chief of staff to Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., 
 has a long _critique_ 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-15/why-nate-silver-is-wrong-on-presidential-election-commentary-by-ron-klain.html)
  up at 
Bloomberg about the _piece that I published_ 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/magazine/nate-silver-handicaps-2012-election.html?pagewanted=all)
  in 
The New York Times Magazine  recently about President Obama’s re-election 
prospects. His article takes the  view that campaign strategy and other 
intangibles are quite important in  presidential campaigns and that statistical 
forecasts do a poor job of  accounting for these. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Klain’s article attributes to me a number of views that 
I  am ambivalent about or actively disagree with, so it deserves a fairly 
long  reply. I will also use this opportunity to respond to some criticisms 
that I  have been receiving from political scientists. The irony is that I 
agree with  Mr. Klain more than he realizes. 
But let’s start with Mr. Klain’s central question: how much difference 
does  campaign strategy make in determining the outcome of presidential 
elections? 
Do all the ads, speeches, mailings, debates, online activity and rallies  
really change minds? Or is the outcome of the election the product of  
underlying fundamentals that are scarcely affected by such  efforts?
This is obviously something of a false juxtaposition. It is extremely  
unlikely that campaigns don’t matter at all. Now and then, you’ll see a  
political scientist come fairly close to expressing this viewpoint, but that is 
 
_certainly not_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/Message-Matters-Economy-Presidential-Campaigns/dp/0691139636/ref=sr_1_20?ie=UTF8&qid=1321406349&sr=8-20)
  the 
majority opinion within the  discipline. The question, instead, is how much 
campaigns matter, and  that is a difficult question to answer. 
I strongly agree with Mr. Klain that political scientists as a group badly  
overestimate how accurately they can forecast elections from economic 
variables  alone. I have written up lengthy critiques of _several_ 
(http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/despite-keys-obama-is-no-lock/)
  of 
these _models_ 
(http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/22/predicting-the-economy-and-obamas-re-election-chances/)
  in the _past_ 
(http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/what-do-economic-models-really-tell-us
-about-elections/) , which suffer from fundamental problems regardless  of 
which variables they choose. 
One of the things it took me a long time to learn about forecasting is that 
 there’s a difference between fitting data to past results and actually 
making a  prediction. A regression model built from historical data is really 
just a  description of statistical relationships that existed in the past. 
The  forecaster hopes or assumes that the relationships will also  apply in 
the future, but there is often a significant deterioration in  performance.

I’m not just talking about  obvious examples of spurious correlation like 
that the winner of the Super Bowl  _was once a highly “statistically 
significant” predictor_ 
(http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/superbowlindicator.asp) 
  of the direction of the stock market. (In recent years, this indicator 
has  performed badly.) The problems run a lot deeper than that, affecting many 
or  perhaps even most of the statistical relationships documented in the  
peer-reviewed literature in some fields. 
John P.A. Ioannidis, for instance, has _described_ 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1182327/?tool=pmcentrez)  how most 
published research 
findings  in medical journals cannot be replicated independently. Scott 
Armstrong of the  Wharton Business School, who has devoted most of his life to 
studying  prediction, has found _analagous problems in the social sciences_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/Principles-Forecasti
ng-International-Operations-Management/dp/0792374010) . My research  into the 
_Survey of Professional 
Forecasts_ 
(http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/)
  suggests that actual  economic data falls 
outside the 90 percent confidence intervals as claimed by  economists somewhere 
between one-third or one-half of the time, meaning that  they are extremely 
overconfident about the reliability of their forecasts. 
Presidential forecasting models that rely on economic data are likely to be 
 especially susceptible to these problems. Most of them are fit to data 
from a  small sample of 10 to 20 past elections but have a choice of literally 
hundreds  of defensible economic or political variables to sort through. 
Forecasters who  are not conscientious about their methodology will wind up 
with models that make  overconfident forecasts and that impute meaning to 
statistical noise. 
I would not paint all the forecasters with the same brush. Two political  
scientists who I know have a very sophisticated understanding of these 
problems  are Larry Bartels at Princeton and Robert Erikson at Columbia. 
Others, 
like Hans  Noel, will _publish models_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/Party-Decides-Presidential-Nominations-American/dp/0226112373)
 , but provide very explicit 
disclaimers  about their limitations. But there others who tweak as many 
knobs as they can,  and there are bloggers and reporters who take all of the 
results at face value  and don’t distinguish the responsible forecasts from 
the junk science. The  problem is made worse when a _game show_ 
(http://www.brendan-nyhan.com/blog/2011/11/a-comparison-of-presidential-forecasting-models.
html)  is made out of forecasting and everyone  competes to see who can get 
the most _overfit_ (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overfitting)  model 
published in a peer-reviewed journal. 
A more tangible question is how well economic statistics alone can really  
predict elections. I have written previously that a good assumption is that 
they  can explain perhaps 50 percent of the results. But based on some 
further  research that I will soon publish, I suspect that estimate was too 
high, 
and  that the answer is more like 30 or 40 percent when the models are 
applied to  make real, out-of-sample forecasts. Economic variables that perform 
better than  that over a small subset of elections tend to revert to the 
mean or even perform  quite poorly over larger samples. 
So say that 60 percent of elections cannot be explained by economic  
variables. Should all of the remaining credit go to campaigns? 
No, of course not. First, the fact that widely available published  
economic statistics cannot explain more than about 40 percent of election  
results 
does not mean that the actual living and breathing economy  cannot. The 
American economy is a very hard thing to measure. Gross domestic  product was 
originally estimated to have declined at a rate of about 3.5 percent  in the 
fourth quarter of 2008; revised data puts the decline at almost 9 percent  
instead. The government first reported that the economy had grown by 4.2 
percent  in the fourth quarter of 1977, but that figure was later revised to  
negative 0.1 percent. Using revised data can reduce the error to some  extent, 
but there is quite a lot of intrinsic uncertainty of measurement. Some  of 
the debates about why variable X is superior to variables P, D and Q are no  
more productive than debating the number of _angels that can dance on a 
pinhead_ 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/How_many_angels_can_dance_on_the_head_of_a_pin?) 
; the measurement  error swamps any marginal gain that might be made 
from the choice of one  reasonable variable over another. 
Moreover, there are differences between what the statistics say about the  
economy and how Americans actually experience it. Some of these differences 
can  be exploited by campaigns, but others fall into the category of being “
unknown  knowns”: things that are manifestly important but that we don’t 
have a good way  to measure. Beyond the economy, likewise, there are other 
sorts of factors that  campaigns may have little control over. Wars. Terrorist 
attacks. Earthquakes.  Hurricanes. Sex scandals. Most of the attempts to 
translate these events into  statistical variables have been quite silly. But 
that doesn’t mean the  uncertainty they introduce into forecasting should be 
mistaken for the skill of  a campaign. It’s not to Michael Dukakis’s credit 
that Gary Hart was dumb enough  to get caught on a yacht with a swimsuit 
model. 
Next, we have to make a distinction between candidates and  campaigns. 
Sometimes a very appealing candidate runs a terrible  campaign — Hillary Rodham 
Clinton comes to mind — or vice versa. Variables  related to the candidates 
themselves are potentially easier to quantify than  those related to 
campaign strategy. 
One of those variables is the left-right ideology of the candidate, which I 
 do include in my model and which political scientists have sometimes 
included in  the past. Measuring ideology is not easy — although in practice it 
is probably  no harder than accurately measuring the economy — but there are 
a few _well-regarded_ (http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm)  methods for doing 
so. I have evaluated a  couple, and they perform quite well according to 
statistical tests, even when  taken in conjunction with factors like the 
president’s approval rating on  Election Day or robust measures of economic 
performance. 
To be sure, statistical tests may miscalibrate the impact of ideology just 
as  they exaggerate the impact of particular economic variables. But there 
are _strong theoretical reasons_ 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Median_voter_theorem)  to believe that ideology  
matters, and there is moderately strong 
evidence from other contexts, like  Congressional elections and elections in 
parliamentary systems, that it does. It  does not seem plausible, meanwhile, 
as some political scientists’ models imply,  that the difference between 
Representative Michele Bachmann or Mitt Romney would  amount to only 1 or 2 
points at the polls. 
Another difficulty is that candidate ideology is _correlated_ 
(http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/history-may-point-toward-more-conserv
ative-g-o-p-nominee/)  with other variables, like the length of the  time 
that a party has been out of office, and those variables in turn have been  
correlated with election results. My view is that there are strong reasons to 
 believe that ideology is in fact the causal factor — models that make the  
opposite assumption come up with some _highly implausible results_ 
(http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/11/11/the_fuzzy_math_and_logic_of__el
ection_prediction_models_112042.html)  — but it is hard to know for  sure 
when you’re dealing with highly correlated variables over small samples. We  
will be publishing more about this topic in the coming weeks. 
Nevertheless, Michele Bachmann’s campaign would have to work with Mrs.  
Bachmann, while Mitt Romney’s would have to work with him; how much difference  
can their strategies make at the margin? 
One of the more tangible examples of campaign strategy mattering was in 
2008,  where by a variety of measures Mr. Obama’s campaign (which Mr. Klain was 
a part  of) overperformed by a net of about 3 or 4 points in swing states. 
In this case,  Mr. Obama’s sound strategy was superfluous since he was 
likely to have won the  campaign either way, but had the election been closer, 
it 
may have made a  difference. Our models in 2008 generally found that Mr. 
Obama was about 5  percent more likely to win the Electoral College but lose 
the popular vote  rather than the other way around. 
My guess — and it’s just a guess — is that this may be as good an  
estimate as any at the effects that a well-run campaign might have. Perhaps a  
very 
well run campaign can improve a president’s chances of winning re-election  
by 5 or 10 percent. But who knows. We have already had an extremely wide 
array  of outcomes in the various special and interim elections that have 
taken place  around the country so far this year, and we’ve had a very wild 
Republican  primary, suggesting that voter preferences may be more malleable 
than  normal. 
In fact, I discussed some of these effects in my article. I wrote, for  
instance, about a scenario in which the economic numbers might be relatively  
good, but Mr. Obama nevertheless would lose to Mr. Romney: 
Romney is much different stylistically from Bush’s opponent, Bill Clinton,  
but both are skilled at driving an economic message. Romney would bring out 
 his PowerPoint and seek to persuade voters that the growth had been too 
little  and too late. After all, if killing bin Laden couldn’t lift Obama’s 
approval  rating much above 50 percent, who knows whether one year of 
good-but-not-great  growth would?
My article was full of these sorts of devil’s-advocate cases — reminders 
that  it’s hard to forecast an election a year in advance, and that even when 
you get  closer to it, things might not go according to the formula. Among 
other years,  1948, 1952, 1960, 1968, 1976, 1992 and 2000 were problematic 
for at least some  of the model-based forecasts. More recently, a lot of “
fundamentals” models  badly underestimated Republican gains in the 2010 midterm 
elections. 
These models are not that good, so my view is that if you’re going to build 
 one, it ought to have a nice wide _confidence interval_ 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confidence_interval)  that is designed to apply 
in the  real 
world and not just in the software package. I also hold the view that one  
should switch to polling-based metrics sooner rather than later. These models  
are easier to calibrate, are less prone to overfitting (they have essentially 
 just one variable: the polling average) and are far less presumptuous 
about why  the electorate votes the way it does. They make the very reasonable 
assumption  that voters will do a better job of explaining why they vote the 
way they do  than can be inferred from a series of quasi-random economic 
inputs. 
If polling-based models do a much better job of prediction, they sacrifice  
something in explaining elections, leaving some of Mr. Klain’s  questions 
unresolved. At the same time, it is important to be aware of the  elections 
in which no campaign would have changed the result. One of these is an  
example that Mr. Klain cites: 1984. 
But, to use just one example, if cold, hard economic data were decisive in  
elections, then President Ronald Reagan, seeking re-election in 1984 when 
the  economy was beset by a 7.5 percent unemployment rate, wouldn’t have won 
49  states. After all, his successor, President George H.W. Bush lost by 
more than  200 electoral votes when he ran for re-election in 1992, with the 
jobless rate  at 7.4 percent.
The unemployment rate may have been 7.5 percent when voters went to the 
polls  to pick between Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale. But it had declined 
from as  high as _10.8 percent_ 
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/UNRATE.txt)  earlier in Mr. Reagan’s 
term. Moreover,  economic growth was 
exceptional in both 1983 and 1984, with G.D.P. advancing at  almost 6 percent 
in 
the election year. 
One thing the statistical evidence is quite clear upon is that voters are  
reasonably forward-looking and weigh the rate of change much more heavily 
than  how the economy is performing in an absolute sense. (Historically, the 
raw  unemployment rate has been among the very worst predictors of election 
outcomes,  while the change in job growth during the election year has been 
among the very  best.) Mr. Reagan’s _morning in America_ 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EU-IBF8nwSY)  campaign seemed brilliant when 
the  unemployment 
rate had fallen to 7 percent from 11 percent. The same message  would have 
been ridiculous had the unemployment rate risen to 7 percent  from 3 percent 
instead. 
I apologize if some of this seems prickly. I lived through the  Moneyball 
wars in baseball and then saw how much progress the sport  made once everyone 
learned how much they had in common. 
Baseball games, however, are played 162 times per year, so the learning  
process is accelerated. But presidential elections are held only once every 4  
years, and we make the same mistakes over and over again. The outcome of 
the  election isn’t especially predictable right now, but here are four 
predictions  you can take to the bank: 
1. Next year, the strategists of the winning campaigns will be praised as  
brilliant.
2. Next year, the strategists of the losing campaign will be  blamed for a 
long series of mistakes.
3. Next year, some of the political  science models will hit the outcome 
right on the nose.
4. Next year, some  of the political science models will miss wildly in one 
direction or  another.
Maybe one of the campaigns really will have made the difference; the  
forecasting models can tell us something about that, by the way. But it’s just  
as likely that a campaign that deserves praise for keeping the election to  
within 2 points when its candidate “should” have lost by 6 will get blame 
when  it deserves credit. Meanwhile, I’ll be rooting for the models that apply 
more  responsible forecasting practices, but most of how they perform over 
the next  few elections will be determined by luck. Better if we acknowledge 
their  limitations in advance.

-- 
Centroids: The Center of the Radical Centrist Community 
<[email protected]>
Google Group: http://groups.google.com/group/RadicalCentrism
Radical Centrism website and blog: http://RadicalCentrism.org

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