The most coherent thinking I've seen yet...

http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2011/obamas_foreign_policy_doctrine_finally_emerges_with_offshore_balancing_60

Obama's Foreign Policy Doctrine Finally Emerges with 'Offshore Balancing'

What does America's disastrous bombing of Pakistani soldiers this week have to 
do with President Obama's much-ballyhooed trip to East Asia last week? Between 
them, they suggest that the Obama administration may be, finally, edging toward 
a foreign-policy doctrine.

First, Pakistan. The bombing was a mistake, but it comes after a series of very 
conscious decisions—most significantly the assassination of Osama bin Laden—in 
which Obama put killing al Qaeda terrorists ahead of America's relationship 
with Pakistan. That's not the tradeoff many expected when Obama came into 
office determined to eschew unilateralism, reinvigorate diplomacy and improve 
America's relationships with the Muslim world. But it makes sense when you 
realize that the Obama administration has largely given up on trying to remake 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.

As Bob Woodward's Obama's Wars made clear, Obama never considered the Taliban a 
real threat to American security. And after giving Gen. David Petraeus and 
company a chance to try counterinsurgency, Obama is increasingly pursuing the 
policy that Vice President Joe Biden proposed from the beginning: leave 
Afghanistan to the Afghans and keep al Qaeda off balance with Special Forces 
and attacks from the air.

Indeed, as the U.S. withdraws its ground forces from Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
centerpiece of its military policy in the Muslim world is becoming drones to 
attack al Qaeda (the Washington Post recently reported that the Obama 
administration is building secret drone bases in the Arabian Peninsula and the 
Horn of Africa) and military aid to contain Iran (last fall, the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia agreed on the largest weapons sale in American history).

One way of understanding America's shifting policy in the Middle East is that 
we're moving offshore. Instead of directly occupying Islamic lands, we're 
trying to secure our interests from the sea, the air and by equipping our 
allies. That's in large measure what the Obama administration is trying to do 
in East Asia, too. The central message of Obama's trip last week to Australia 
was that the U.S. finally is focused on restraining China's rise in the 
Pacific. And how will the U.S. do that? A token deployment of Marines in 
northern Australia notwithstanding, the Obama administration's strategy will be 
to buttress America's naval presence in the Pacific and aid those nations on 
China's periphery that fear its hegemonic ambitions.

There's a name for the strategy the Obama administration is increasingly 
pursuing from the Persian Gulf through the Hindu Kush to the South China Sea: 
offshore balancing. It's the idea that America can best contain our adversaries 
not by confronting them on land, but by maintaining our naval and air power and 
strengthening those smaller nations that see us as a natural counterweight to 
their larger neighbors.

The strategy has deep roots in America, a nation rich in technology and naval 
power but highly sensitive to casualties. When World War II broke out, Franklin 
Roosevelt at first tried to make America Britain's quartermaster. Then, when 
forced to directly enter the fray, he initially hoped to limit America's 
participation in the European theater to air and naval support while the 
Russians and Brits fought Germany on land. After the war, George Kennan's 
original vision for containing the U.S.S.R. was similar: aid the ravaged 
nations of Japan and Western Europe so they could resist the Soviets on their 
own, and patrol the seas.

When America's leaders are flush with money and confident in America's military 
might, off-shore balancing goes out the window. That's what happened in 1950, 
when the Truman administration—against Kennan's warnings—went to war in Korea 
and signed NSC 68, which dramatically increased U.S. military spending and laid 
the groundwork for Vietnam. It's also what happened when the Bush 
administration—buoyed by America's victories in the Gulf War, Bosnia and 
Kosovo—responded to 9/11 not by offering counterterrorism cooperation to 
America's allies or by launching air strikes, but by invading two Muslim 
nations.

Offshore balancing, by contrast, reemerges when the money and bravado have run 
out. After the trauma of Korea, Dwight Eisenhower tried to use the U.S. Air 
Force—now outfitted with nuclear weapons—to deter the Soviet Union so the U.S. 
wouldn't spend blood and treasure battling communism on the ground. Richard 
Nixon withdrew U.S. ground troops from Vietnam and launched ferocious bombing 
from the air while sending vast quantities of weaponry to governments such as 
Iran's in the hopes that they could contain the U.S.S.R. while the U.S. stayed 
offshore.

Now, Obama is doing something similar in the wake of a land-based war on terror 
that America manifestly cannot afford. Offshore balancing has its drawbacks. It 
requires abandoning the idea that via nation building the U.S. can remake other 
societies, and often involves partnering with smaller nations with which 
America faces a common enemy—the Gulf States against Iran, Vietnam against 
China—regardless of our allies' democratic credentials.

For an Obama administration that came into office talking about remaking the 
world's institutional architecture to combat common threats like global warming 
and nuclear proliferation, offshore balancing seems a bit amoral and zero-sum. 
But it offers a way for the U.S. to maintain influence at reduced cost, which 
is likely to be the central foreign policy challenge of the next few years. And 
it offers a way to distinguish between vital national interests, such as 
preventing China from shutting the U.S. out of East Asia, from non-vital ones, 
like who rules Afghanistan. Given the staggering cost the U.S. has paid for its 
inability to make those distinctions over the last decade, Obama's new doctrine 
isn't coming a moment too soon.

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