Richard Clarke on Who Was Behind the  Stuxnet Attack 
America's longtime counterterrorism czar warns that the cyberwars  have 
already begun—and that we might be losing 
    *   By _Ron  Rosenbaum_ 
(http://www.smithsonianmag.com/writers/Ron-Rosenbaum.html)  
    *   Smithsonian magazine, April 2012,
Air  &   Space





 
The story Richard Clarke spins has all the suspense of a postmodern  
geopolitical thriller. The tale involves a ghostly cyberworm created to attack  
the nuclear centrifuges of a rogue nation—which then escapes from the target  
country, replicating itself in thousands of computers throughout the world. 
It  may be lurking in yours right now. Harmlessly inactive...or awaiting 
further  orders. 
A great story, right? In fact, the world-changing “weaponized malware”  
computer worm called Stuxnet is very real. It seems to have been launched in  
mid-2009, done terrific damage to Iran’s nuclear program in 2010 and then 
spread  to computers all over the world. Stuxnet may have averted a nuclear  
conflagration by diminishing Israel’s perception of a need for an imminent  
attack on Iran. And yet it might end up starting one someday soon, if its  
replications are manipulated maliciously. And at the heart of the story is a  
mystery: Who made and launched Stuxnet in the first place? 
Richard Clarke tells me he knows the answer. 
Clarke, who served three presidents as counterterrorism czar, now operates 
a  cybersecurity consultancy called Good Harbor, located in one of those 
anonymous  office towers in Arlington, Virginia, that triangulate the Pentagon 
and the  Capitol in more ways than one. I had come to talk to him about what’
s been done  since the urgent alarm he’d sounded in his recent book, Cyber 
War. The  book’s central argument is that, while the United States has 
developed the  capability to conduct an offensive cyberwar, we have virtually 
no  
defense against the cyberattacks that he says are targeting us now, and  
will be in the future. 
Richard Clarke’s warnings may sound overly dramatic until you remember that 
 he was the man, in September of 2001, who tried to get the White House to 
act on  his warnings that Al Qaeda was preparing a spectacular attack on 
American  soil. 
Clarke later delivered a famous apology to the American people in his  
testimony to the 9/11 Commission: “Your government failed you.” 
Clarke now wants to warn us, urgently, that we are being failed again, 
being  left defenseless against a cyberattack that could bring down our 
nation’s 
entire  electronic infrastructure, including the power grid, banking and  
telecommunications, and even our military command system. 
“Are we as a nation living in denial about the danger we’re in?” I asked  
Clarke as we sat across a conference table in his office suite. 
“I think we’re living in the world of non-response. Where you know that  
there’s a problem, but you don’t do anything about it. If that’s denial, 
then  that’s denial.” 
As Clarke stood next to a window inserting coffee capsules into a Nespresso 
 machine, I was reminded of the opening of one of the great espionage films 
of  all time, Funeral in Berlin, in which Michael Caine silently,  
precisely, grinds and brews his morning coffee. High-tech java seems to go with 
 the 
job. 
But saying Clarke was a spy doesn’t do him justice. He was a meta-spy, a  
master counterespionage, counter­terrorism savant, the central node where 
 all the most secret, stolen, security-encrypted bits of information 
gathered by  our trillion-dollar human, electronic and satellite intelligence 
network  eventually converged. Clarke has probably been privy to as much “above 
top  secret”- grade espionage intelligence as anyone at Langley, NSA or the 
White  House. So I was intrigued when he chose to talk to me about the 
mysteries of  Stuxnet. 
“The picture you paint in your book,” I said to Clarke, “is of a U.S. 
totally  vulnerable to cyberattack. But there is no defense, really, is there?” 
There are  billions of portals, trapdoors, “exploits,” as the cybersecurity 
guys call them,  ready to be hacked. 
“There isn’t today,” he agrees. Worse, he continues, catastrophic  
consequences may result from using our cyber­offense without having a  
cyberdefense: blowback, revenge beyond our imaginings. 
“The U.S. government is involved in espionage against other governments,” 
he  says flatly. “There’s a big difference, however, between the kind of  
cyberespionage the United States government does and China. The U.S. 
government  doesn’t hack its way into Airbus and give Airbus the secrets to 
Boeing 
[many  believe that Chinese hackers gave Boeing secrets to Airbus]. We don’t 
hack our  way into a Chinese computer company like Huawei and provide the 
secrets of  Huawei technology to their American competitor Cisco. [He believes 
Microsoft,  too, was a victim of a Chinese cyber con game.] We don’t do 
that.” 
“What do we do then?” 
“We hack our way into foreign governments and collect the information off  
their networks. The same kind of information a CIA agent in the old days 
would  try to buy from a spy.” 
“So you’re talking about diplomatic stuff?” 
“Diplomatic, military stuff but not commercial competitor stuff.” 
As Clarke continued, he disclosed a belief we’re engaged in a very 
different,  very dramatic new way of using our cyberoffense capability—the 
story of 
the  legendary cyberworm, Stuxnet. 
Stuxnet is a digital ghost, countless lines of code crafted with such 
genius  that it was able to worm its way into Iran’s nuclear fuel enrichment 
facility in  Natanz, Iran, where gas centrifuges spin like whirling dervishes, 
separating  bomb-grade uranium-235 isotopes from the more plentiful U-238. 
Stuxnet seized  the controls of the machine running the centrifuges and in a 
delicate, invisible  operation, desynchronized the speeds at which the 
centrifuges spun, causing  nearly a thousand of them to seize up, crash and 
otherwise self-destruct. The  Natanz facility was temporarily shut down, and 
Iran’
s attempt to obtain enough  U-235 to build a nuclear weapon was delayed by 
what experts estimate was months  or even years. 
The question of who made Stuxnet and who targeted it on Natanz is still a  
much-debated mystery in the IT and espionage community. But from the 
beginning,  the prime suspect has been Israel, which is known to be open to 
using  
unconventional tactics to defend itself against what it regards as an  
existential threat. The New York Times published a story that pointed  to 
U.S.-Israeli cooperation on Stuxnet, but with Israel’s role highlighted by  the 
assertion that a file buried within the Stuxnet worm contained an indirect  
reference to “Esther,” the biblical heroine in the struggle against the  
genocidal Persians. 
Would the Israelis have been foolish enough to leave such a blatant 
signature  of their authorship? Cyberweapons are usually cleansed of any 
identifying  marks—the virtual equivalent of the terrorist’s “bomb with no 
return 
address”—so  there is no sure place on which to inflict retaliatory 
consequences. Why would  Israel put its signature on a cybervirus? 
On the other hand, was the signature an attempt to frame the Israelis? On 
the  other, other hand, was it possible the Israelis had indeed planted it  
hoping that it would lead to the conclusion that someone else had built it 
and  was trying to pin it on them? 
When you’re dealing with virtual espionage, there is really no way to know  
for sure who did what. 
Unless you’re Richard Clarke. 
“I think it’s pretty clear that the United States government did the 
Stuxnet  attack,” he said calmly. 
This is a fairly astonishing statement from someone in his position. 
“Alone or with Israel?” I asked. 
“I think there was some minor Israeli role in it. Israel might have 
provided  a test bed, for example. But I think that the U.S. government did the 
attack and  I think that the attack proved what I was saying in the book [which 
came out  before the attack was known], which is that you can cause real 
devices—real  hardware in the world, in real space, not cyberspace—to blow up.
” 
Isn’t Clarke coming right out and saying we committed an act of undeclared  
war? 
“If we went in with a drone and knocked out a thousand centrifuges, that’s 
an  act of war,” I said. “But if we go in with Stuxnet and knock out a 
thousand  centrifuges, what’s that?” 
“Well,” Clarke replied evenly, “it’s a covert action. And the U.S. 
government  has, ever since the end of World War II, before then, engaged in 
covert action.  If the United States government did Stuxnet, it was under a 
covert action, I  think, issued by the president under his powers under the 
Intelligence Act. Now  when is an act of war an act of war and when is it a 
covert action? 
“That’s a legal issue. In U.S. law, it’s a covert action when the 
president  says it’s a covert action. I think if you’re on the receiving end of 
the 
covert  action, it’s an act of war.” 
When I e-mailed the White House for comment, I received this reply: “You 
are  probably aware that we don’t comment on classified intelligence matters.”
 Not a  denial. But certainly not a confirmation. So what does Clarke base 
his  conclusion on? 
One reason to believe the Stuxnet attack was made in the USA, Clarke says,  
“was that it very much had the feel to it of having been written by or 
governed  by a team of Washington lawyers.” 
“What makes you say that?” I asked. 
“Well, first of all, I’ve sat through a lot of meetings with Washington  
[government/Pentagon/CIA/NSA-type] lawyers going over covert action 
proposals.  And I know what lawyers do. 
“The lawyers want to make sure that they very much limit the effects of the 
 action. So that there’s no collateral damage.” He is referring to legal 
concerns  about the Law of Armed Conflict, an international code designed to 
minimize  civilian casualties that U.S. government lawyers seek to follow in 
most  cases. 
Clarke illustrates by walking me through the way Stuxnet took down the  
Iranian centrifuges. 
“What does this incredible Stuxnet thing do? As soon as it gets into the  
network and wakes up, it verifies it’s in the right network by saying, ‘Am I 
in  a network that’s running a SCADA [Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition]  software control system?’ ‘Yes.’ Second question: ‘Is it running 
Siemens [the  German manufacturer of the Iranian plant controls]?’ ‘Yes.’ 
Third question: ‘Is  it running Siemens 7 [a genre of software control 
package]?’
 ‘Yes.’ Fourth  question: ‘Is this software contacting an electrical motor 
made by one of two  companies?’” He pauses. 
“Well, if the answer to that was ‘yes,’ there was only one place it could 
be.  Natanz.” 
“There are reports that it’s gotten loose, though,” I said, reports of  
Stuxnet worms showing up all over the cyberworld. To which Clarke has a  
fascinating answer: 
“It got loose because there was a mistake,” he says. “It’s clear to me 
that  lawyers went over it and gave it what’s called, in the IT business, a 
TTL.” 
“What’s that?” 
“If you saw Blade Runner [in which artificial intelligence androids  were 
given a limited life span—a “time to die”], it’s a ‘Time to Live.’” Do the 
 job, commit suicide and disappear. No more damage, collateral or 
otherwise. 
“So there was a TTL built into Stuxnet,” he says [to avoid violating  
international law against collateral damage, say to the Iranian electrical  
grid]. And somehow it didn’t work.” 
“Why wouldn’t it have worked?” 
“TTL operates off of a date on your computer. Well, if you are in China or  
Iran or someplace where you’re running bootleg software that you haven’t 
paid  for, your date on your computer might be 1998 or something because 
otherwise the  bootleg 30-day trial TTL software would expire. 
“So that’s one theory,” Clarke continues. “But in any event, you’re 
right, it  got out. And it ran around the world and infected lots of things but 
didn’t do  any damage, because every time it woke up in a computer it asked 
itself those  four questions. Unless you were running uranium nuclear 
centrifuges, it wasn’t  going to hurt you.” 
“So it’s not a threat anymore?” 
“But you now have it, and if you’re a computer whiz you can take it apart 
and  you can say, ‘Oh, let’s change this over here, let’s change that over 
there.’  Now I’ve got a really sophisticated weapon. So thousands of people 
around the  world have it and are playing with it. And if I’m right, the 
best cyberweapon  the United States has ever developed, it then gave the world 
for free.” 
The vision Clarke has is of a modern technological nightmare, casting the  
United States as Dr. Frankenstein, whose scientific genius has created 
millions  of potential monsters all over the world. But Clarke is even more 
concerned  about “official” hackers such as those believed to be employed by 
China. 
“I’m about to say something that people think is an exaggeration, but I 
think  the evidence is pretty strong,” he tells me. “Every major company in 
the United  States has already been penetrated by China.” 
“What?” 
“The British government actually said [something similar] about their own  
country. ” 
Clarke claims, for instance, that the manufacturer of the F-35, our  
next-generation fighter bomber, has been penetrated and F-35 details stolen. 
And  
don’t get him started on our supply chain of chips, routers and hardware we  
import from Chinese and other foreign suppliers and what may be implanted 
in  them—“logic bombs,” trapdoors and “Trojan horses,” all ready to be 
activated on  command so we won’t know what hit us. Or what’s already hitting 
us. 
“My greatest fear,” Clarke says, “is that, rather than having a 
cyber-Pearl  Harbor event, we will instead have this death of a thousand cuts. 
Where 
we lose  our competitiveness by having all of our research and development 
stolen by the  Chinese. And we never really see the single event that makes us 
do something  about it. That it’s always just below our pain threshold. 
That company after  company in the United States spends millions, hundreds of 
millions, in some  cases billions of dollars on R&D and that information goes 
free to  China....After a while you can’t compete.” 
But Clarke’s concerns reach beyond the cost of lost intellectual property. 
He  foresees the loss of military power. Say there was another 
confrontation, such  as the one in 1996 when President Clinton rushed two 
carrier battle 
fleets to  the Taiwan Strait to warn China against an invasion of Taiwan. 
Clarke, who says  there have been war games on precisely such a revived 
confrontation, now  believes that we might be forced to give up playing such a 
role for fear that  our carrier group defenses could be blinded and paralyzed 
by Chinese  cyberintervention. (He cites a recent war game published in an 
influential  military strategy journal called Orbis titled “How the U.S. Lost 
the  Naval War of 2015.”) 
Talking to Clarke provides a glimpse into the brand-new game of 
geopolitics,  a dangerous and frightening new paradigm. With the advent of 
“weaponized  
malware” like Stuxnet, all previous military and much diplomatic strategy 
has to  be comprehensively reconceived—and time is running out. 
I left Clarke’s office feeling that we are at a moment very much like the  
summer of 2001, when Clarke made his last dire warning. “A couple people 
have  labeled me a Cassandra,” Clarke says. “And I’ve gone back and read my 
mythology  about Cassandra. And the way I read the mythology, it’s pretty 
clear that  Cassandra was right.” 
Editors Note, March 23, 2012: This story has been modified to clarify  that 
the Natanz facility was only temporarily shut down and that the name  “
Esther” was only indirectly referenced in the Stuxnet  worm.


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